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saturday american history tv, documents american story, and on sundays, book tv bng you the latest fiction books and authors funding for "c-span2", from these television companies and more, including tonight the world has changed today in the fast reliable internet connection is a big hundred something nobody can live without the wow is hard for us from customers in the speed and reliability i value and choice, in number than ever, it all-stars with the internet. >> wow, along with these television companies, support "c-span2" as a public service to members we got sebastian bellamy the author of five books including the new york times bestseller, more money than god, hedge funds in theun making of a new elite in. the men who knew, the life and times of - we spent in his life has been published in various publications including foreign affairs, we had planned taken, the anwashington post, the financial

times we spent two years as contributing editor. in the power of law, venture-capital the making of any future, they tell the story of the dominant inter- capitol firms, and how the strategies in space have shaped the path of innovation and global economy. and next we have philip short any has written several definitive biographies including now, a life in anatomy of nightmare in a taste for entering the multiple - eddie worked as a journalist the bbc for 25 years as a foreign correspondent in moscow, beijing and washington dc and rough of the economist in the times of london. and the first comprehensive fully up-to-date biography of vladimirto putin, into the tumultuous saga of rush over the last six years.

and next we have michael buckley it is leading expert the balance of power between the united states and china, michael beckley and the other two books and multiple award winning articles, he has associate professor at dusk university and on present senior fellow at the american enterprise institute he had previously been an international security fellow at harvard school of government, kennedy school of government. and "danger zone: the coming conflict with china" co-authored he provides a provocative and urgent it analysis of the u.s. china rivalry. last but not least we have meenakshi ahamed morning india and enjoyed a varied career working at the development consultant journalist, and a foreign correspondent for new delhi television base in london. she has written articles written

in the asian wall street journal and washington post and cnn in the atlantic monthly and in her book "a matter of trust: india-u.s. relations from truman to trump" she draws on the presidential papers, really declassifiedre documents to my memoirs interviews to reveal the prejudices and securities and political imperatives that so often casting a shadow over this vital relationship with other turn it over to the panel. [applause] [applause] >> braided think you for the introduction and so when into good delivery of three books very different subject, i understood immediately that thesee authors united and untila bit divided but what they write about and one india and one in china one on russian okay so

these countries part of that - india china south africa but there are actually smaller than the differences and if you think about having will you thought that russia and china was supposed to have $2000 per capita in india around 2200 some looked as of the sort of 5x and four and half x difference and you have three countries which are indeed japan of different interests in the incidents trinity and to authoritarian governments in the democracy and you have to members of the security council of the un, india to his disappointment as not among the group a permanent member so i was thinking about how to nip this group together that sort of take this creativity. barriers and exciting the mess and i both come up and when i

came across was a sort of michael's book, where he says white sort of clearly and without much i was a provocation that the united states does not have a xi jinping problem, it has a china problem was tenant tempting as it might be to press that foreign policy clash, in space because this foreign - is a bad guy and is wrong and individual leaders normally embody differences which are kind of hard wired into the dna of the countries they lead so i want to get to with all of these different countries come up if that is true, when you have tension between the united states and other 101 hand india, the other hand russia, thirdhand you have three has, and you have china is because of personalities or something

deeper. michael you provided something and i'm going to come be percent xi jinping has kind of wrecked off this addition of leading following tenures and a collective fashion and an sligt was what you nonetheless believe that they are back in china when it looks at china, is not just about one person. >> will i think that and fourthly, the united states has both china and a xi jinping problem ways a broader issue with china offers to be lookout the administration about you think a lot of the policies we are concerned about today, the ethic missourie buildup, china has been churning out ammunition had warships we have not seen for many countries as world war ii. a lot of the domestic questions can laying the foundation for what we are seeing some people call digitalf authoritarianism n theat system that uses artificil

intelligence with hundreds of millions of cameras as well as more expansion of policy economically so the precursor to what we now call the thousand year olds initiative for china has lent out more than a trillion dollars, mostly to full countries to build mainfrastructure from a demand r china's exports and that begins actually in the last few years and a lotd of it can be traced back to 2000 income a financial crisis because the really jeopardize china's rise and they've been selling into openun market in the united states and europe and in japan we have the huge financial crisis, suddenly from that drops in realizes it will face more protectionist and essentially more hostile whole world and so to get out in front of that's coming china has directed what is now this vast internal security efforts on a broad and in ay big way economically and also looking for ways to consolidate control of the territories of the claims which

