x. did a special on the future of u.s. turkey relations. the council on foreign relations hosted this event which also looked at the trump

administration's decision to withdraw u.s. troops from northern syria. good afternoon, everyone. i want to welcome you all to today's meeting on u.s. turkish relations, the shifting nature of two nato allies. i am currently the director of the international security program at george mason university, and it is a great pleasure too preside over todays discussion on the topic that i i think is particularly compelling. so, in our topsy-turvy world where we write love letters to authoritarians and publicly disparagee our allies, it's kind of interesting to think where does the u.s. turkey turkish relations in the spectrum from how we treat allies and authoritarians. it seems to fit into every category or maybe none coming

and maybe we will figure ou out today how special is the case of u.s. turkish relations. it's of course been a tumultuous relationship, one where the executive branch and congress don't always see eye to eye. is it fundamentally a security partnership or do we have a stake in turkey's democratic standing and if turkey is questioning its nato membership ands its evolving relationship with moscow, what should the united w states do and this is without even mentioning the incursion into northern syria and the decision by the united states to withdraw troops from northern syria so there is a lot going on in the u.s. turkish relations chap and i'm delighted thai amdelighted that we have te such excellent speakers today to join us and to try to make sense of it. professor of international relations at lehigh university where he also served for over a decade as the chairman of the ir department andde an adjunct senr fellow here in middle east studies at the council.

he served on the department of state's policy planning staff and currently is an active member of the board of trustees for the american university of iraq. and the senior policy adviser to senator jeanne shaheen of new hampshire but moved back and forth between the detail in the executive branch had served in the european bureau departmentov of state and spent some time on the atlantic council digital forensics researcht lab. very interesting project that looks at the digital dimensions of international relations, and to my immediate right is the founding director of the middle east program at the turkish program at the middle east institute and also an adjunct professor at gw. so, we decided to start with all three of our speakers giving their topline analysis of whether u.s. turkish relationships and what is the

current state of play. is it different than it's been in the past and where do they see it heading. so they will each speak for about two to three minutes on a very broad opening question and i think that we will start with you like to go first? >> thank you again for having me. you know, i know what's probably on everyone's mind right now is the current crisis and how our own government is going to deal with the sandwich i can say is i'm coming from the legislative branch and served for many yea years. the legislative branch has been pushing for some creative thinking, some new s thinking on u.s. turkey relations. obviously there are a number of different perspectives and congress both on the house and in the senate, but a lot of what you are seeing now is driven by a sense of frustration among senators and congressmen who felt, who feel for many years we have been turning a blind eye to

what they refer to as turkish data behavior much of it obviously focused on turkish president. i think from a little to going back to my time two years ago in the executive branch, i have to say i don't think that those in the executive branch do not feel that frustration i think they are very well aware of it, too, but there is more of a long-term thinking to what's going on with turkey and obviously there is a constant fear that if you push turkey or the turkish president too far in the surfer to an direction they will certainly go in that direction. i guess the main difference between congress and the executive branch on this issue is to the legislative branch in particular feels as though turkey iss already there in the clinches of russia. it's an authoritarian state and for the most part, we can't do

much while the turkish president is there to actually bring turkey back. so they arere looking at what sorts of examples does this setup in terms of our own relations with turkey and turkish relations with europe and so this is what is actually driving some of what you are hearing now when it comes to the sanctions though it isn't solely focused on the incursion into syria. this is a much broader conversation that has been halved for the last few years over some of the steps that turkey has taken. i will say there is something fundamentally different about the conversation that's taking place right now. even though i think the publicity anbook wascited in thh haven't always seen eye to eye on howgi to respond to turkey io think for the most part the legislative branch did dispersed to the executive branch for about a year in terms of how to do about thigo about this relatd how we should kind of deal with

turkey and this president. i think that since october 6 there has been a tangible change and i do think that what you are going to see is both republicans and democrats take a very stern turn and look at their own authorities to address some ofhe the issues that they feel are not being addressed by the administration now and added into this dynamic, and the democrats are a little bit more forward on this issue than republicans are not just extreme frustration with our own president and not being able to really decipher what the president of trump is trying to do with his relationships not just with this president had with other leaders who have a bit of an authoritarian bent. so, part of the discussion about sanctions and the response to turkey is also related to how do we respond to president of trump and what members of congress feel is just these open-ended relationships with authoritarians that don't really

