knew nothing about. now they are now, the spotlight is on them. the world is waiting for them to deliver. we can't do that without the support of individual member states. the u.s. is a really important one of them. really look forward to moving forward on all of this, also with u.s. support. jacqueline: we are unfortunately out of time. i know this has been really interesting for me. you have a lot on your plate. thank you for being here today to talk about it. i hope you enjoy the rest of your visit to the u.s.. get out to colorado next week. thank you to the atlantic council for hosting. thanks to our audience in the room. aarti: thanks for having me. ♪

♪ >> good afternoon and thank you for joining us.

i may nonresident senior fellow at the u.s. center. it's a pleasure to have you with us whether it's in person or online in washington, d.c. thank you all for going to this event. what can the u.s. learn from europe about support from ukraine? the title of today's conversation, russia's full-scale invasion of ukraine is now in its third year. ukraine and its people need help now more than ever. the united states is ukraine's largest supporter of military aid and has provided billions in humanitarian assistance and support to the government. however, u.s. aid has stalled. a $60 billion aid package has set in congress for months as ukraine needs ammunition and supplies.

europe has stepped up well u.s. support withers. the members account for the largest aid to ukraine in terms of financial, humanitarian and military support. the support comes from humble beginnings. early in the war when europe offered helmets, no european countries are sending tanks, artillery shells. in the past few months, many european countries and the eu have stepped up and created ways to support ukraine's defense and counter russia's war of aggression including french president emmanuel macron who issued a full statement in support of ukraine and initiatives spearheaded by the czech president. they have supplied much needed ammunition to the front lines of ukraine so what can europe teach the united states about support to ukraine? we will ask these questions and more today. we are pleased to be joined in person by great group of speakers including the liberty

chief ambassador in the czech republic, welcome. thank you for being here. we will be joined by benjaminhaddad who's joining is virtually from paris or i don't know where you are. he's a member the national activities of france. i'm joined by deborah keegan, senior advisor at the u.s. center. a pleasure to have you here and ambassador john hurts, senior director at the council of euro asia center. make sure to send your questions and follow us online atx. with that, i would like to begin with you the first question. as i said, the czech president was a hero at the conference when he mentioned check efforts

to find -- to supply -- to find on international markets and ensure that ammunition can be provided to ukraine. over 10 countries have agreed to bite and fund more than 1.5 million rounds for ukraine. what is the status of this initiative and what does the public propose? >> he became a hero of the munich security conference is a former general and chief of defense and is a hero to many of us. his announcement provided a very critical moment of leadership. it has become increasingly more difficult with european stocks depleted. my country and the leadership

that gathered around a system we been devising since day one and even before the war began. we look outside of europe to find additional sources of ammunition. since that day, we been able to gather up to around 20 countries so that's double to the recent announcement and identified currently 800,000 rounds of ammunition sitting around the globe. i cannot be specific about those countries. we have also embarked upon a very ambitious initiative and we been very fortunate. it has become an initiative that's a concerted effort by around 20 european countries plus canada. it's just to show leadership and

to show the united states that we are in this together in europe is taking its own security and its neighborhood very seriously. >> when will ukraine see these munitions arriving? >> some of them relatively soon and some are being delivered as we speak. we are not talking about -- we are talking about security and very sensitive material. i don't want to be too specific on any of the timelines or numbers. as i said previously, we been working on this system logistically through our defense industrial networks and government networks. we are able to do this expeditiously. we are talking about weeks to a short number of months for the first deliveries. >> president macron has also taken a new leading role in his debate on russia's war on ukraine. he has a discussion on the use of french troops were a possible

