country to look forward while considering the past. looking 20 years into the future 20 years into the past it response we received inspiring and thought-provoking documentaries from over 3200 students from across states. a top reward for a grand prize goes to nate and jonah. greater southwest high school in connecticut their compelling documentary in a sense held hostage. navigating future past conflict with iran. >> it is evident that the united states must make more policy that places heavy refraction on all americans traveling to iran. not only will we see less, but the united states will no longer have to participate in such considerable negotiations with iran. >> be sure to watch the top 2120 documents on c-span later this month 6:50 a.m. eastern or anytime online.

the house will be in winter. >> this year c-span celebrates 45 years uncovering congress like no other. since 1979 we have been your primary source for capital help providing balance unfiltered government. taking it all within the support of america's cable companies. c-span, 45 years and counting powered by cable. next, an event marking nato 75th anniversary. the u.s. ambassador to nate juliann smith spoke about the importance of the military alliance to the u.s. and internationally. nato's recent expansion to include sweden and finland as new membersnk while the russian ukrainian war continues. other speakers also discussed the future and its deterrent strategy.

>> i believe this here for later good morning and thank you for coming out early on a monday morning and thank you to joel for that lovely introduction. it is a real pleasure and an honor to open this conference at 75, charting a new course. i am very much looking forward to your questions in a few minutes. for three quarters of a century, nato has been a cornerstone of international peace and security united nations in a collective commitment to mutual defense into our shared values. nato's success story really is remarkable and it is one by no means preordained. .... of soldiers, , sailors, aviators and operate

there'll be several panels throughout the day where folks will be allowed to look at the alliance from different angles. looks f like a superb conference in series of discussions and i congratulate the organizers but what i do want to do this morning is i want to walk us through all that has happened inside the nato alliance over just the last two years. since russia launched its unprovoked war of aggression in ukraine. these last two years have in many ways been transformative and i don't use that word lightly. i don't think there's a better word to describe what has happened across the nato alliance since thes war startedi

i think they showcased time and time again nato's agility and its innovation so let me walk you through five egg changes that we have seen just in the last few years. first after many many years of focusing on expeditionary operations and you'll remember in the 1990s they were often referred to it as out of area operations the alliance had come home and return to its core mandatere of collective defense and it has taken a series of dramatic steps to enhance its deterrence. before the war even started nato allies were moving force posture into eastern europe. you will remember that nato just a few months after the war started announced four new multinational battalions on the eastern plank that repaired before but the four created in

the baltics region right after russia went into crimea in 2014. a pavilion summit last year the alliance also rolled out new regional plans that provide clarity to all allies in terms of what is required to protect every inch of nato's territory. we are also working on an entirely new command and control structure which i suspect the general will talk about in his remarks later today and we just finished conducting her largest military exercises since the cold war and with 90,000 nato troops and that exercise, the first time in a long time enabled us to exercise north american troops moving across the atlantic and into europe to the territory so that's point number one, dramatic shift where

collective defense andof enhance deterrence. secondly burden sharing has increased significantly in recent years. you will remember that in 2014 all allies pledged to spend 2% of their gdp on their own national defense. that pledge was the last 10 years and that brings us to 2024 when we started the pledge 10 years ago we had three countries in the alliance spending 2% of gdp on defense and by last count we don't know where we'll end up by the end but right now we have 20 allies that are meeting to 2% pledge, 20 allies. that is a significant increase over a decade and a course who wanted to be all 32 and we will keep pushing until we get there but the movement that we saw over the last two years particularly in countries like germany that put an extra

100 billion-year-olds on the table in their own defense after the war started speaks volumes aboutbo where we are on the subject. but when we talk about burden sharing it's not just about 2% of gdp spending on defense. burden sharing takes us to the question if ukraine. here we are also seeing remarkable levelsab of burden sharing across the alliance for the united states over the last few years has provided roughly $74 billion worth of support to our friends in ukraine. ouour european allies collectivy have provided somewhere around the order of $110 billion worth of support to ukraine. every single member of the alliance is providing assistance to ukraine, economic, humanitarian and security assistance. so burden sharing is something that we have seen, an area where we have seen tremendous positive shifts just over the last two