includes taiwan as well as roughly 80 percent of the eastern south china sea so you can ashley see avoid the book we try to show this start under whose administration and hunted ministration and xi jinping has certainly accelerated many of these damages that we saw in 20 party conference was striking and especially putin essentially walked of the proceedings and so that shows that xi jinping himself that we think that the system sorta selects these type of leaders the whole system and if you look back at china's history, look for a leader with these type of qualities it seems to about his work with xi jinping i'm a it would be a mistake that based on the scene that you get different personalities and play, we don't think it was radically altered china's long-term trajectory as well as the policies pretty. >> and the china and u.s. what you see right now, in front of it is generated by the u.s., hardening of the u.s. - towards china. when you make the same claim thatly really about something

about what the u.s. huntress is at least two more aggressive start incredibly tied to personalities with her be that of trump or somebody else. >> i think trump blow the lid off of the american engagement of china really dreading hundred dramatically shooting towards a hired at harvard containment policy but i think that momentous that had been building for years and even in the second half of the obama administration of the just become exasperated by what they felt was just an uncooperative after and a lot of it just make sense sort of geopolitics 101, and a very oipowerful country to look to constraint the rise of a potential competitor and i shall think american china policy would have gotten more hostile earlier had it not been for you if you sort of bleeding circumstances and in the '90s, the cold war has ended and everything to democracy and capitalism urges widespread were

in there for a moment of member when george w.t bush was running for president, he started to talk about china as a strategic competitor and planned to get much more aggressive with china the 911 happened suddenly the united states needs china's cooperation, not to screw things up and human security council to warrant poorly of his trouble any sage with the united states will be bogged down in the releases of the united states is distracted strategically i think thatvi provides china with attorneys themselves have coded 20 year opportunity to build up their own national power north of the united states has shifted its focus back towards great power competitions using the emergence of what i think was unfortunately, •-ellipsis policy that we see all too often in international history. we have these great powers competing for influence. >> so let's try to reply to the same question that recently the u.s. has been upset and

disappointed because this in india has declined to come down on the u.s. and leaving russia ukraine invention. invasion prayed egg as you would argue that reading your book coming the generation very tricky u.s. relationship over the past 70 years and there's something deew these two countries interact with served bigger than that. >> so indiaas case, i would arge that when the war ended in india gained its independence, india had a unique issue which is having come out of the colonialism and he had had no intention of letting up with another western power. they opted for nonalignment and theyhe did not what i wanted toe able to be free to develop their foreign policy based on india's

erstrategic interest. that was universally embraced by everyone in the indianst establishment that was a congress party or the opposition and having said t that, whatever you have a country that's emerging. i think thatof you would find tt the personalities of the leadership, usually has a pretty significant place in pretty significant role has a stamp of the country whether vitamins before russia, we have a russian expert here you know if you look at that installing, they had a pretty significant impact on the country. in theit same with india and you can look at indonesia go down the list of newly independent countries etc. so i think that

yes, newlyes emerging country i think the leadership and ntpersonalities do play a fairly prominent role and had a vision for india andpo there was a very illiterate country at that time. so we do have a strong role in the did have relations you refer to that was because this is country especially on truman was very much with us or against us and india's policies have nonalignment was a thorn in the side of their relationship. so i led to some pretty deep seated misunderstandings between the two countries from the beginning to one of the fine details that you would learn if you read this book, i recommend all of these books and in truman

was a fancy dresser with issues but his diplomacy was somewhat elegant and he said he could smell the - was a communist. >> will there is this famous incident where supreme court justice douglas go every summer would go off on vacation in truman discovered that he wasmm going off to anyone summary and saidid i hear you're going to india and ime want you to go off meet mr. narrow and the justice douglas says, okay yes mr. president and so he was sitting in the chair where you are sitting had i can tell you that he was - he said he is a communist and i can smell a communist a mile away as we go subcommittee and he meets him and he spends many dinners with