[indiscernible] in western ukraine. how serious are these proposals and what are the reasons he proposes? >> i just got back from kyiv where i was with the speaker of our parliament and clear to us that the war is at a turning point and it will be critical. today, the russians strike 10 times as many ammunitions as ukraine is underground. you have cities like odessa where there's infrastructure of water and energy under constant strike and has europeans, we see questions arising coming from the united states with the supplemental being held up in congress and questions for the next election. the question for us is are we ready and can we put the effort into rights of this moment help

ukraine win this war which we do not hope even without the united states. this is the question president macron has asked and he made it very clear that this war is crucial for the europeans. if tomorrow, russia would conquer ukraine, it would be at the doorstep of the baltic states, poland and romania with dramatic consequences for security. this is why he decided to launch this initiative, bringing together heads of state and prime minister's to paris. it's to see everything we can do to step up our efforts and one of the key elements of this is supporting the czech initiative we just mentioned. but seeing anything we can do in terms of long-range missiles, ammunition, trying to help states that want to do more but don't have the capabilities to replace them and see how different states in europe can help each other. then he was asked the question about whether sending troops at

some point would be excluded. he said we don't exclude anything. for the last two years, we've kept telling vladimir putin the redline. we kept negotiating and securing ourselves when we have in front of us, russian leader with no such limit, no such redline on his own behavior and aggression against ukraine. this is the moment to turn the table on him, to put red lines and start pushing back against the russian aggression -- this is what president macron said and he's trying to shake europeans out of complacency. at the end of the day, the french have been saying for years that europeans need to take ownership up security and defense and we need to push for our own strategic autonomy or whatever you call it. we need to take security issues seriously and this is the test. we have a war of aggression on

the continent as a direct security consequence on the architecture of europe and i would say the well-being of european citizens. it's time for us to step up. >> you have been a long-time practitioner and observer in politics, power politics. as an american, how do you characterized administration policy toward the war and what is the impact of the republican blockage of the next aid package to ukraine? >> thank you very much. i will pick up on what was just said and i will start by saying in war, never telegraphed to your enemy what you won't do. it is like giving your enemy an advantage. picking up and what my colleagues just said is this totally undermines the concept of deterrence. as much as deterrence is nato and the allies have in the united states has, when you convey to putin who is your

enemy, not your adversary, what you won't do, that gives putin a lot of leeway to take even more violent, more destructive and more murderous intentions and effects because he does not think you will respond. you already told him you will not do certain things. my reaction now is that i will borrow a word for my colleagues of timidity. you still have the white house that is still timid and still a little too much afraid of putin and what he can and cannot do. because of that, we have been very slow and almost two flooding in our efforts to supply ukraine. yes, the blockage of this aid is significant. to be honest with you, aircraft should have gone to ukraine a year ago, long-range fire should've gone to ukraine a year ago, we shouldn't have been arguing about even giving them

javelin weapons three weeks into the conflict. part of the problem is one that we've created by not giving ukraine what it needed to thwart russia. it was enough to keep them alive but not to win. the u.s. would never send its own military into conflict under those circumstances, never. it would not happen. a couple of other dynamics here -- if this funding aid does not go forward, it will be devastating. i complement our european colleagues but i think doing more and creating a bigger burden than they ever have in the past 40 years in terms of burden sharing but we need a compendium up all of our defense industry on this, not just u.s. defense industry but it has to be a cooperative approach to

this, not a competitive approach. for too long, we've been ruled by competition and protectionism and we need to understand that these are our allies and we need to work together so that ukraine can defeat russia and the rest of europe is safe from russia's desires. >> ambassador herbst, what is your assessment of the dynamics between the u.s. and the key players in response to the invasion of ukraine? >> of course there is 75 or more years of american leadership in the west. first, world war ii and then of course the postwar world. early in my career, i saw how essential strong american leadership was when the reagan administration insisted on deploying intermediate range nuclear missiles in europe despite reservations and many of the european countries in response to the soviet

deployment of comparable missiles in western russia and the western soviet union. sadly what we see today is a truly peculiar and dangerous synergy between a timid administration and quasi-isolationist n republicanaifs who don't understand that putin is coming for american interests. while china is the greater danger in the long run because china come unlike russia has a working economy, russia is the one who is pursuing major war at the present time. even if we are worried about china, the best way to deter chinese aggression is to soundly defeat putin at in ukraine. that is a prelude to talk about what's happening between the united states and key european countries. sadly, the white house is found a spiritual partner in the