years. third, nato has added two new members are you'll remember after the war started in 2022 there was a knock at the door in two countries that had hundreds of years of nonalignment and decided to shift their national policy and request formal nato membership, not in five years, not in a decade and not in two years but immediately or they wanted to start it immediately and as you well know finland became an official member last spring and just joined and now has taken its lead to the table just a couple of weeks ago and those two allies are already making many meaningful contributions to the alliance every day.bu number four nato rolled out a new signature concept and 2022. this is something new. nato regrets the strategic concept its core mission statement about once a decade. what was new about this particular strategic concept was

that in addition to mentioning the two threats that the alliance is facing russia and terrorism, for the first time in nato's history the strategic concept mentions the prc challenges associated with the prc form nato member states and the importance of keeping our partnership withs, our friends n the indo pacific. why is nato doing this? does this have aspirations to become a d global alliance and members in the indo pacific? absolutely not. that's not thers plan. our indo pacific partners don't have an interest in joining the alliance and the alliance is not looking to go global but what we see is increased utility in working together with their friends in the indo pacific on the number of shared security challenges that really have no geographic boundaries. disinformation, malicious cyber

attack more emerging and disruptive technology. we be viewed these security challenges increasingly in one theater and not limited to just the atlantic or the pacific so nato is moving out while it's focused on the war in ukraine. it is moving out to deepen its important or partnerships with their friendsep to share best practices on those challenges. finally nato while it's been addressing the challenges in ukraine and coping with the russian threat has taken a series of unprecedented steps to address a wide range of emerging and future challenges and i will give you a couple of examples. we have new initiatives across the alliance into new domains cyber and -- you remember when nato was created we focused on land, sea and air and now increasingly the alliance is moving out to focus on security threatsit in cyberspace and in

state proper. nader announced a 1 billion-year-old innovation fund a to protect our collective technologicall edge. nato is in the process of building something called the defense innovation accelerator for the north atlantic that has the handy name of diana to solve critical defense challenges, both with the private-sector and with academic. we have expanded our work across the nato alliance on climate securityie and also resilience. we have identified 18 areas such as our telecommunications networks, our health system and continuity of government that must remain resilient in the face of any potential attacks. and last summer we announce something called the defenset production act -- action plan to ensure that nato has the industrial capacity and the capabilities that it needs to support its defense plans. so taken together what does all of this mean for this alliance

and enhance deterrence, the new resourcing regime, the new members that are still trying to join this alliance, the deeper partnerships with their friends in the indo pacific and all of the new initiatives that we are rolling out to cope with future challenges. well it tells us at 75 this alliance remains relevant, it remains resilient and it remains ready for the future. and that'sut why we look forward to hosting this year's anniversary summit right here in washington d.c. july 9 through the 11th where we will no doubt celebrate 75 years of historic achievements are strong transatlantic bond in nato's vital importance in defending against future threats. in addition to the celebration week course will be spending a lot of time at the summit focused on ukraine. i can't predict and none of us

can with any certainty what the war will look like come july but here's what we do now. all 32 heads of state will be traveling to washington d.c. in july to showcase their unwavering resolve in helping ukraine win. we will send a strong signal to president putin that he can't wait us out three we are not distracted and we are looking away and we remain focused on ukraine's immediate and future security needs. we will take concrete steps at the summit to move ukraine closer to the alliance and build a bridge to nato membership. in the course in addition to ukraine the alliance will be making a series of new announcements on many of the subjects i just mentioned are the rare rolling out new initiativesve that it relates to cyber, the resilience to climate security and defense production as well. so let me close just with this.

sometimes encounter folks that wonder whether nato's 75 years, whether or not that's the reliability and i have a very short answer on those types of questions. nato 75 years of experience, that is not a liability, that is an asset. 75 years of working towards consensus with our closest allies dayur after day on nato's core mandate and their future mandate have made unity our greatest strength. h.yes working with 31 other alls day in and day out does have its challenges. it's not always easy to get 32 nations to agree around the table but when allies to put their full weight behind an issue or a position for a new initiative there is no question that it has regional and global implications. i think madeleine albright

formerly a professor here at course in their first female secretary of state said it best whenst she said we know that whn democracy of europe and american are divided crevices are created through which forces of and aggression may emerge spelling may stand together there is no force on earth more powerful than our solidarity on behalf of freedom. and that's it, right there. it's our solidarity, the solidarity that makes nato stronger and it made nato one of the most successful alliances in history and one that has made the alliance ready for tomorrow's challenges. thank you very much and i look forward to your questions. [applause] >> thank you. >> thank you ambassador smith and thank you everyone for being here. i'm david sanger from "the new