him and he's an intellectual is written many books and with law school in think yet on very well and they discussed india constitution framing evidently comes back he said mr. present a says i met him and he is no more economy than you are i and present truman just erupts into this furious and he said that he just refuses to believe him. it has melted down as of the justice douglas rising these diaries which i found in the archives and he said you know, it was like blowing into the wind, there's just nothing that you could do to convince as man that you know what men like narrow was not a communist and he just deleted nonalignment, that is all so to answer your question about about - is a big geopolitical shift taking place in the world as we we all know containment of china and the reason in those days despite the

problems the west did support india because it was seen as a front-line say because chineseis communist expansion as of today were back full-circle and we are still saying the front line and the chinese expansion and of course economic foreign is a greater threat ten they have often now, watching the balance take place were russia is lining up with russia the traditional allies lining up with the chinese and russia and showing it to be a rather week ally and so they have decided to put their eggs in the u.s. basket i don't want to take up too much time. >> celeste just apply the same question to the russia and as opposed to putin would be regarded as you know, exhibit a

if you were drawing up a list or individuals to released on his mark on the global order and sort of his will becoming a monitor czar. do you think he would be the exception of michael's rules. >> no, i don't think he's an exception and one thing thatg i've been struck by is listening to both of you talking is in the case of china and of india, so specifically is to forge their policies. the united states of w lewis has its roles to play and it takes two to tango in each of those relationships that is also true russia russia is a bit of a special case because the soviet union collapsed in 1991 the kind of while two possible directions in theory at least in russia could have become as was

initially believe that it would become much more democratic and liberal. and much more friendly to us much more reasonable relationship for it could become reverse adversarial relationship which had the soviet times. and you ask about whether putin and i would say a lot of what we have now, the foundations for it, were laid back in the 1990s when it was bill hundred philip us and it was bill clinton and boris yeltsin, couple of power holders. in putin has built from that which suggests the know, it was not putin who did all of this stuff, is a much deeper historical trend. and bill burns who is now the cia chief, he was ambassador in moscow in a very good u.s.

ambassador to moscow and he wrote his memoirs that kind of a train rock between the u.s. and russia was building into the equation from the start because america the delusion that russia would neatly follow the course that america set. the u.s. led rules -based americass called the and russia would be part of that. and russia the illusion that the united states would accept it as an equal and neither of those were ever going to happen. but it did not have to lead to the kind of challenges that we have today with a war in ukraine. that iss very much a tribute to putin, differently or would've probably done different things. ... we're in. but putin played a pretty important part in it, too.

but maybe just to go back with, one more question, philip, about the bill and boris. i mean, what i remember is, you know, bill clinton going out of his way to, bring russia into the what was the g7 and became the g8, a big effort from washington to prevent the collapse of. russian financial markets before august 1998, which failed and they did collapse into a big devaluation. but i think there was a rounds of assistance before, the collapse suggesting that there a desire from suggesting there was a desire for helpful. so, tell a story the u.s. did its best as it did with china when brock tried to give russia a chance to be part of the western tribe and the rest they didn't take a break works you

cannot make that case. it's very much the question is the glass half full or empty? the way the russians of some of the west gave them just enough aid so that they did not revert to communism. talk about 1998 i could talk about 1996 and there standing for reelection. and was terribly sick, terribly unpopular. they really had to make enormous efforts of gerrymandering, all of the things people do to try to win elections when they are very much behind. and they controlled the media. at that time, yes the west didn't warrant a little bit of money to help. but it was never enough the first deputy prime minister the guy who formulated economic policy, if you could give us

just half as much again would probably be able to take off and really establish a market system. but you don't. there are aow lot of visitors in russia about the way things did not go right. giving you one side of it there is a nether side which many people in the west believed which has a lot too it. owrush it was so dysfunctional f you pour in the money is just going down a black hole so there's no point. that was an argument for the late 1990s most ordinary russians felt they had been cheated by this cup from the west. there is even a plan and will