chancellery. american timidity is at least mastiff not exceeded by german timidity despite the so-called agenda. the good news though is the brits have kept an upper lip since the beginning of the big invasion. boris johnson encouraged the support ukraine needed in the early months after the big invasion. they set an example which we partly and only partly slowly in a doddering fashion followed. now to my great satisfaction, we are seeing a similar but distinct effort coming from paris. deborah is actually right. it's unbecoming for a superpower , it undercuts a superpower's interests and leadership to be telling a country, a nuclear

power that has identified the united states as a principal adversary that we will not do x or y so putin can sit comfortably as he considers his next abomination he will visit on ukraine. macron is right when he says maybe we need to put nato troops are french troops in ukraine. give putin something to worry about. john f. kennedy famously asked not what your country can do for you but what you can do for your country. i think the appropriate paraphrase for that is asked not what putin can do to us but what we can do to putin. sadly, that is not the approach of this white house and that has the timid policy of the administration has given the quasi-isolationist there big argument against are going to se into an armageddon. >> why do you think the administration has taken the

timid approach? >> i had a professor in graduate school was also a senior advisor to lyndon johnson. he would say when you're dealing with senior officials, psychology is history or destiny. we have folks on the national security team now who have been intimidated by putin's nuclear threats. not very well-versed in the successful nuclear diplomacy of the united states starting in the early 1950's once it was clear russia had the bomb and who would not -- and who were not intimidated during the cuban crisis. in the past come you never had senior american officials say we can't do x or y. they may go nuclear. we've heard that a dozen times in the last two years. it's a very bad look. there have been moments when we've had strong statements coming from the president but sadly, they been moments when

we've had the opposite. >> is this your reading as well? are we intimidated by nuclear weapons? >> yes, very much so. for months now, we heard, including a most recent visit of national security adviser sullivan to ukraine telling ukraine, please stop hitting targets in russia. i was think to myself at the time and it's something that france has invoked many times in the u.n. charter. under article 51 of the u.n. charter, if you want to look at the you as being legitimate in this, ukraine has a perfect right of hitting targets in russia that can deploy the means of war. that means energy sites and that means weapons depots and that means aircraft and the like. that's perfectly legitimate under article 51. to tell ukraine to stop doing that is ridiculous especially in

light of what russia has tried to do to destroy ukraine's entire energy infrastructure. let me go into the details of what john was just saying. there is this extreme paranoia that russia will deploy a missile with a nuclear warhead. it's a tactical nuclear weapon. two nato allies have been living across the standards for some time, pollitt and let the weenie a. it's really ironic to me and i will paraphrase some of my nato allies colleagues who said it's really ironic that we are less afraid of the russians using a tactical nuclear weapon than those of you who live across the atlantic. that should not be the case. we should not be afraid of a tactical nuclear weapon that may cause infinitely more harm to the russian troops on the ground than it ever would to the ukrainians. >> thank you.

president macron's statements have been well accepted by many but there was some controversy and frustration from berlin. how should they coordinate its messaging with its european partners? do you think macron's forward leaning approach with its neighbors might sometimes have an opposite effect by showcasing more divergence then the unity everyone needs now from europe? >> there was consultation and discussion about this. the president answer the questions that there is no consensus about sending troops but there is no reason to exclude it. if you look at the momentum over the support for ukraine in the last two years, unity among allies in europe and the united states has been critical but

it's also been important sometimes for some countries to take the lead and push others and go where others didn't want to go. i remember when polish and lithuanian leaders went to visit president zelenskyy kyuiv when it was seen as risky and dangerous in many others followed. then we needed countries to talk about sending tanks and long-range missiles and planes and so forth. you do i think need countries to bring forward others. when you look at the last few weeks, initially, it was much said in the press and the french press said france was isolated but that's not the case. we sin countries like poland and the baltic states, the czech republic that have applauded the words coming out of paris and these are countries that we should have listened to for years that have felt very much

abandoned by paris, berlin and other capitals when they were warning us about the threats that were coming out of vladimir putin's regime. president macron said we should have spent more time listening to you. how much time have we wasted over the last two years? if we had given ukraine what they needed to reconquer their territory and defend themselves early on with tanks and long-range missiles and the planes -- think about the planes where they are still training pilots how useful they would have been in meeting the counteroffensive a few months ago. instead of worrying once again about putin's escalation when the truth is, he's chosen aggression and but no limit on it, let's give ukraine what they need to push back. as for germany, i don't want to push into the narrative of disagreements among europeans.