york times" and just so you understand the order of the next few minutes, the ambassador and i are going to talk for about half an hour and then we will go out to questions for everybody. there are couple of microphones lined up where you can stand for your question. so thank you for coming. >> thank you. it's great to see you at again in a previous flight. we had offices next to each other but it was hard to imagine that you'd be ambassador of nato. i'm still doing the same thing i was doing. soso let me start with your comments about what it is we learned in the past two years. it's been an extraordinary moment for nato. i think you summarized itou wel,

that there were decades really where they were doing expeditionary out of area operations. there was a lot of debate within nato is this really what we were created for? there was some debate, do we need nato anymore? one of my favorite conversations that i dug up when i was working on this whole board the book that you heard reference before the intro discussions mostly in the bush administration about whether you could bring the russian nato and the russian nato office gave them an office inside the headquarters. i think it's gone. >> it is gone. >> yeah so that takes you to the question of what we have, what we were surprised by what we have learned. you gave us some of the great strengths that come together. there are three things that strike me that to took nato by

surprise and i wanted to run through them with you. give us a sense of how they react. in the opening days of the war or in the run-up to the war a lot of european leaders, even the weekend before the war were telling me for telling you were telling secretary blinken rushes just bluffing. their economic interests are so great and providing gas and oil, they would never take this route. he's just trying to negotiate a solution. what lessons have emerge from the fact that while the united states did lie to the intelligence they didn't believe oure assessment of the intelligence. >> you are right. this was an interesting time for me because i was confirmed in

november of 2021 and that was right in the of the think it was early i fall 2021 when we had taken the biden administration had taken the decision to share an unprecedented amount of intelligence with our closest allies to bring them into what we thought was a clear indication that they weren't just bluffing. this wasn't just posturing, they were preparing to go to war and so i landed in brussels late at november in 2021 and i frankly didn't quite know what to expect. i guess my assumption going and was that the united states is putting information on the table and the debate would shift and we would all then sing from the same songib sheet but in fact wt happened is exactly what you are

describing. there were many allies around the table that were saying come on, we hear what you were saying and we appreciate the fact that you have shared this level of intelligence with us many times, not just in one instance the -- >> you were beginning to make it public. >> that's right. and we were making it public absolutely and with our closest allies. but then one of my most vivid memories is when the phone rang at february 22 at 3:00 a.m. and we always talk about the

3:00 a.m. phonecalls in the united states. it literally rang around that time and we went in for the emergency north atlantic council meeting. before the meeting got started one of my colleagues from eastern europe raised his hand and before we were going to launch into a series of assessing activating nato's graduation response plans in the flurry of activities he said i just need to say look down the table at me and said i didn't believe you. >> secretary blinken.

but sorry, so what that did, the fact that tragically russia decided to go forward with this war and there were several diplomatic efforts with the chip -- trips to geneva around the table at the north between the u.s. and the other nato members, the agreement has fundamentally changed? >> i think it's fundamentally change t in the changes that we saw two years ago are still ever-present today in the nato

alliance in terms of this seriousness with which allies look at and consider u.s. intelligence. there were two other areas that jumped out at me from my reporting on this period. one in the oldest -- your pet pretty much stopped making conventional artillery. krthe ukrainians while the u.s. and microsoft and amazon servicesin and others fabulous b moving the ukrainian government to the cloud there had been no planning for how they were going to communicate. elon musk stepped in and solve this. that was not part of the plan. so i'm wondering if you could bring us up to date on that side and the communication side. >> yeah so sorry. twoaf things. first and foremost on what was

happening in europe before the war one of the hardest lessons i think of the were in ukraine for the nato allies is a deeper appreciation and understanding of the brittleness of the transatlantic t defense industrl base and some of the shortages that we were seeing because of a the aging and shrinking workforce across that defense industrial base and so what we thought were nato standards that would enable us all to have the stops necessary to cope with any potential contingency ukraine opened our eyes to the reality that first and foremost you do have a lot more in hand but also we needed to open up those production lines that we had shuttered many many years ago and rethink about how we would and we are still in the process of doing this, back to the, back

to the shortages and hoaxes across the alliance because of the critical assistance that's been provided to our friends in ukraine. that defense production community is front and center for us in the transatlantic project we have seen some remarkable steps forward in just two short years but my goodness we have a lot more work to do ahead of us. let me cite one amazing example. the jack: used to produce about 10,000 per year they are now producing 100,000.155. there areha many more and we hae done a lot to increase production here in the united states especially on ammunition but frankly across many systems. ukraine pieceai of it, there isa