not repeat it. [laughter] the democracy which is exploited rather that seek be over. initially tried to make harmonious relationship with the westward south for reasons we can subtly discuss later. reasons that came from both sides from the russians very much as h well. i have another question for michael. which is, exactly title of his book, things about russia is that a declining power economically it has been to make a lot of geopolitical noise. the story with china the conventional story is that it's not the decline which is what you see in russia economically

is precisely the opposite, it is the rise in china that create the potential clash. klein story is dangerous. right is dangerous. you have a story, please explain. >> we characterize china as a peaking power at this point. it is coming off of more than 30 years of rapid growth. now its economy is slowing it's getting more pushback internationally. my co-author, rachel brand, is a leading historian john hopkins distributes go back to history with every powers. they do not mellow out and the rise to come to an end. they go out to try to rekindle their rise as well as to try to accomplish long-standing national goals while deception. it is the rise followed by the

fear if they do not take decisive action in the short term they are going to be doomed to longer-termon declines. russia is one of her cases. we note that in the 2000 russia was a resurgent power banging out 8% economic growth rates every year largely because of high oil and gas prices. then after the 2008 financial crisis went oil and gas prices plummet and break down pollutants popularity in the russian economy along with it,t first of all sorts clamping down domestically. also he starts putting pressure on former soviet states to join what eventually is called the eurasian union party wants him become economic vessels of russia as a way to rekindle or shore up both russian wealth status and power. and the ukrainians a big part of their country says thanks but no thanks. we are actually much more interested in aligning with the westio essentially sending us a

massive trade deal with the european union. we know how that tug-of-war ultimately played out. we go through these historical cases we look at roughly the last 15 years of chinese foreign policy finding rising power tend to be peaceful. everything is going in their direction once you up in the applecart if you're gaining prestige countries and free felt like the soviet union in the late 1980s they tend to be peaceful they have no other option after basically sell out. they built out formidable capabilities it has puffed up their egos and expectations. they are looking at a future of closing the windows opportunity in opening windows ofey vulnerability. they tend to be the prime movers and shakers. they are catastrophic we argue germany started world war i in large part it's worried it's about to get crushed in a russian and french vice with an assist from britain. we note why did the japanese attacked the nicest of pearl

harbor? wasfe it because they're super confident about their ability to defeat defeat the states, no. if they did not make decisive moves in the short term they're going to a lot of trouble in the longng time. even if china doesn't go in and review the catastrophic examples are so many other moderate examples of which turned out purely well. these countries become more prickly and aggressive as well as i impressive effects you are arguing that it is this decade in which some kind involving china is the most likely. was when they were rising in the facet won't be in the future when they stagnate properly it's right now. the greatest geopolitical catastrophes ambition and desperation. so, this leads to the obvious question, what probability do you ascribe to ministry conflict between the u.s. and china by 2030? next major power war is always a

pretty rare and not very probable thinker if you ask a question maybe five years ago i would say maybe a 1% chance on a war over some of my title i bumped up to double did 10 -- p15% really fresh meat may not set high probability that i play w a lot of poker. i can't say how many and submitted 90% favored and lost all my money. these things can happen but because we're talking about what could rapidly escalate to essentially a massive potential nuclear between the two most powerful countries in the world, even at 10% of the risk of something like taiwan is way too high. into your points the reason is called danger zone was not a piggyback on tom cruise and maverick. it's more because we tend to think about the u.s./china rivalry is a decades long marathon. there's a best-selling book called the 100 year marathon were each side has ears to get

its house in order. the xo were the sharpest phase of this conflict will be a 10 year sprint given all the headwinds that china faces quickly just militarily but economically as well as spread through aspects of the systemin internationally. next this how they can be heaved, obesity the united states based on how fast they are growing, have they gone through growths and now they're and it is dangerous. i just wonder the policy the u.s. is engaging in which goes back to george w. bush and the acceptance of nuclear power. the other would be geopolitics from a u.s. perspective, we are

word about china, india is a democracy, india speaks english, india has nice tech people we like. let's hope for huge indian growth. this will be a counterbalance to china. but if you take the view countries with populations north of 1 billion people grow very fast ultimately -- inevitably want a share of the power of the global system. as a member of the un security council. that could end up being the kind of error we feel we madeou vis-à-vis china by brandon as the debbie geo. thought arising try to integrate the system, it may be might grow very fast and be more of a rival and a friend or do you think it's too negative?