tie back into the u.s. interest. interest. so they are trying to use what leverage they have and quite frankly in the legislative branch we have limited options in the sanctions have been to be one of those options. >> i think we will return to sanctions later but why don't we continue with this kind of topline big picture? >> she took the frustration on the hill and i think there's something to be said about the nature of the current crisis. the partnerships survived many in the past but i think this is certainly the most turbulent period the turkish-american relations and there's something different and i would like to talklk about several factors tht the relationship between the two countries conflict prone and difficult for them to solve problems. the number one problem here is the centralization of personalization of power. for the last decade we have seen a transformation of turkey from

in and starhim and start to bece institutional states to highly personalized one. all policymaking is very centralized in the presidential palace, so in the past, the united states u.s. policy sought to weather the storm during turbulent times by investing in institutions or regular government contacts but these things are not there anymore. he is a key figure and you would think thatma this would make things easier because you are dealing with one man turkey isn't saudi arabia or egypt. despite the centralization of power and authoritarianism and popular opinion, the election still matters to turkey and you are dealing with a public that is deeply anti-american. the things the u.s. is in decline and irrelevant so you

combine that opinion with a very personalized system in which there is no one that can put the brakes so you get turkey where the worldview and electoral considerations become decisive in the foreign policymaking and the second thing i want to talk about this the change in the turkish military. historically it has been set up in thiss relationship. it's been despite the very marginal pro- russia military it's always been very pro- nato, pro- united states and it was a very strong actor that hold the relationship from the ranks during these difficult times. but now, it's become very ideological. just recently, there were

turkish soldiers on their way to syria and they were flushing party signs and some of them said they were going to the land where the sun of islam grows, and this is something that you would never see before. so they've become very ideological and also it is a similar story that you are seeing here through the central command. it's very skeptical. ..ou

>> on nationalist policies. and this strained pushes towards confrontation with the united states. so the very strong anti- american narrative. and with that policy. so it seeks the relations through government contacts. because many of the problems that we see are booted from

turkey. >> so to step back a little bit and for the most part we all know that determines that relationship is to talk about location location location. the fact thatt turkey from that perspective from the soviet union. that's what happened. so that region of turkey has not disappeared. h still remains that you can see

that elsewhere in notion -ng - that notion elsewhere it is crucial to nato. to play a very important role. that said if location was the most important factor than that changed when the turks engaged because of that process and then a significant change here in washington if it was muslim country going to those democratic changes essentially is a model for the rest of the islamic world. so that's on the democracy side and that is a window of opportunity.

so now we are in that third space and i heard the other day general mcmasters say that turkey's geopolitical shift is one of the most significant strategic surprises of the last ten or 20 years. so there is a perception that turkey is going in another direction. and with the actions of the soviet union and putin from the fifties so it is russia even the united states or

maybe china but then i would argue this is not the case. turkey is not moving toward russia. it is making all kinds of deals with the soviets and so that relationship between russia and turkey that really this is about a new narrative from erdogan. he wants to see turkey as the leader i'm not sure of what but look at his pronouncements and you saw me last week in the new york times talking about the nuclear option.

he has been wanting to reform the un security council. of course he thinks turkey should be a permanent member of the security council. so you can see very ambitious and this is very much in line with the ideation of foreign policy. sometimes it is very aggressive. it's also very pragmatic. he knows how much toic push and when to stop pushing to make the deals and that you can be stopped. but the most significant aspect off his foreign policy is to make himself the most

important leader or even to upstage in the process he has completely personalized and he needs a message of that mobilizes people. in that critical part of the message has to recognize liberales democracies. him calling the europeans. and his buddy madero. all of these policies are designed for domestic and

basically they say turkey has one big enemy. >> thank you. we should follow up with two remarks on the domestic determines of the us turkish relationship another interesting piece in foreign affairs of the turkish desire to take over syria as a domestic reality of erdogan hold on power. >> i only argue that turkey's reaction must be seen as a backdrop president erdogan and in 2007 for instance the number one priority is because he had consolidated his power and in 2011 he could not play

a role because he was so vulnerable facing the opposition and then he would give away his power and saudi arabia saw the opportunit opportunity. so that shapes is priority in syria and in 2015 that priority changed because erdogan lost the majority party from the kurdish party and withr the 2015 elections to hold onto power he decided to deal with the country's internationalist known for the anti- kurdish dissent.

