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join us in celebrating these typically engaged inspiring young minds as they share their opinions on the issues that are important to them and affect our world. academics discuss china's diplomatic efforts across africa, latin america and in asia. this is an hour. ♪ ♪ ♪ >> welcome back e so glad to wee everyone to our first panel for this conference.

and what we are going to do with this first panel is really lay out some of the broader themes and dynamics around china attenc focus to the global south at this moment where we are clearly at an inflection point in the global order, look a bit of what are china's goals,hose goals, and whathi we think it's likely china will achieve those goals, what will its success be. we could not hav a better group to kick us off it first panel. so let me introduce them very briefly. i won't go through their full y virtual program and they're very impressive bios. which is give a quick introduction of each panelist now. we have on the screen here bilahari kausikan, chairman of the middle east institute at the national university of singapore. we have next to me paul nantulya, research associate at the africa center for strategic studies at national defense

university. dege rolland a sadistic michelle in cell in china studies of the national bureau of asia research. and on the screen joining as from beijing is michael schuman was a nonresident senior fellow with the global china hub as well as a contributing writer for the atlantic magazine. so i i should just say at thee audience questions for the last ten minutes of our panel today, and audience members cant submit questions via ask■. so we will get to that at the end. please feel free to jump in and ask questions. what were going to do is jump into our moderated discussion for the rest of the conference. we won't be have any open marks. w free-flowing conversation. what i want to start off with is really a question for you, just very broadly why is beijing so interested in the global south to begin with?

>> thank you very much for having me today, it's good to be and to focus on such important questions for a couple of days. interest in the global south and what we call the global south is not new. it dates back to decolonization movement. over time it has evolved obviously during the reform and opening period of china's in focused on economic developments and getting resources, raw material from the developing world, and also using it as a way to asphyxiation eight taiwan's diplomatic space. but for the past ten years really what has changed is a vision that's much more strategic, much more comprehensive, that is looking at multi domains starting with the economic one, and interest in developing the markets for

its companies and the diplomatic area, trying to build coalitions with the t developing countes and international institutions to align with china's political and diplomatic interests. and politically, o partnering, shaping the way countries in the developing world are helping china maybe shaping norms on the global stage. strategic vision where beijing looks at these a a vast area which they can't expand its power, expand its influence. i should maybe start by also saying that domestically china doesn't talk about the global south. it talks about developing countries and the eme tells youi think the vision is about this emerging force on the

international scene that will bahe current order that is dominated by western countries and being replaced with that emerging force with china as its leader and composed by non-westerntriee west and non-western world by focus of their interest. >> as josh discussed at the conference, i mean, this is not a new dynamic, right, in terms of china's bid to lead the global south, this is kind of return to that dynamic. >> right. i mean, of course during the '50s throughout the '70s the interest wasas somehow similar n the sense that it was a global vision, something that was supposed up in the world order, but that's the only thing that is very similar in that way. today of course it's not about

communist revolution. it's more about malleable coalitions to reduce the influence of western, what western concepts, and to led , ty different and in which beijing thinks that the developing world can be partners in that. >> so i think it's worth digging into this question that you touched on them that assistant secretar is this notion of the global south. nobody likes a terminology but we don't seem to have a better one. so t maybe, bilahari, i'll turno you. what is this creature recalling the global south?

is this a useful terminology? is a better way to about this? i think it's something that's on everyone's mind as we kick off our conference. o >> well, that' very good question, and the short answer is there is no such creature. what we now call the global so i think from political correctness, we used to call the third world, we used to call the lesser developed countries, used to callie the developing countries, we used to call them -- now we can call it -- [inaudible] right? it reallyt represents a certain mood, a mood which is partly a hangover from the colonial experience, a sense of bei politically in the global system, certainly resentment of inequalities of the system, [inaudible] of certain aspects of western diplomacy, particularly european