well, they tried to make india a member of the security council but china blocked it. so way back with khrushchev actually way back in 1955 had suggested they should nominate india he thought that was a step too far, that was nott necessar. he thought there would be all kinds of resistance at that point india did not think it was ready. obama as you well know sort of came to india and made an announcement saying they're going to try to propose india. there is a lot of pushback from china. and so they knew they could not get it through. i think the intention was to let

the indian public know and let the indian bureaucracy no that the u.s. was on their side. and it was very much in favor of having india and the security council. andy stern is coming up to be the g20. it is a temporary position. but if you saw what happens, it's taken a pretty active role internationally now and india has a lot ofs power. it's got a seat at the high table at the global high table is taken as a serious country partly because it has become economically a force in the world. and its membership in the quad is made also a powerful player. and initially president xi, maybe not him about his foreign minister several years ago at a

first meeting a few years ago said this is like foam is going to disappear into the sea the quad is not an important instrument they pooh-poohed the idea. today there calling the quad eastern nato. they are finding it rather a threat. so now they are taking it quite liseriously. the quad has become a slightly more aggressive counter to china. i think the u.s. is building up the quad. and i think between australia, japan are on board with it as a counter. where it goes in the future i think india is hedging its bets to be quite honest. this is what someone called the

most dangerous place on earth. everyone is nuclear armed. >> back to what you're saying earlier, you've come out of colonization traumas as you're with us or against us and stay tuned either. there could be a repeat of that, right? >> after what happened last week in the g20 and after what happened in the shanghai cooperation last month where moody came out frankly and criticize russia quite strongly. i do not see how india can say is not aligned anymore. so i think they seem to be fairly clearly in the western camp right now. now, with russia even though they have come out quite strongly against the war there still 90% they are dependent on russia. they have diversified their

military down to 60% now. the new sales are not coming u.s.europe or the but it takes a long time to diversify your military hardware. it takesd years. for all thehe old military thats still russian made, 90% is still russian. now i am wondering, rush is having trouble supplying its own spare parts for the ukraine or. and i mentioned this earlier to michael, they turned to china to help them out. and china said no. there's a lot of geopolitical shift going on in that region right now. i think china is also saying. >> if you want to on your expertise on russia and china because you write the biography and selling more recently that's

talent,. [inaudible] [laughter]i i guess i had that in my head. i was in the wrong era. but traditionally one argument that used to be made in contrasting stolen and. was russia had a doctrine of global revolution and therefore was ideologically committed to spreading trouble abroad, china did not. now we are in an amendment were china'spe willingness to focus appears to have evaporated or qualified by a desire to be more dominant region. do you agree that was a valid

ideological distinction to make during the cold war and how do you see that now? >> i think partly valid. do not entirely agree he saw china very much as a kind of revolutionary beacon beaming out to the rest of the world that would inspire revolution everywhere else. that's not the same having the common form and network of quite powerful communist parties which the russians have. it was not black and white put it that way. i've been very struck what you just said. geopolitical shifts. we are all talking about china, me about russia. there is a broader picture. we have entered a period for the geopolitical givens of the last 30 years are changing and we are

really going into unchartered waters. part of the reason is the relative strength of the united states has declined. i think relative back in 1968 you had 40% of world gdp now it otis 24%. which means other countries have gotten stronger, china honestly, india, that is a process which going forward is going to stop. these challenges to american domination. and fundamentally what we are seeing in ukraine is a challenge by russia to american domination in europe. american leadership if you would like in europe. the chinese, the indians as well have a certain sympathy with this. and so does most of the global south. they wouldat rather have a largr say in things which means the

united states ought to listen to them more. that europeans ought to listen to them more. they will eventually be a much more multi- part of the worlds. it is within context we are all talking about our individual areas, problems and conflicts and everything else. but the next 10 -- 20 years of putin says that notis everything he said is wrong, it's going to be very dangerous and unpredictable. not just because of what he is doing in ukraine because they hold chessboard is changing. >> yes. and in some ways you could say that if cold war is starting. youo, see the u.s. imposing an embargo on the export ofmi advanced semi conductors to china. semi conductors are so essential to modern industrial economy it's kind of like an energy embargo. if you look at the numbers which