and so that was the kurdish nationalism. so these priorities and then in northern syria becomes the number one priority and then to the back seat. and then erdogan weakens the position and then those turkish actions and then turkey decided to end that position prior against the kurds and then it was closer with iran and with those regimes that were on the ground. and then to see that change with the recent local election that was huge blow to erdogan teenin teenine.

and then even lost again by a bigger margin. the number one reason is the chronic downturn but one of the top reasons with a presence to see increased seeingas back last - - backlash so that priority now talks esout that could have 3 million refugees. even as an urgent priority. in a recent talk he said we have to clear that area off the why pg elements because

they will make it difficult for us with a safe zone to send back the syrian refugees. 's even the narrative would shift.t so it isti still important but it is the number one priority. into northeastern syria last they are trying to do. >> it's not an exaggeration to say on foreign policy issues is an agitation so look at different parts of that

conversation. so how do you see those debates as a political struggle? >> that there are separate authorities with the executive and legislative. but the senate in particular and under democrats it happens even more in the house there is an effort to regain authority there is a push and pull for that reason.

and it does have a place in foreign policy is just a different type of place than the executive. but when president trump came in over issues regarding russia it was the overwhelming mistrust. there are some members of congress that are willing to talk about that than others. but it played out in 2017 when the legislation came forward. and then to put together a massive sanctions package not only enforces new sanctions and then to remove those existing sanctions.

so this shaped that current narrative of what is happening to the executive branch. so now you see that again. the legislative branch is mistrustful of president trump's intentions when it comes to turkey. they don't really understand what happened in 2018 when there was a phone call with erdogan and trump tweeted the troops to be withdrawn and they subtly don't understand what happened on october 6 when they basically saw that happen. and further many of these members of congress visited northern syria.

they went there when it was a stabilized region. but they very much feel like trump opened the door to have erdogan ruin that stability. and with people fleeing to iraq illustrate there are people there with whatever agreements of the united states and russia. and those with separate proposals. but initially what congressmen and women were trying to do and globally to reclaim the message they felt that they

don't feel like the turkish incursion is right. and that the president should not have done what he did but that initial package was meant to send out loud message now it is the deliberative message so the house will that pass and bring forward one of their sinks and proposals. and then as what would do next and mcconnell has already spoken on the floor. and then indicated to be very carefully put together. it's unclear that pathway forward but to say we have to

have a response. so whatever ends up happening that could pass in the senate. sumac in this complicated tdynamics and then more than two actors including russia. and is there this future of the syrianan kurds. and hat as that kurdish question has always been a part of the turkish relationship and what is the kurdish side of the story these daysor? >> this is a major setback and

everybody knows it. and in the united states in the mid-d- seventies. but in terms of understanding erdogan's actions that this was the wife the k security threat but so they never engaged but what you mention

is here erdogan realizes that one.and then had emissaries the head of the pkk in jail to if he could convince erdogan of the turkish kurds. and then to turkey and syria. and in syria. and then in the process to

create that functioning autonomous region in syria. and then once it is over and those kurds get autonomy that in of itself. so in that environment as they are seen as the enemy over time of what they really really want to do. but for many people that is an organizing principle.

to stop the syrian kurds. so what about the future of the kurds? they have been here before. and they will come back. it is always to step forward and one step back. over the years and they have made slow improvement. and yes theyce are displaced but nowur that the main and single

most problem is a kurdish problem. and then not where it really focusess on. but also the iranian kurds are looking and especially made the alliance with the united states. 's a fake one - - they said it was by the president not the government. but the assumption is that maybe things will go backnt to normal. but with that said there was that element between the pkk and the united states.

these are all small steps but that kurdish revolutions nationally. but chances are it will be autonomous regions but that is where this is going. >> now we will at the members join the conversation. today we are off the record. >> next week the house is

expected to pass under suspension of the rules resolution on genocide and to be a continuous part of policy toward turkey will you comment on that will this play into erdogan hands to rally the base to be reelected? >> you are right the house does have intentionste to move that. it's not the first time we have seen armenian genocide resolution but yet each time it infuriates the turkish government and the public but that being said another reason why it is happening right now on the hill over what they

just saw with northeast syria over time with pastor brunson and a number of other issues i do think there's a effort i won't necessarily the comment if that's a strategy that is shaping turkey's behavior but i do know it's on the radar and one of the reason why the hell wants to move on that measure. >> that congress uses this as a political tool to service the victims of the genocide. so bringing these issues to the table. >> it will play into the narrativeov of the government.