we also have to appreciate the fact that germany is doing a lot when you look at the mess of weapons. it is number one in europe. i hope that germans will give the support so they can strike into territory in ukraine, the ammunition depots and so forth. i think it would go a long way to helping ukrainians on the ground. it's good to have other countries taking an intensive push forward on specific issues. >> on the french boldness, how does that come off? >> i appreciate the president mike rounds comments are bringing -- that president macron's comments are bringing leadership. that has been one of the lessons learned which of our discussion today.

no country talking about american europe can do this alone. it has been sometimes painful to watch a lack of leadership over the course of the past two years in europe. over and over again, we proven our ability to come together and to coordinate ourselves and continue the support to ukraine. one more note on mike rounds comments -- mike rounds comments macron's comments, for deterrence to work, we need ambiguity, the strategic ambiguity, we need strength and resources, we need the whole of the government approach. it should not only be up to the government but it should really be up to private industry as well. i think they have shown

throughout this war that they can deliver and they understand the critical importance of operating in a safe and secure environment. i think we are now going through a new phase of renewing our deterrence. >> talking about deterrence, what do you make of the european proposal to arm ukraine and themselves? will it be enough to turn the tide in ukraine's favor and will it be enough to build up reliable defense readiness on the continent? >> i was hoping you're going to ask me that because i have some answers. i want to say that other than countries like theczechs and the ones who live in the neighborhood with russia, there was a position of going to a slack mode in the united states and in europe among defense industry and everyone else about this cold war dividend.

there were countries who up until a year and a half, two years ago, they were on the list to be up next for deployment under the rapid reaction force. everything was on paper. when it came to chaim to -- when it came time to the play those forces, it didn't exist. i won't call out names of allies but some who were supposed to deploy into rotations of the baltics couldn't put together more than 10 people with equipment which is ridiculous. that's not have nato should have ever operated. it's not how the eu should operate. on the upside, what russia has done and i always used to say that [indiscernible] what russia has done is wake up the world and in particular the european and north american part of the world to understand that your way of sitting back and

thinking everything was going to be ok was not ok. and it hasn't been ok for a long time. and you have to do something about it. i would argue that the leadership of the czechs, the danes and others have been looking at this for a long time, of the baltics, of poland is that yes, it's a thread on your doorstep and you have to do something about it. i have not seen in decades the people being able to work together cooperatively to rebuild the defense industry, to rebuild output. i think friends just announced a new upgrade for production of this arm as well. the germans are upgrading the numbers of gephardts they produce not just for ukraine, but the safety and security of all of europe.

that, to me, is an upside. russia has woken people up and said, this is a really dangerous world and we have to do something about it. so what is happening here in the defense industry, event to our neighbors to the north who have been a little slow on this, is a recognition that there is a threat. it's not going away, and you have to do something about it. that, to me, is actually positive. for ukraine, these production levels are going to be driven by watching the modern battle space. the war in ukraine is different than anything we have seen before. you are now seeing changes in the battle space every three months. not every five years. so when you change your defense industry now -- >> you mean military tactics? >> yes, the modern battle space is different. just the use of uas's in that space. you used to look at the defense budget and say, five years.

now what you are planning on developing is going to be worthless in one year's time. the lessons being taken from the battle space in ukraine are huge and they are saving taxpayers but only in the united states but also europe billions and billions of dollars of euros because now they know may be building this cannot end this helicopter makes no sense now because the modern battle space will no longer have that. what we have learned from ukraine in terms of the future of warfare and conflict is huge. >> ambassador, if you want to comment on the europeans'