i happen to do for some reason recently, and you look at total natural gas exports before the invasion of ukraine the total size was 16 of the china's size of chinese semiconductor imports. very much bigger dollar business and natural gas and we see how much damage putin has done to the colonies in western europe by putting in embargo on the export of natural gas. for theto u.s. to say china will not get any more advanced semind conductors are pretty big deal. and coming off the summit just recently biden said we are not in a cold war with china. but if you actually look at the walk he's walking at the talkies talking it does feel like a cold war. maybe michael wants to comment on that with his expertise in china. quick similar budget brought that up. i've actuallyri been surprised w

little news coverage there has been paid to me this is essentially a cycle of economic warfare by the niceties on china. china spends march import computer chips than it does to import oil. think of how many aspects of our lives depend on high-end computer chips. and so for the united states to not only prohibit china from accessing these chips but also no real possibility to build them itself, could be a devastating blow for the chinese economy and no amount diplomatic summitry can squelch that out. so to me this is a huge offense of not just interesting but terrifying to see how china decides to respond to this. they have spent more than $100 billion make their own domestic semiconductor industry. i think china has no prospect of being able to catch up just simply because no single country i think can produce these chips

by themselves. not even the united states. united states is completely dependent on the dutch to make the machines and only the dutch can make for their completely dependent on taiwanese to do the final manufacturing of those high-end ships for their depend on parts of south korea and japan. so how is china going to make up for all of that it just does not seem possible. think it is notable that despite spending than $100 billion, china's national champion inn this area makes king peter chips about his cutting-edge as they flip phone. it's going to be externally difficult for china to close the gap. but that actually worries me the chinese have made very clear an assault on china's economy is basically an assault on the ccp on the whole power which justifies a whole range of options where they don't have to just respond the economics they can respond in a number of. othr ways. i am worried because in our book was noted that history of u.s./japan relations the 1930s when unisys cuts japan off from

oil the japanese say oh, i guess we will abandon our empire and east asia. we end up with pearl harbor. it is very worrying to see how china will respond. when i see his economic warfare. >> dimension to this policy which is can the u.s. keep its allies on board around the semi conductor embargo? specifically as michael is saying you need holland to be your ally they have got the best company and that is the one those machines with which you engrave under the wayfarer, so you need the japanese union the south koreans in the taiwanese. these are key economies in terms of the supply chain for semi conductors. now, when the u.s. was trying to set your with this or you are against us in a cold war to be

our allies a lease instrument marshall plan. alisa truman was a president who decided with the creation of the gaps. setting up a system of international alliance including nato. means is not standing on its own. your with us or against us. it's more like 50% not 40% u.s. is superstrong. super cognizant of the need to have strong alliances. now the question today in the skit slightly into thens u.s./india relations is if the u.s. wants to get strong alliances to back it up in this embargo and it needs the taiwanese and dutch and so forth to beom outside, as it have to o something terms of trade access or other economic cooperation. he could not say to the dutch to

give up on the chinese market working a zero extra american market access. you cannot say that to taiwan. india and its historic bumping up against the u.s. in terms of the trade policy rep intellectual a property rights t can become a bit of. >> and is definitely had a very difficult trade can i actually asked a question on the issue. initially the wholeha concept ws

the trading partners to prevent wars in the future. that was the hold theoretical concepts have some interesting comments. we have discovered now is not necessarily the case. especially with china. most country now we're in the terrible terrible conflict situation i love to hear from michael and from you what you might think about that and where we are and where the future

lies.' locks on trade it doesn't look very good, does it? everyone's drawing in their horns. i think that is a part of the difficulty that we are moving into. people are reassuring as the new are, they want toon rely less on globalized supply lines. whether that is actually, i think one can in the way look at the globalization that occurred rather sectional situation. some steps back from that perhaps not as bad as it seems. we move forward in the future. is very speculative area there to tiny things i like to pick up. one from you. sebastian talked about a new cold war, i really have to