diplomacy but also american, and a sense thatit western definitis of norms are not the only definition of norms. but i think it's also important, organizations such as nonaligned non-aligned movement, the g-77 and most recently bricks. but this mood and these forums,, i wouldn't even call them organizations, do not create any coalition of interest, e

generality. so hot and so general that it barely prescribes nothing for a practical in terms of the non-aligned non7 they have certain relevance international like the u.n. but i wouldn't overstate the case. perhaps because i did some -- i spent a lot of my youth as aunga non-aligned movement and in the g-77. i can tell you there is -- not that much can be taken seriously. and china insofar as the united states is any success in convenience, is because it takes that role or tends to take that mood seriously. perhaps even more so the result of the west, europe, north america, not taking that mood seriously enough.

i think, i think what nadege said at the beginning is all correct. but i think one of the reasons china is making a concerted effort, not new, but renewed effort to calculate theef global south, is really because its policies towards the developing countries, the global north if you like, towards north america, towards europe, towar increased. i can't think of any country in the so-called globa n global south that are not without concerns of anxieties about one aspect or another of chinese be now, i think they also have concerns about western behavior, one aspect or the other. i think it's important to

understand that generalities like global south, third world, developing world can be of interest. it's much more porn or as important as -- [inaudible] it doesn't mean thatver resentfl they may be about different aspects of western policy -- [inaudible] the only trust their own agencies. some of those interests, maybe even many of those inter, will align with china's interest but not all of them. some will align with western interests and some will not aligned with either chinese western interests.. that's certainly, that is certainly very clear in my part of the world. southeast asia. but i think it's clear, generally speaking, in this amorphous animals that we call the global south.

tackle that, that i think difficult question, around this terminology. i do want --z6 [inaudible] >> exact address hoping you would give us, make news and give us a terminology we can all use going forward but i are stuck with global south for now. so building a that i ask miael, you kno b talk about as y to china's shifting interest and relations with members of the global south and what it meansf. i would be curious if you wanted to add onto that and talk a little bit about as china has grownicher, more powerful, how have its interest in the global south changed and what impact is it having all those relationships is having across this creature we're calling the global south. >> with you, thanks, david. you know, as was already mentioned, china likes to see itself as a represent itself as

kind of a fellow traveler of the global south, another developing country, poor country that was a victim of western imperialism and, therefore, shared interesty but i think that's becoming less and less true. the chinese economy is only a little bit smaller than the entire rest of the global south combined. and china is becoming incredibly dominant player within the emergingng world. for many countries, global■h ch. china is the largest is a majory low-income countries, in some cases thean largest. and this is trading, well, any

old days when i was in college, i won't tell you when that was, but we would've called this a kind of first world, a third world relationship. that in some ways all that difference between the relationship between the north and the south. and in many ways the chinese have not been particularly generous dominant partners when you look at the way t that they are handling, for example, the debtonstruction for low income countries where they have been extremely reluctant to give these countries significant debt relief. so i think it's this power balance has shifted, this opening divisions between china and the rest of the global south, a potential point of disagreement and conflict. and my sense actually those sitting here i beijing is that the chinese government actually

likes this an equal relationship on the level because my sense is the chinese don't want to see, they don't really want to see a multilateral global south. i want to lead the global south and they want the global south to fall in behind china and support chinese interests and al stage. and you can see this in the way china deals with the global south and certainly the soviets, china offering the programs, and other countries sort of expected to kind of sign-up whether it's a belt and road initiative, the global security initiative, global development initiative. and because of the way this relationship is unequal relationship is developing, i think what you are also seen is the emergence of global south tt

don't see it in their interests to have china lead the way it i. you see this, for example, with india which is trying to exploit some of these new tensions and divisionson that china is facing within the global south. so i think going forward in terms of what chinese aims are globally in terms of remaking the global order and competition with the united states and the west, that this change in nature of the relationship between china within the global south and thisou role of the global south is going to be increasingly important. >> so it's fair to say thathinks that china now views the relationship with the global south, global south general fund essential to its geostrategic objectives? >> i mean, yeah.