proposal to get rid of a possible threat from russia, will this be enough? >> i think it is a strong step in the right direction. >>the fact that it is not just the east europeans, but east of europe, they understand putin is coming for europe's vital interests, it is a large step forward. first of all, you have to recognize the problem before you can deal with it. we have seen clear steps in meeting this challenge. 10 has stepped up its aid in light of the problems with the american aid package. and of course the bold things we are seeing from paris right now also reflect that. it is true that in europe and in the united states, there has been some talk but not nearly enough action to begin to ramp-up defense production, the domestic arms industries to deal with, letter a, the challenge of ukraine, but b, the possibility of direct confrontation between the west and the russia on one side or china and the other. this has to happen. but as far as i can tell, certainly the administration has not treated this as a high priority not the way they treated the green transition. and this is only during our

security. so that is what i have to say on this. if i could through -- >> no, go ahead. >> i have been critical of the administration, but i have to acknowledge for fairness's sake that they have put together the right pieces of overall policy to deal with the russian threat in ukraine. all the pieces are there. the position has at least been adequate, and we can do a lot worse than adequate as we watched the isolationists in the republican party. the point is we need to be stronger. >> good message. i want to encourage our virtual audience, i see some questions that have arrived, please ask them at askac.org. we will have some time after the panel to address your questions. as an elected official in france who has spent time in washington, d.c., how should the european policymakers

be approaching u.s. officials? what the messages about europe's support to ukraine that could be more productive, what should change? >> first, i think we should say that we are all in this together. i was struck when i was in d.c. in january with european colleagues, making the case to the american congress that everything europe is doing for ukraine is not always crossing the atlantic. if you look at the ranking it's not perfect, but it is one of the tools we have to quantify aid. you add military, economic, financial, humanitarian, european countries taken together are above the united states. not to be critical of anyone, but when it comes to critical military equipment, it has come from the united states. by the europeans are pulling their weight. we have had debates for a long time about burden sharing, about

european defense spending. and, again, it's important to communicate that not only are people appearance spending for ukraine, but they have also dramatically increased defense spending in the last two years. germany is going to 2%. it is putting 100 billion into upgrading its military equipment. a lot of this may be slower and bureaucratic and frustrating for some of us, but the change is there. france, over two terms of the macron presidency, france will have doubled its defense spending. poland and other states are considerably increasing their defense readiness. we should do more than just discuss building and industrial military base. it is absolutely critical for your appearance to put much more resources into defense both at the national level, but also at the european level. because if you add all the 27 military budgets in europe, we are the second expander behind

the united states. does it translate to actual capabilities? of course not, because there are so many redundancies in procurement, in what we decide to develop and buy at the european level. we need to coordinate this much more. during covid, we considered that we were facing in existential crisis and we had a huge fund at the european level, a borrowing fund of about 800 billion euros to recover from covid and invest in technologies and green transition. a lot of us considered that the war in ukraine is also an existential issue for europe, and so the estonian prime minister has proposed another surge fund, $100 billion for defense. that is an idea we support and it would go a long way also to putting money where our mouth is. but i think really communicating to the united states that europeans are with them and we

are pulling-, i think, on this is important. that will be my main argument. >> so, make sure that the messages and whatever europe is doing crosses the ocean here in the u.s. ambassador, what will it take for congress to pass the aid package? >> this is a difficult issue, sadly. and right now, speaker johnson in the house has authority to put a bill on the floor and i think he would like to do it but he doesn't want to lose his job. and there is a small group of republicans in the house, naive about russian intentions, who are -- who want to kill aid to ukraine and now they are threatening to remove johnson the way they removed speaker mccarthy in the fall. the reason why i think we will

eventually get this aid package done is because there is another way to put the bill on the floor, through a discharge petition which requires a majority of representatives to sign. most democrats are prepared to sign it and enough republicans, to make this a reality, so i think we will see it happen. but johnson is trying to find a magic formula which enables him to put it on the floor without him being kicked out. i don't think he will succeed and he will have to either make the hard decision to risk being tossed out by naifs and his party, or we will see a discharge petition. i think we are talking too much for this to happen. >> what will happen on the battlefield if the package does not get approved? >> i was in ukraine two weeks ago and three weeks before that, but -- sorry to interrupt -- but i heard from senior officials . their expectation that even without this aid package, they

can hold their defensive lines for the next several months, especially since they have ignition incoming -- they have munitions coming in thanks to power. but if they don't have in several months, it will be a problem. >> thanks to the initiative and between what the u.s. has supplied in terms of cluster munitions, there should be enough ammunition to get us to the fall for ukraine. once that happens, though, you're going to need more resources and reinforcement. now, the united states, there are industries in the united states who are plussing-up production and working cooperatively with other industries in europe whose governments are much more, shall we say, relaxed about having those companies go to work in ukraine which the united states is not very supportive of here.