very interesting set of different lessons that we have learned from them and learning in real time and that is this war with russia with ukrainian in the middle of defending their territory have brought emerging tech into what sometimes feels and i knowte general millie hasa great "methods in your book we feel it's trench warfare. it feels not like world war ii but there's an element of that with tanks rolling back and forthwith the trench warfare brings us backhar to world war i and get the ukrainians are appearing new technology in drones using apps swiped right for more ammunition. unbelievable with the ukrainians have done in terms of attaching new technology to basically soviet legacy equipment. so on that side of things yes they are feeling the pinch of the shortfalls that exist in

europe and in the united states but they also continue to innovate throughout the war and use technology to their advantage and that's why nader just recently created something called jay pack which will allow ukrainians and distracts the lessons learned on how they are finding their rations and what is mater dei combat with recent look like. no one knows that better than our friends in ukraine right now and has pieces of the sci-fi movie and yet it also has pieces of world war i conventional warfare. >> it's interesting you say in effect is going to ask about the millie quote. i will cut out a little bit of it. as he only always said he speaks army is his first language but you said trench warfare for a well we thought this would be a

cyber war and then we thought it was looking like an old-fashioned world war ii tank war and then there are days when i thought they were fighting world war i. and the fact of the matter is and i said these are my words and not his 1914 and part 2024. >> completely and that's exactly it. >> does nato have its hands around the alteration and you are doing something that mixes -- >> absolutely. first and foremost we are working to exact the lessons learned and what it means the winds in increasing production. we have thought increasingly about how nato standards need to continue to drive and sends signal to defense industry. if nato says for example let me take a random number nato mandate that all members must

have lets say 30 days of ammunition and then suddenly says not 30 days, six months a year three months whatever it is and dramatically increases with the nato standard is that all allies have to meet. obviously then sends the right signal to industry that hey this has a future in this merits reopening because the answer you get from defense industry so often now when we pound on their doors and say please produce more and faster both for our own stocks and her friends in ukraine they often say well you need it right now but will you need it next year and we have seen this movie before where nato allies think they need a certain capability and then they back off a bit or they pivot to something else or planning dictates a different set of requirements so we are trying to take a longg hard look at what those nato standards are

particularly as we refill our stocks based on the assistance they provided but then to send the right signal that this will be a lasting project for the alliance and the way we see it this will be, the defense production piece of it will be over the next decade we are going to be working on not only ensuring that we have to stocks necessary to counter any potential threat but to backfill and continue to get the ukrainians what they need. >> so i know you were celebrating the 2% mark or for 32 countries but that 2% mark or was at 10 years ago and a couple of months in berlin and i some time with the german defense officials about their plans to do exactly what you just described. well the plans are impressive

you can't do it for the 72 billion-year-olds a year on defense. it's hard for me to say this with any accuracy but i have my doubts whether you could do it for twice what theyou are sendig and yet the political conversation including in germany has not caught up with the cost of doing what you just described. >> yes. there is good news and news. and the good news we are getting 2% of news is 2% want do it anymore. >> it's interesting if you go back and look at the language from the summit last summer what did we say about 2%? >> said that it is -- and we said that because increasingly when we look at what's going to be required for the future we increasingly believe that additional resources above and beyondbo every country hitting %

are going to be needed and secretary austin has been there about that in no doubt the general will mention it later today andn what are we seeing n europe? we are seeing countries now stretched to 3%. we have a number of countries that are already at 2.5. that's just the baltic states by the way romania some of our friends andi a whole array of countries are looking at 3% in the polls are talking about 4%. obviously with thehe polls becae they are right there on the edge of what's happeningof in ukraine they feel this war in ways that others don't feel it so acutely but it is a conversation that is occurring across the alliance day in and day out about whether or not even when we all hit 2% whether or not that will be sufficient because you are right to point out thatt not only did the backfill work that we had to do but to prepare for all

contingencies including in some of those new areas that i mentioned it's going to require resourcing. >> a bill in congress right now is at $54,000,000,000.1 and still it is. much of the ammunition is just going to backfill, you would actually result in more ammo going to the ukrainians. >> it's both, it's both and that's what we have to get the supplemental the supplemental its absolute critical we get it through congress with the ukrainians need this support desperately. they need to have u.s. continue to peter schiff and they need to endorsements. we want to make sure they don't wonder the summer resting theire ammunition or facing unnecessary shortfalls. we want to put them in the best position possible. they already are rationing. >> they are rationing and they are our shortage is that they are grappling with and i very