but remember erdogan he will make deals more than anybody has sent through the muslim white house. and with the famous johnson letter he took a long time to get overr it but this time they went to make a deal with trump. so yes he will be upset that he will live with it. >> i am from johns hopkins you make a m convincing casee for erdogan pragmatism he already has sea 400 which is a threat

and that is a done deal. how important is nato to erdoga erdogan? i'm not suggesting turkey should be kicked out but parenthetically the two beexamples where members of nato have been chastised and punished and for a few weeks in the summer of 75 in both cases they were denied intel. it might be a way to make clear to erdogan but my question is how important is nato? >> a variation is itor more likely nato would take action

or erdogan would say i am suspending my nato membership? >> i was going to say in my initiall comment i don't think erdogan wants to get out of nat nato. because turkey is not a member of nato he wants to make turkey one of the big powers of the world. so he plays the game. but then to see how far he can go. >> so there is still mistrust between turkey and russia so they trust each other just a few years ago, remember that

erdogan realized to withdraw the patriots. and in some ways recently just a few months ago the eastern mediterranean it is very important and the turkey russia partnership is not that type is not to the point we can talk to that i see the relationship is very fragile but to see that and russia is only where you are reporting from and the caucuses everywhere. so despite that close partnership and i don't

understand this it's one of the reasons why. >> to add to that but erdogan is pragmatic obviously that's a continued tool in the alliance with the number of nations that pay close attention to the domestic turn as well as the authoritarian action so as long as turkey is in nato it is a chip for erdogan to make sure others are not paying too much attention or expressing frustration with what he is doing in his own country but then look at turkey's actions they are a good nato partner

they are framing that mission in afghanistan i don't think this rhetoric about kicking them out we do have to be careful because even in this small choice time we have to be careful to hold onto those lovers that existt and nato is the premier love her and foundation to make sure that in the future a future turkey can maintain. >> i want to pick up two points the first is the tool but also the turkish public opinion against america. so my question is foreign-policy to me that our recent years can you comment on that and your thoughts

going forward? >> thank you. >> with sticks and carrots before this country we are currently in there has been distant on - - discussions in my opinion this outweighs the discussion on sticks if i can be so bold to say that's the reason right now as well but in terms of looking at other countries that might be true but with turkey there's always an effort to make sure we are not pushing them away and that somehow the united states really is in charge of making sure you can determine erdogan move but now there is a realization i that the country itself under erdogan is moving in a direction it's not the

country itself it's more than one man but erdogan is making these decisions. but i do sense that it won't be an exact replica of the bills you are thinking. >> you have to be careful with the sanctions. make sure you don't punish the turkish to be anti- american that will only strengthenn. erdogan. >> with the council on foreign relations can you reflect on the question i know it's hard to imagine turkey without erdogan but what do you think the state of relations would be between turkey and the united states without him?

because there was a good point about the domestic determinants of what is happening it strikes me that two years ago he was very proud of the way in which turkey handled the syrian refugee crisis. now a leading voice to push syrians back items taken that from the opposition it strikes me that we talk a lot about erdogan but is this turkey us problem or erdogan problem? >> look it is the us problem and it goes back decades but erdogan has amplified that and organized it and there are no

alternatives that view is completely dominant. that said turkey without erdogan he plans to be there through 2034. [laughter] it is far away but authoritarians are their own worst enemies. and they always make the mistakes that undermine them. if there is a small one and is symbol one - - instable but then in bolivia today and then

the change of turkeye will come maybe before 2034 with the kind of change of foreign relations. it will go back with the healthy dose of americanism but at the same time with that relationshi relationship. >> your question is important because we do have to think about what turkey will look like post erdogan and senators just want - - shaheen has said is not necessarily doing what we can at the unit one - - the united states that we have strong links to turkish civil society and looking at other segments to see where we can grow relations in the future. ndwe do that in other countries