that will help pick up the slack while our production levels here, germany and other services, can pick up the slack. having said all for more shipments of himars, for more weapons to be launched from himars, because you can't just pull them out of somewhere, they have to come from someplace have to replace them from the army or the air force. that is what the new funding would do. then it becomes more problematic in the fall. i think there is enough there now and there were enough contracts signed. and what europe is doing in terms of stepping up, it will get us to the fall for ukraine. i think once we hit the fall, the lack of that funding will really begin to show, and i think that is a really difficult

situation. but they do commend my european colleagues for stepping up on this. and i want to make one other point here, we are looking at that modern battle space and all of these modern things, the irony is that some of this equipment like the french cesar it is very effective because it is old technology and less susceptible to russian jamming. little ironies. they can do damage were some of these modern technologies are more susceptible to russian countermeasures. so in some ways you are moving very forward and fast into the modern battle space and in another way you are looking at things that actually are working better on the ground because they are less susceptible to russian countermeasures. >> ben, is europe, and particularly france, able to step up u.s. aid is diminished or even stopped? i saw last week, the upper by

the french, polish and german foreign ministers who basically concluded, as europeans, we are ready to do our part. what are they ready to step up in case u.s. aid will hold? >> i don't think we have a choice. if u.s. aid is blocked, there are two alternatives. either we say well, we can't go on without the united states and pushed ukraine to a negotiation that de facto will be a capitulation, a defeat. because if you look at russia's demands, they have not moved in the last two years, at russia still wants to take over ukraine, not only its territory, but it's political and democratic future. that will have dramatic consequences on the security of europe tomorrow. . you will have russia threatening the baltic states and poland.

the credibility of the european union alliance will be at zero and what a resident it will set for the rest of the world. or, we find the resources and the political will to take matters into our own hands and be able to continue to help ukraine defend themselves and win this war. at the end of the day, we are defending our security interest, not only the security architecture of europe, but also the very basic sort of everyday well-being of our own citizens. if russia tomorrow takes over ukraine, it will control between one-third and one-half of grain exports in the world. they will continue to put pressure on energy prices, so, even the basic cost-of-living in terms of food or energy of the citizens will be affected. so once again, either we step up. but this will demand critical choices, especially when it

comes to finding resources. this is why i was talking earlier about either a fund, or there is a debate that i and a few colleagues in europe are trying to push about the confiscation of russian frozen assets. in any case, we will have to find the resources and the will to be able to continue without the united states. >> i have set all over again, we are in this together. not just as a european who has been part of a larger concerted effort here on capitol hill in this town, just to make a case for ukraine and also for europe to illustrate that we are doing this together. so far we have only spoken about the war in ukraine itself and the transatlantic corporation, but this is happening in the wider global context, with china watching and assisting russia and other countries, north

korea, assisting russia in this brutal and ruthless war. so we are talking about the overall perception of the united states, europe and other democratic countries and that is what we have to bear in mind. so yes, europol have to continue your support and i think we are ready to do that. my country included. we are spending 2% of gdp on defense and we understand it is no longer about the 2% debate as we will see in the upcoming nato summit and other meetings, it will go beyond that threshold. but we have to be mindful that we are part of a long-term confrontation. not and similar to the cold war, but definitely much more complex given the technological development and the myriad of factors, both state and nonstate. and i can't stress this enough,

private sector is playing a primary role in safeguarding our values and interests. >> since you mentioned nato's summit in july, ambassador, i wanted to ask you, this illustration has always stressed unity in its discussions about the ukraine-nato relationship. with the nato summit in d.c. not far off, what will happen to washington, how is policy being formulated among nato allies? >> sadly, i have very low expectations for the upcoming summit, the 75th anniversary summit for the alliance. again, i think we see in washington and in berlin, they don't want to take a clear step forward toward ukraine's eventual membership in nato. we put together a proposal in october that was short of