disagree. one of the jewels of the cold war this relates a little bit to trade. one of the essentials of the cold war was an ideological is very little ideology now. domestic consumption is a spin this is a war between good and evil ideology does not figure that much but it's much more in the case of ukraine military and more broadly about economics. you should china's pushing back i don't like the british or the french who were hanging on for permanent for the membership counsel went i was

just chinese others have their interest too. parks rethink the portrayal the complication u.s. and china has something to do with ideology? parks i do think we tend to downplay the ideological component of u.s./china rivalry. they say they're not really evangelical power. they don't really care if other countries adopt many chinese systems. could be more talker sees in the world. to criticize the chinese commerce party for its own methods. and second if china can make democracies look shambolic and chaotic and corrupt, than the chinese people are less likely

to want to emulate those systems. it will be more likely to say hey, you are right. you should have aso hierarchical well society work everyone knows their place and there's lawn order. especially over the decade is been amazing the extent to which xi jinping has made loyalty to the party's critical to every aspect of life in china. have a political commissar on staff. whose role is to sit ideology. people the chinese government to send 15 the idea that somehow this is not an ideological regime strikes me as a bit odd. convert united states certainly will deal with talker sees.

but the united states a product of our comfortable and a world where there's more democracies for the exact mirror image reasons for china. you're seeing this playing out not just in that un over conceptions of human rights. to what extension we prioritize the individual which is what the united states months. are the community or the group. you can trounce on some individual rights for the betterment of the group. takes a very different position. but in terms of support for various regimes are on the broker china has been funneling not just loans but technology surveillance systems to help them clampdown on their populations. and so i think fundamentally there's a strong strong ideological component. x exacerbates it rivalry. the chinese and we now know that some documents that leaked out. notf just that xi jinping error but supposedly united states of uss china relations where those

leaders. they literally said to his comments in this internal meeting clinton just told me you nice it's want to engage us but do not be full by that point whether they called an engagement strategy or containment strategy. what they want is to change us. they went out regime to change to become a democracy. that we effectively lose our iron grip on power for it will never ever let that happen. were not going to do stupidd gorbachev move and open up and look how that turned out in 1989. the berlin wall falls because of gorbachev. we face the square and we roll e tanks into the streets we are here and on our way to become the dominant country. in their minds is a natural experiment that justifies their ideology. and accentuates the ideologicalr aspect. >> i'm going to ask a slightly different kind of question but also to get questions from you guys. so if anybodydy has one we've gt one right away.

>> my question is for the entire panel. with the rise of authoritarian countries like russia, hungary, belarus,s, china, north korea vietnam do think the weight the u.s. should be to this crisis of authorityy relations by embracig western values and gay rights women's rights freedom of religion freedom of the press. they are all inun all those countries. >> yes, i guess. i'm very reluctant towh take a black and white view. the rates we hold dear in the west in the united states to have republicans who would not agree with a lot of what you just said about these being important freedoms.

that is why i kind of hesitated. we have to stick to our absolute core values. basic freedom, freedom of the press, the rule of law, economic freedoms. be on that we get in the culture wars pretty quickly. chinese will be happy our democracy looks a mess doing a pretty good job of making a mess ourselves. yes, core values. that is what we should really stick too. do either of you want to comment?r >> got three people or four people behind you. take the next one. ask my question is forin mr. beckley. the rear book which is

excellence. everything we hear about, how great the chinese are in solon. how they do have problems along the way. now we heard from the russians how great their communication service was. how great their army was. and we have seen the merge. they built an enormous military but they have never fought against a power like the united states or even when it's well armed like taiwan. do you have any ideas or do you have any information about how they really consider the effectiveness. >> no one is going to beha doing

the majority of the finest combat experience they have not fought in the major war since 1979. they also recognize and live in a different era. pla china's military is awesomely corrupt organization. to move up the ranks there have been massive rivalry et cetera. xi jinping when it came to power in late 2012 he disdain for the pla he sent it has become fat bloated corrupt organization. he purged many top level leaders he would afteret retired leaders and through some of them in jail some disappeared. he pumped a lot of money into it you seen on paper satellite photos of china during bombing runs full-scale mockups of basis and american aircraft carriers. they've been training quite a bit the sun the same as combat. when you time to who proved you