much open we all hope that supplemental will get through no later than the end of this month. >> so let's talk vermont about something you rates at the end of your discussion which is the delicate dance of nato in admitting ukraine into nato eventually. no secret there is division in the nato alliance and to the eastern europeans are clear and they want the man basically now. the president had a chance to show the two leaders who were the l most vocal. you cannot admit a country while it's in the midst of a war. and it sounds from what i'm hearing it's vague about when ukraine would be admitted and move similarly moving forward.

president zelensky came in pretty hot. we read his tweets as all of you were. tell us say you are managing this. >> we will look in filming this we did a lot. we came together. had some challenges allies have different perspectives as you noted but we did come together on a couple of things, first and foremost we said to the ukrainians there's no question about membership and you will become a member of this alliance. your future is in nato and we will continue to work to get there. we also made clear that there are a number of reforms to be granted full-fledged membership and that's a challenge that they face in their making good

progress. we just had secretary blinken in brussels last week we were able to get a report from the ukrainians on all they are doing in the security forms. list for thessive country in the middle of a war to make progress on anticorruption is affable and so we applaud those efforts and we encouragels them to keep going t also in addition to basically saying to them look nato will agree to full-fledged membership with ukraine and allies agreed and that holds >> it least it's a stopping point. >> ukraine comes in and sits as an equal around the table and is able to share first-hand impressions and insights on the war and we can hear what they are plans are but we can t also talk about other subjects. we have meetings of the ukraine

council on attacks on on critical in structure on critical and structure only talk to them about cyber attack so look for ways to provide additional assistance but we did another important thing last year and that was the membership action plan that many new members have gone through which can be a bit of a lengthy process. we removed that entirely and said he will not have a membership action plan. you will proceed towards a session with the timing is right. your question is whether you going to do this summer on top of what you did last summer of membership is known the table and there we will have a concrete deliverable for ukraine. i can't get into the full details of that at this juncture but we are working on a way to get them on what we are calling a bridge to membership by deepening nato's work with the ukrainians on questions of interoperability and modernization providing

additional resources to our friends r in ukraine and institutionalizing some of the bilateral support that has been provided they make you mentioned cyber. several years before the war broke out nato agreed a major cyber attack on the member would constitute a -- tell us a little bit about how they are using cyber inside ukraine or at monmouth cyber attack and the -- in what you were seeing outside of ukraine. he probably expected a more active russian attack in the nato nations but not dramatically higher. >> the gate i guess the way we describe that it hasas in essene

been in the steady state. the rations this is one of their favorite tools of a variety of hybrid taxis in which they rely. maliciouss cyberattacks are something we have seen them or lie on time and time again. obviously it has anto impact inside ukraine on the battlefield with ukrainian public to create political strategic dilemmas for president zelensky to drive disinformation. they also used disinformation on a regular basis as well. but cybersecurity and cyberattacks are regular part of what we cope with across the alliance is ever-present and it's not just up and down the eastern flank. i'd be hard-pressed to find an ally that hasn't dealt with some site of -- some sort of cyber attack and oh by the way the amount of learning that's happening between the prc and russia is staggering. those two actors increasingly

learned from each other and rely on that cyber instrument to divide the nato alliance from within, to divide europe from the united states well into wars but also cyber attack son or government structures and their systems on what the ukrainians are doing on the battlefield so what nato is doing about it, nato started first and foremost with protecting its own networks. otthat was project number one in declaring cyber and new domain which happened in 2016 as you noted and then from there last year we built a virtual cyber response capability under which an ally that is under attack can knock on nato's door and say what's available in termsbl of finding forensic help, need help patching the system. i have part of my government that's off-line and what can nato provide me onli the fly and there we have this virtual

response almost like a chinese pendulum. a whole array of options that you can hand to an alley and say this is available to you today. >> have you made use of this? >> yeah and it don't want to get into details about that but we put it to use. and now at this summit what we are going to be focused on we will have four or five new cyber deliverables at the washington summit working on holding better capacity at the national level across the alliance and you know better than anyone we have nato members that are best in class when it comes to preventing, deterring detecting cyber attacks and we have allies that are catching up. so we want to bring the capacity of all allies up to the same level when it comes to counter defense. >> your nato members u.s. and