virtually extending an invitation for ukraine to join the alliance -- excuse me, to begin negotiations for alliance membership at the nato summit. we talked about inviting them to a session of membership talks and even that was a bridge too far for the white house. they talk about alliance unity. they talked about alliance unity at the vilnius summit which had a very modest, modest result on nato-ukraine. but they defined not unity based on the actors who are unwilling to move forward. is basically the u.s. and germany which is setting the pace, which is a very slow pace. if the administration is willing to move in the more stalwart fashion on nato and ukraine, they could use the summit, for example, to announce an alliance wide major new aid package with

weapons. that would be a major step forward. but i am not confident we will see that outcome. i have very low expectations. let me make one more point -- we should welcome ukraine antenatal blood test -- into nato not just because that will anchor stability across europe, which is ukraine is not in nato, they are a target for russia, but because ukraine has arguably one of the most effective militaries in the world. not because they have stood off this massive russian invasion, but what ukraine has done, and debra can talk about this with more expertise than me, is with drones, they have defined the future of warfare. instead of saying don't strike russian facilities, we should be uploading the success that they are producing. ukraine and nato will bolster

nato's defense capacity by a wide margin and that is one more reason we should be welcoming them. >> is the timing to say publicly, like secretary blinken said yesterday in brussels, that ukraine will be a member of nato? does it help or hurt ukraine right now? >> i mean, i think that's a pretty loaded question. [laughter] my inclination is, ukraine should be a member of nato, they have a very effective military, nato is a defensive alliance and you want militaries in nato to be effective, not just the 2%, it is what you do, how you go at it. there are countries who have 4% and 60% of what they are doing spent on personnel costs, so that is not exactly going to make them a more effective military. ukraine has more than met that need and i think ukraine has done more to defend nato's

borders and sovereignty than any other country in any recent memory. that is really important to say. politically, i think you then go to congress and you go to other countries who have ratified this and that may become problematic. but i think if you do not telegraph that the washington summit -- at the washington summit russia, that ukraine has an opportunity and chance to join nato, then two will take that, run with it and do whatever he can to crush any hopes of that ever occurring? >> what if he hears that ukraine will be a member? >> you will be upset, but he has lived to be upset for many decades in his life and you are not going to change his personality by making that statement one way or the other. i am sure he will give more nuclear threats. my approach is a little more

cavalier, which is, please try to fire one of your missiles and see what happens to your troops. >> thank you, debra, thank you, ambassador. ben i have some questions from the audience. i will start with you. french armed forces minister said, the production rates of, i hope i am saying this right, scalp eg cruise missiles must be looked at. can you say something about possible plans that the national assembly has to fund production of new missiles both for ukraine and for the french force? >> so, first we have been almost billion-dollar military aid package in 2024 for ukraine, part of president zelenskyy and president macron talked about. the defense minister has been quite concerned with our defense ministry being able to step up,

ramp up its speed and its production capabilities. , of course, we need to put resources so that our industrials have long-term visibility to be able to do this. but he has been quite bland in the last few weeks, basically saying that he will not shy away even from requisitions, basically taking over and putting military priorities over civilian orders over some of these companies. we have had some successes like this company that manufactures the caesar cannon, which have been very effective on the ground in ukraine and more than doubled production speed. but other companies have not been so successful. so a big priority is getting them there not only for ukraine,

but also for us to be able to replace our need and that is something we are looking at all across europe, it is part of the admonition plan. is to identify -- part of the commission plan, to identify where industries can go quicker. >> i have a question open to whoever is brave enough to answer. what can we do to move forward using of/frozen russian assets for defense? ambassador? >> i spent a fair amount of time with the single most effective individual in the world on this issue, philip zeliko, who has pushed the debate forward, making the case under the legal doctrine of countermeasures, not sanctions, that russia owes ukraine a great deal of money for the damage it has inflicted during the war of aggression