go through a sledgehammer ticket big part of the leadership attends andec imprisoned during force. the prime directive of everyone in the military becomes not tous tfight wealth but to show the telling us what they want to hear. i think xi jinping should worry is military on paper will perform how the russian military performed. i don't know for gets that information for that reason. dictators tend to fall into echo chambers. whether there's top level discussion outsider like me can get their hands on certain documents and textbooks that are in chinese military category. i really don't think that gets filtered up to the top level leadership. which is why don't think weau cn assume a bit rushes performed badly thatsh china will say conquest is really hard. maybe we should lay all i want.

i worry that will drive other lessons like rental of the nuclear saber loud and clear. bank of embryo of a country and discount the weaknesses of the military. another question? >> mr. short, could you say something please about the origins regarding brexit they do the counter moves how effective aree they? >> the case and brexit is easier for me too answer. i don't think there is any significant meddling. there is a littlee indirect. the british managed to shoot themselves in the foot without any help from russia. [laughter] in your case, and the three key

2016 the margins are pretty small. did potenza meddling swing votes towards trump or did the democrats perception -- make voters perception mobilize themm lmore? it could have worked both ways. we tend to not look at the other side of that. the possibility trump association may have rebounded against him. it's really as i find it outsider impossible to judge. don't think would believe it would succeed.

i think you can say he'd gotten such a terrible job as that. whether he moved from votes, i don't think anyone is actually going to be able to prove it one way or the other. but 2021 i don't that there great deal of interference. managing such a grand job in your selves of messing up those elections. it's better he stay away and did not get involved. just never change, never accept democratic rule that somehow built into their culture.

>> the chinese case i do not buy that. just looke at taiwan and the people of chinese heritage. they are one of the most flourishing democracies in the entiree world. one of the many reasons they want to destroy taiwan is his counterexample to the whole narrative. 1.4 billion people. one thing i would say is after they square massacre the chinese regime relates communism was not going to cut it as an ideology for the people. as develop a new and nationalist narrative centered aroundnt the century of humiliation from the mid- 1800s to 1949 china gets

ripped apart by imperialist powers and collapses in on itself. look, ccp we are the ones that recovered china from the horrible catastrophe. we have to hold together as a nation because we are in a dangerous and dark world. all these other great powers are out to get us. that narrative, with my chinese friends and so many other aspects of life are very open, globalize they study chinese students. you bring up some of these issues the regime has characterized and they can quickly become a much espousing that. i think there is a certain strategic culture developed in the country. precise look at the states. >> what about the russians? >> may i briefly at something? >> i agree with what you said. i think there are historical and cultural continuities which you have to take into account in both china and in russia.

taiwan sent apples and oranges. they are in a very special situation with a lot of american support. and influence. i thinkto what one can say is is not going to happen overnight. it's going too be extremely slow process. we took a long time to get to the democratic societies. same with russia if you talk to young russians very much like young frenchmen young germans young americans. they are very open minded. but there is a historical overhang to expect democracies going to come about in russian tenures time 15 years time.

going to take longer than that because of the weight of the past and the strength of the russian culture. >> not in my lifetime. >> last question that will wrap it up. next line question is. [inaudible] right now we are at war with russia, with china who knows what will happen. we are in competitionti wit china. they are pushing out of asia. it seems to me people on the street are not familiar that we are really at war. >> maybe i will take that.

it's always very hard to quantify i think that in thes case of russia the train or is pretty well understood think with china the general drift, when i write off into the "washington post" about china a lot of people think she read them. people are preoccupied with china as the main rival in the world. submit a huge deal. warner setting the narrative.

[applause] >> thanks everyone. theutut author will be autograpg books at the end of the hallway. the next session. >> you are enjoying a book tv cited for our newsletter is the qr code on the screen to receive the schedule of upcoming programs, author discussions book festivals and more. both tv every sunday on cspan2 or anytime online apple tv.org. television for serious readers. c-span is a free mobile app featuring your unfiltered view of what is happening in washington alive and on-demand. keep up with the day's biggest events of live streams of floor proceedings and hearings from

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