>> i think from a different point of view yes, but ostensibly no. sorry, i did mean to interrupt you. >> that's okay. well, my view on this is that chinese policy towards global south i think is becoming increasingly, like me aspects of the chinese policy with the global competition with the united states, and it's starting, beijing is starting to see its relationship with the global south more and more in the context. i think because of that the chinese government, is actuallyf weaponizing the global south against the u.s. and its to use the global south as a foundation to promote its own strategic aims, its own vision for a new global order.

and i b think that, that, too, s also going to be creating robin for china w global south. as already been mentioned, the most members of thelr global soh we don't want to pick sides between u.s. and china. they do want to s pick sides and the surrender want to take sides with china against the united states because they benefit from both of these relationships. so i think -- and sees the global south as a more and more foundation to support its own interests and power in the global stage, that this is going to create more divisions within the global south as well. >> they don't company, china doesn't need the developing world to take sides i think they're very much aware that each of them have the own interests and their own agency. it just needs to have their support in some areas, but some

areas are actually very consequential for the shape that the global order is going to have in the future. and so it's not to be two separe teams with the west isolated on one hand and china and those developing countries on the other. it's more fluid and complex than that. it doesn't mean that using those relationships, using the increasing influence that china hass economically, politically n terms of security, in terms of governance in those countries, it cannot sort of stew them in the direction that is more beneficial to china's own interest, the influence of western countries and universal values. so i think that's the broad pictur here.

i don't think china's economic slowdownil because china is going to feel more in, more cornered in a way, more, maybe more like reduced options, it's going to use more, a of tools for influence that are cheaper than just, you know, investing in big infrastructure projects. we've seen that a already happening with -- started to decline akin 2015 already. was never the objective. anyway, so investing in other m, shaping governance, training, i think we can talk about that in other areas that are not as costly but very consequential for the future shape of the

world. >> that's great. .. demographic changes but, yes, i want to talk a little bit about the training, the secur china's interest and engagement around the global south and how big a factor that is and the way that china is looking at engagement. >> thank you, thank you, david, and great to be on our >> again with many other colleagues that i've worked with in this room for many years. let me just associate myself with remarks that were made earlier, which is this term the global south. if you talk to african diplomates, they don't u at all they'll talk about the developing countries, the developing regions. the regions that were once feel not well-represented international

multilateral institutions. regions that basically constitute the vast majority of the world's population, but have very little voting power in imf, world trade orga bank, right? that's the language you're going to hear from african diplomates. now, global south, yes, it will it's really not seen as a fundamental when it comes to the african countries i think we saw this in the recent nonaligned movement and 77 mmit to the discussions in those rooms and you listen to what the delegates were talking very use of this term global south. people talked about group of 77, group of 24, which is a group within the g77 that

defends african interests inside the imf with thecretaria those were the conversations that were taking place there. but in terms of the -- i pictur terms of china's security vision, i would say perhaps four things in this region. in africa, in latin america in it i can. one is to socialize the concepts. so the chinese defense establishment believes that it has, you know, that the military -- the china's military and its military influence a grown to such a level that china has a legitimate intest in promoting, right, its visions and its ideologies of security and security management. and i think that'sfundamental. there are quite a number of platforms, i wouldn't call them

institutions, defense dialogs that h sco, the africa-china defense forums, similar in latin america which are younger because i think the african ones are much older, having been established between 2000 and 2006. latin america, these were only established in 2020, 14. and by the national defense whi gathers african, latin american, asian officers, once, twice, three times every year, concerns, global problems, but from an alternative kind of perspective. so i think this is key. e seco alternative defense ddialogs. and if we look at the forum, rights that took place, for the

first time african countries were invite today participate in it. so it was hosted by the pla, national defense university and the deanf that university, one of the things he's said-- >> we're going to leave this and take you live for a press conference with the house freedom cauc.