and, therefore, it is legal and smart geopolitics to use the russian frozen assets to ukraine. maybe not all of that, may be a small portion can go to other countries which have been hurt by russia's aggression in your green, especially food-importing nations in the global south. his ideas were considered way outside the mainstream by year ago. right now, this is largely the position of the u.s. government, the canadian government, and the british government. france, germany and japan -- the g7 plays an important role here -- remain skeptical. i believe they are hiding behind the legal argument, when their real concern is that russia would respond if assets were transferred to ukraine by going after the assets of their firms in russia. even though, my understanding is, to thet great french

hydrocarbon company, has written off their assets in russia holistically. al this is an issue. i think more progress will be made at the nato summit in june, but there is more work to be done. one last point, the europeans like to point out that most of these assets are, in fact, under their control in belgium. but it is also true that in substantial part of these are in dollars, which gives the united states a say. i think that may also be important tactically in bringing the other countries to what i consider the right position, meaning using those assets for ukraine's defense and ukraine's reconstruction. >> your perspective on the use of those assets, ben? >> first, european countries

have agreed on the first step of taking over the windfall profits that are generated by these assets, something along the lines of three to $5 billion a year, which is a good start but it is the far cry from the close to $200 billion that would be located in belgium and over the world. my sense is that it is not so much about potential countermeasures in russia, because i agree with what john just said. but the risk of a single currency area like the eurozone if we were to do this unilaterally. because the truth is infinite countries like the united states were or canada have signaled support or interest in doing this, they have not passed legislation to that effect. and even though there are more resources in your, a coordinated

g7 decision could go a long way in protecting the countries that are more exposed. that is critical in doing this. i say this as someone who introduced a resolution in the french parliament calling for the confiscation of assets. i am very much in support of this. i think the u.s., canada, japan, maybe switzerland, as well were to move forward with doing this, i think we would be aligned at the trans-lactic and other g7 level, which would make it much more secure to move forward with this. because it is still an unprecedented step so there are legitimate concerns. so it should be done in a robust and cautious way. i say this as a supporter of moving forward. >> thank you. note to debra, a question i found provocative, but i think

is important to discuss. given this work is in the third year, it is not proving intractable and as such, does increasing military assistance, does it not basically amount escalating the war rather than ending it? >> i have heard this question asked about 15 different times in 15 different ways. sort of, why should we pour more weapons into this, it'll just upset russia more and the world will never end, et cetera. a couple of historical facts, people pushing for a peace agreement, i want to remind them that in the last 100 years, there has never been a single peace agreement that has succeeded without u.s. boots on the ground. that is in any of the berlin crises, the dmz in korea, vietnam post 1974, the sinai -- the list goes on. even with a couple of hundred u.s. troops. so my question to people who are

advising the white house, my question to people who talk about this peace agreement is, do you want u.s. boots on the ground? because to be honest with you, you and peacekeeping forces from south africa and pakistan will not hold russia back from taking more territory in europe. so this is a ridiculous kind of point, because there is never going to be enough for putin. it's never going to be 20% of ukraine and just stop. . who is going to stop them from taking more than that? and remember, the last solution that the west absolutely collapsed on, including the united states was 2008 in georgia, where they were going, oh, yeah, we will let them in. there will be peacekeeping russians. nothing more ridiculous i had ever seen in my life. the russians will just change out the uniforms and put on a blue hat. what i say to that is, no, this

war has to be one, because there is no way to stop it unless you want to put u.s. boots on the ground, and i think people forget that that is historically what would have to happen to end this other than green retaking all the territory that russia is illegally occupying. >> thank you very much, ambassador john herbst, benjamin had died, jan havranek, and debra cagan. and i think our title was quite difficult to answer, but we provided some good answers and some tips on how the u.s. -- what the u.s. should learn. first thing i can remember now is not to be timid, but boldness. the messages are very clear and simple -- a robust u.s.-e.u. response is crucial not just for ukraine's future, but for the

future, for deterring future aggression in europe or anywhere else in the world. thank you very much for watching. see you next time. ♪ [applause] ♪ [indistinct conversations]