britain have pretty good offensive cyber capabilities that i've read about. you admission -- envision -- >> we are not talking about this. >> erased the chinese cooperation with the rations in cyber but obviously it's broader than that. i would say one of the surprises in this era is at the partnership development turned out to have some limits and it was announced by president xi and president putin, as one of the major dynamics in our conflict now it's also what kissinger decades or years anyway trying to deploy and that was the motivation for -- in china. two yearss into this it was announced at the olympics prior

to the invasion in 2022. how do you assess the level of chinese and russian cooperation and i guess i will throw the iranians in as well. there was a lot of battlefield help and drone help. >> yes and let's not forget the prk as well. the amount of assistance that the dprk has provided to their friends in russia has had a major impact. >> are you talking about the artillary? >> yeah. >> you had a major impact. >> certainly something the allies increasingly talk about but but this brings us back to e theme that i mentioned earlier widest nato invest so much and why is nato investing so much right now in the partnerships of japan australia and new zealand

because we have so much to learn from one another about what the dprk is doing to support rush in thisis moment. they can talk about the prc not direct lethal support but an indication they are providing some sort of matériel support for dual-use components and we talk a lot about that across the alliance and their indo pacific partners in the forces you noted the iranian peace as well. they have provided a whole upgrade a very effective drones. >> the u.s. has been doing a lot to try to interrupt that supply chain with sanctions of many kinds. how effective is that and you think there has been any impact on dave rainey and the ability to produce? i know they are trained to produce iranian icbm. >> it's an ongoing project for

the transatlantic partners. the sanctions piece obviously isn't handled by the nato alliance and i'm sure our ambassador to the european union could doubt get up here and tell you why the last two gears have also been incredibly transformative for the u.s. eu relationship because of what's happened in ukraine. the amount of work that we have done with the european union on sanctions on support for our friends in ukraine has also been just absolutely remarkable but back to your question about the prc and russia we do find yourselves across the alliance increasingly grappling with this question of how do we draw attention, each of us bilaterally in our relationship with the prc to call them out on this matériel support to apply pressure not to continue to provide that kind of support and make sure that they understand the consequences if they

continue down this path. i think it's been a very effective area of work for all the transatlantic partners. we are seeing many countries across europe be much more forthcoming in calling out the chinese for this no limits partnership with russia but also for their political support to what russia is doing in ukraine and that matériel support that i just mentioned. >> the core of the nato security since nato's creation 75 years ago with the nuclear deterrence and yet we have seen in the past two years a revival of nuclear threats. i describe in the book in october of 2022 when you and your colleagues are quite concerned and in fact some of

your colleagues had a 50/50 chance that russia would have the battlefield nuclear weapon. tell us a low bit about how that experience may have been transforming to nato members. were they fully aware as the u.s. was of the nature of this threat and then let's talk about how it may be changing the way nato that's the strategy? >> first one we revote the contract in 2022 b.c. you see when you read the document nuclear deterrence remains the backbone of nato's deterrence policy no question and our wording on that is very clear. as long as nuclear weapons exist it will remain a nuclear alliance so that's not going anywhere in the language on that i think ishe clear. i b think you're right to point out with the war in ukraine and all of its nuclear's saber

rattling that we've seen in the part of president putin we now gotten into almost a review of what nuclear deterrence involves what it means where and we are working day in and day out to raise would call our nuclear iq and dusting off,, i mean just the whole theory of deterrence i would say back to the forefront when the war started we were back where nato started 75 years ago. obviously we take what putin says seriously and the u.s. was able to share more with our allies to help them understand what we were seeing but honestly it's what putin has been saying that has gotten everyone's attention. he's been very public about this and very outspoken on the potential use of tactical nuclear weapons in ukraine. not as much recently that you are bright and early stages before we heard of lots about the potential use of tactical

nuclear weapons so you can imagine what the reaction was around the alliance. we were deeply concerned. at the same time i think the u.s. made it very clear publicly but also privately to our closest allies that we didn't see any clear indication that the rations were actually preparing to use nuclear weapons not then and not now. so we take this nuclear's saber rattling seriously and we continue to monitor the situation. we are in close contact with allies up and down the eastern flank that are obviously gravely concerned about thiss product -- process that we have one reassure allies about what we were seeing if we were seeing signs of weapons being moved closer to the border but also just the need to continually warned the rations that there