for sure but it hasn't been strong in turkey without the usaid mission but looking at russia the turkish public was also anti- russian as well if you look at public opinion oulling they are not as anti- russian so look at what the kremlin is doing in turkey you can see there is a blueprint there we should have followed with their own public hdiplomacy initiatives and civil society reaching out. >> i don't think we could think about it post turkey because he's the most vulnerable. because of the syrian incursionn now the support for him is 40 percent but i think

it will be short-lived i could think of several scenarios where he could survive this in with the pkk it does not empower erdogan and somehow that turkish economy turns around but aside from that it is one of the reasons why the rest of the world has to engage your position so that what happens what does that .relationship look like? first a very personalized system and that's a big

problem. but if they are in power then they have to leave the institution. that takes the effort and time but these things will change. >> john negroponte wide comment and a question. the comment c is simply as the senators contemplate sanctions make sure that does not increase his popularity and not decrease. >> that what happened to the notion of a non- sectarian political state in turkey? said where are the remnants of comal is and where the strong

points? >> it is alive and well i assure you. bad it is dormant in the sense that because erdogan is so omnipresent and dominates everything that the element has been pushed out. ld they announced an important national event. turkish embassies will no longer serve alcohol. this is clearly an attempt of a legacy.

but the great problem of turkey that they are not democrats. they are the ones who back the military coups. so i hesitate to look at that as a panacea but that main opposition party is awful. they do not know how to win an election and they would still manage to lose it. so now it is an organized political movement as an idea about a little dormant. >> and that radical secularism an's not there anymore that

main opposition party if you look at the candidates so to incentivize those backgrounds coming from the conservative background but what has happened but now to be an alliance with erdogan islam the common denominator is nationalism so they are not completely against each other but it is the merging of the two ideologies to be very anti- western anti- american and anti- kurdish.

but then to focus on state power instead he just mentioned the liberal democratic ideology this is with the state power and one of the reasons why it's not delivered so those worst elements is nationalism and anti- kurdish but erdogan has all of those and now they are in the alliance. >> i am a correspondent here in town. moving to the eastern mediterranean outcome with this activity in this economic

sound cracks can you say the administration doing something to stop it and that would be enough. >> i think it goes back to the notion with erdogan, the united states and for erdogan and then that was yesterday what will you do for me today? and now he wants the military leaders. my sense is that there are two

problems. that he will push as much as he can and whether or not it may be an attempt or by erdogan himself to be uninhabited. but the point is i worry because every time he sees the west backing down he pushes the envelope. but what do we do? i m don't know. >> one more quick round we will do all three questions. >> how does erdogan view the difference between the united states with the congress and the president? because there seem to be a bit of a romance that they get out

of jail card. >> i would like the panel to talk more about the arrangements between russia and turkey and how that played out. thank you. >> another intersect between turkey and the us that recently has come out that giuliani was lobbying for the extradition and people forget that michael flynn was brought down for the work he was doing on behalf of that. >> thank you. >> let's each take one minute. >> this touches on both bad if air to one does not see trump as get out of jail free s card then clearly that's why he called him directly and every time he can bypass those in

the administration who has other opinions and congress has been concerned aboutho this. we have seen those reports as well that is part of a larger discussion w of the administration and who he surrounds himself with and the effect of those individuals on our foreign policy. there is a picture taking place on those matters. >> there was a question that was between turkey and russia and now that would be the why peg forces and that's where erdogan wanted but he also wanted a lighteryr zone but he

didn't want - - wider zone b he did not getil that. but also with that agreement turkey is one step closer to recognizingus the aside regime again. because that agreement that was signed inn98 1898 that says the beauty of the regime so they say that if you have problems at the syrian kurds then otherwise you stay away. in the short term i think it will be a short term solution. but in terms of american troops that could change everything but just today we heard n that the president is giving options to send them

back to syria to those sacred oilfields but if t that happens that would only strengthen the kurdish hand with their negotiations with their regime and russia but it will not benefit syria. >> with russia essentially he plays a three stage game with turkey and the rest of nato. that's one of the goals he started to do that earlier. and this is what they don't realize and very much for all

of syria to take turkey into his hands and this is to be expected the next move from russia is in terms of more refugees erdogan run one against united states but lost againstt russia but there are allch these lobbyist who had been trying to get extradited but they have not sent of what you could use because into those files.

>> we have run out of time please join me to thank our. panel. [applause] thank you for coming. [inaudible conversations] al offs

from michigan, southern california, and new york city.