would be serious and i think jake sullivan said catastrophic consequences should rush off to do something. >> president biden compared to the cuban crisis and the fund-raiser in new york. we hear him in his most candid. it was a searing moment. they did not move any nuclear weapons as you say. they did hear commanders discussing the possibility and that made a bigg difference. alas question for you is the think about the summit that coming forward. there are the -- there are the assurances that you can put on paper. there's the capability that you can build any describe how you were doing that. but the political atmosphere made a big difference to allies

conviction that the u.s. would' be there should they need to invoke our help. one candidate said publicly what he would do and i assume he meant but it's hard to know the 2% that separate and apart from candidate trump's arguments it is in europe today in part because of our own hesitancy in passing the ukrainian bill, a questioning about whether or not the political body in the united states is as committed to nato as it was before. the republican party has several prominent members who have expressed their doubts e both in ukraine and they may just be

voicing noise out here and i suspect the majority of the parties has the full view. this must be a problem that drives you and you can't do anything about it. all you can do is look on the capability n seidin on the political side. >> that's not entirely true. i think it's on all of us, those of us that work on native issues to continue to make the case and last year i traveled throughout my home state the state of michigan to have conversations with the governor with a variety of student groups and michigan and michigan state state. i was able to do talk radio and a lot of outreach to answer those questions about why do we have the nato alliance and why should we be supporting ukraine? i'm heading off to ohio tomorrow to do the same thing. some of it's out of my control

and i was sure you'd asked this question but here's what i say question. this there are two concerns about the united states and the security of the atlantic. one is are you getting the supplemental done in his u.n. support for ukraine over and is now on as where the europeans have to take over and provide aid to ukraine and two can we count on seven more decades of u.s. presence of all political stripeses standing up and supporting the nato alliance. i think my answer on both fronts are pretty optimistic. one, i think we have visitors coming through from congress almost every week. delegations that are made up of republicans and democrats traveling together and all i hear from them time and time again as we are going to get the supplemental done. there's ae' broad-based supportn the house and in the senate.

it bipartisan support of ukraine to there are members of the house we all know that are skeptical and don't want to see the supplemental go through but by and large when that vote comes to the floor we are confident. you have to get it to the floor and that's the challenge. two on broad u.s. support for the alliance of the public opinion data every -- recent poll that came out the shows u.s. support foria the nato alliance is up and it seems that folks increasing understand why this alliance serves u.s. interests and why it serves our allies interest and the sticker that we say a lot stronger together isn't just a sticker. it's the truth. coping with ukraine is something we need to do with 50 other countries around the world in terms of providing valuable security. coping with instability elsewhere in the world requires us to work with our closest

allies and partners just not in ukraine. fundamental americans understand the value of alliances and important to the nato alliance in particular but also i will say when i travel around the united states and encounter americans in places far away from washington d.c. i think again there is this kind of bipartisan support that nato is not a partisan issue. it always has a post is the going in that direction like any policy subject but from where i sit right now whether i'm traveling across united states or engaging with congress are doing press interviews with talk radio outlets, i think nato enjoys a privileged place in american foreign policy that by and large the majority of americans understand why it was created and why it still

relevant 70 years later. that's what we are going to be trying to do at the summit this summer. >> if people would like to line up i think what we are going to do is probably take two questions at a time. our time is short. the ambassador revealed in the course of the death of her diplomatic feel field that she went to michigan and michigan state. >> outreach yes. i didn't study there. >> i understand that but just the two for aou day tells you yu were still here. when we take the first two questions. >> thank you. the atlantic council -- last week the secretary-general confirmed that at the washington summit the alliance will put forward its first southern plank strategy. now some people would look at that and say well the alliance

has a big problemm on its easten flank so why is it rut at the southern flank so can you say why the alliance and why the united states should care about the southern flank of the alliance and what specifically you'd like to see in the southern flank strategy in the summit. >> hi thank you for this discussion and raising the voice of -- i was wondering when you talked about -- it comes to my mind how effective sanctions are the russia has sanctions in the former soviet bloc like central asia and china. and what is the philosophy and

how you would you address it at the nato level in your own level? i'm from the sender political and global studies. >> great, let me start with the south. it was a good question. you know we have kind of a phrase that we use around the nato alliance that we have a three to 60-degree approach which means that the alliance is not exclusively focused on the north atlantic or the southern flank or the eastern flank that we simultaneously try to take on all of those areas and those new regional plans that i mentioned in my remarks actually defied all nato territory into three different regions and there is a region in the general can say more about this, that has very detailed plans for nato south on how to defend against any potential forms of instability or for any attacks on nato's

southern flank. here's a question on the table and that is while the alliance is focused on the war in ukraine what more can the alliance be doing to address some of the potential challenges or threats that emanate from the south and fair, there's a whole array of things to talk about. you'll be surprised to hear that her southern member states from portugal and spain italy a full array of countries want to see the alliance fortify its initiatives and policies in a particular area. late last year we appointed a group of experts a small group of policymakers and academics with deep experience in handling some of those southernrn challenges. you just recently came to the nato alliance and presented us with over 100h different ideas f what the alliance could do to move out and strengthen its

deterrence and defense and the way in which it protects the southern flank. nato is in the middle of debating those over 100 recommendations and there are a lot of good ideas there. there are small things in than their bigger more ambitious initiatives that between now and july the allies are going to have to settle on a handful of initiatives that will enable us toia deliver on something for te south and as i noted also earlier era to chief threats we are facing inside the nato alliance russia and terrorism so we want to ensure nato continues to do good work in both of those cases and fortifying its deterrence to counter both threats but i don't want t to gt into where the u.s. position on those 100 plus recommendations. i can't get into the details of that because we are literally right in the middle of debating

all of those good recommendations that you are right to note the alliance will have something more to say about a southern flank and the reason i think that's important and why the secretary-general thinks it's important is to showcase for any would-be adversary or after that we are prepared for all contingencies. this is an alliance that canada's old adage goes walk and gum at the same time. as i said nato is addressing ukraine but simultaneously moving on an array of new initiatives. on the sanctions questions i mean again nato doesn't take on sanctions per se. this is not part p of our straty inside the alliance so i'm hesitant to get into it. both europe and united states

have imposed since the start of the war have had an impact. there are instances where we continue to work with airport closest partners in europe through the eu and g7 relationship to get at the heart of that to prevent it from happening and it remains a key feature of what we work on with their transatlantic partners. we believe the sanctions that have been put on the table since the war started have left the russian's with $400 billion less than they would have normally to put towards this military operation. the fact that the russian's are now turning to countries like the dprk or iran or the prc for capabilities and technologyy sas a lot about what the west has been able to do to shut off the flow of potential components that could help them pursue it.

>> we are hearing upwards of half? that there are instances where we see a significant level and what they provided. >> to more here and i think that will bring us to the end. make your questions very short because we are running out of time. >> i'm a graduate here. my question is europe will increase its role in defense capability and european member states to each apply their national requirements for the pure curt -- procurements which

would restrict supply chains and mobilize together. i was wondering how nato is approaching not just expanding the defense industrial base but also seeking to better align capabilitieses. >> one more question. my name is brad morris and i'm from the office of the australian department. my question is u.s. withdraw from afghanistan in 2022, what impact did it have with u.s.

relations under nato allies and was there an impact here regarding the months leading up to the start of the war in ukraine regarding u.s. intelligence of allies? >> on that question you are a member i mentioned i was confirmed in late november of 2021. i actually was here at the state department serving as afr senior adviser to secretary blinken to allow most of 2021. i was not inside the nato alliance at the time during the withdrawal from afghanistan and i feel like i'm probably not the best person to talk about that. on the question of fragmentation across europe industrial base and the associated challenges that we are seeing is result of under investment over many decades, this is a challenge that nato is going to have to work on very closely with the european union. we were pleased to see the european union recently rolled out a european defense industrial strategy. it's a very interesting piece of work that clearly, very clearly articulates these challenges

that europe faces for the foreseeable future when it comes to building upts its defense industrial base and getting that duplication and some of the challenges of fragmentation that were mentioned by the individual that asked the question. we do however want to ensure that as the european unions thinks about taking on a friday of new initiatives to build out defense production and build capacity that it relies on nato standards are the last thing we want to do is for the european unions to establish its own set of standards. we would then have situations where countries are looking at their own national standards and requirements and looking out the nato is delivering in terms of what's mandated when it comes to nato membership and then there would be a new aspect to it with

the european union potentially putting a different setld of standards on the table. the european union is reassuring us that they will rely on nato's standards. to keep it that way and we want to encouraged our friends in the european nation a least in the short-term as they look to buildout capacity and address some of the shortfalls that we addressed at the top that it continues to look at non-eu member states for ways to backfill. omi understand where the europen union wants to focus on