co ambassador mark. thank you. [applause] >> thanks for the introduction and thanks for the great work that you are doing. welcome everyone. we are unique institution in foreign policy. we are congressionally chartered. scholarship driven and we are fiercely nonpartisan and independent. i always say that special status rings with a special

obligations, not duplicate what others are doing but instead to prioritize the most important issues and opportunities, and those places which we believe we can add value and make a difference. so there are few topics that more fit the bill while picking high priorities in the subject of brings us here today and the discussions on iran, the middle east and u.s. involvement in the region. our work is focused on both ends of pennsylvania avenue. i can tell you that we've done more briefings and responded to more requests for briefings on this subject than any other in recent months. our goal at the wilson sent this to do our best to provide informed insights into iran's alliances in the region and the implications for u.s. national security. we are hoping in our work and in today's discussion to foster a more nuanced understanding of

the regions geopolitical dynamics that i think what we all believe is a crossroads moment in modern history. i invite all of you to partake in today's discussion, process what you hear, ask good questions. this is an important time and this is an important topic. i think we can all since their geopolitical shifts underway to take her with recent parliamentary elections and ongoing war in gaza, and the gathering storm of attacks on u.s. military and economic targets from iran's axis of resistant. resistance. the attacks have significant ramifications, not only for regional stability but i think for global development as well. iran is an active partner in putin's war plans. i think we know it's making new investments nearly every day in many regimes around the world. so this is an important time, an important topic and to get

things underway, marissa, i'm going to turn things over to you to introduce the first panel that will delve into iran, its allies and its role in the region. good luck with today's discussions which i know will help us all better appreciate the multilayered complexities of iran, its leadership and again its activities and involvement in the region and around the world. thank you. [applause] >> good morning, everyone. it's my pleasure to introduce our first panel. fortunately which will be moderated by ambassador david hale who is currently a global soul at the middle east program at the wilson center and formally ambassador to lebanon, jordan and pakistan. on the panel come first ambassador jim jeffrey who was chair of the middle east program, ali vaez, senior advisor to the president and director of the of and project

of international crisis group, and last but not least mike singh who is managing director at the washington institute for near east policy as well as lane-swig senior fellow. so over to you, david, to start the discussion. >> thank you, thank yoy regretful robin wright was set to join us but, unfortunately, is unable to do so today. so i'm stepping in. but i want to just open with a quick comment as robin had intended referencing everyone, drawing peoples attention to the odni, the office of director of national intelligence report that came out last week on iran with the assessment which is quite grim of the scope and maligned nature of iranian behavior throughout the region. their continued commitment to work on et cetera to its nuclear program, and in particular its exploitation of the situation in gaza. for all of these will be topics

for our discussion today. my own observation as a diplomat for 38 years at the state department is since 1979, our presidents and our leaders have tried almost every single strategy you could think of in the national security sort of rulebook from containment to engagement, maximum pressure to even a night of less benign neglect, none of which is actually worth in changing the nature of iranian behavior, its threat to u.s. interest. so on that happy note i would like to start perhaps with you, ali, to talk about iran's profile in the region to its network of proxies and allies, which takes to achieve those relationships as an opening sho shot. >> thank you very much, david. it's great to be back at the wilson center and to discuss this timely subject with jim and mike. let me make three broad observations in response to your question, as that of happy to delve deeper into any aspect of

this during the q&a. so first point is the war in gaza into force been a mixed bag for iran. on the one hand, the war has revived the palestinian cause in ways that was really unimaginable on october 6. and i ran has the so-called standardbearer of this cost obviously stands to benefit from this reality. also the conduct of the war has resulted in degree of radicalization that also benefits iran if the objective is recruitment in the future. the war has also fueled resistance and highlighted western double standards and enforcing international humanitarian law which also grants iran a victory in terms of its of discourse. it is also damaged israel's image and, therefore, delayed certain normalization of relations that certain arab countries and israel, and that is beneficial to iran. but on the other hand, the

horrible hamas attack on octobew and it's in the odni report as will, iran did not have any foreknowledge. ds go toward iran was going with the united states, space in the aftermath of an informal understand the both sites achieved last summer which resulted in the longest time of lawless attacks against u.s. forces in iraq and syria. it has come the war has also put iran's vulnerability on full display. iran's preoccupation with what's happening on its western borders resulted in isis exploiting its distraction and conducting an attack on iranian soil from the east. also iran has suffered multiple cyber and covert operations in this time which again highlights extreme degree of probability they have at home. it has also highlighted the reluctance of iran to sacrifice any of its strategic assets for

anything short of the fence of its homeland. and i think that weakens the credibility of iran's deterrent. second point is the overall concept of iran's regional strategy which boils down to four defense based on having these proxies and partners away from iranian borders that would deter an attack on iranian soil has proven simultaneously to be successful and yet perilous successful because the strategy has basically allowed iran to axis of visits to project power all the way from the indian ocean to the mediterranean through the red sea, and the axis operated in a much more coordinated fashion did anything we have seen in all these years. and yet, the fact that iran aids and assist an arms these groups of course creates a degree of

complicity, regardless of how much iran wants to say there's plausible deniability and these groups operate autonomously. and that renders iran vulnerable to retaliation against itself and on its soul. we came very close to that several times during the trump administration. we came very close to that after the tower 22 incident back in january or february. and this completely undermines the concept of the existence of the four defense strategy, which again is the protection of the homeland. final, third and final point i want to make at the beginning is there are two elements that help with de-escalation and one that risks further escalation on the current circumstances. the first is that a certain degree of de-escalation that happens by default simple because neither iran nor the united states wants further escalation in the region. and again tower 22 is a good

example of that. even i would argue if there was no channel either through intermediaries or the channel we now know exist in oman between iran and the u.s., even if there were no channels, because neither side wants further escalation or expansion of the conflict i think this would lead him to act cautiously as they did in aftermath of tower 22, to avoid direct entanglement. second point is the degree of domestic constraints in each of the territories of the stakeholders involved is inversely correlated to their appetite for risk. so for instance, i ran the regime is facing economic discontent, societal unrest, and, therefore, does not want to take major risks in its regional foreign policy. same applies to hezbollah. and i would argue even to certain degree the militias in

iraq, they are in a good position right now at home and they don't want to do anything that would upset the apple cart. but none of this applies to the houthis whose stock at home has actually increased as the result of the escalation to have engaged in. and finally i think the main risk which i'm worried about the most is that i think although the tower 22 incident did not end in grief, but it has increased the risk of miscalculation. i've had a conversation with american officials and iranian in the past few weeks which indicate that perception or implication of what happened is almost mirror image of one another. he was seems to believe that the much more assertive reaction to an incident in which three servicemembers were killed has restored deterrence because now there are four weeks of quiet in that area.

and, therefore, i think if there is another incident like this, use the likely to even respond stronger. thinking that this works. on the iranian side the problem is that because no iranian assets was directly targeted, they have interpreted that the u.s. has no appetite for risking too much. and it's also i think creates possibility of miscalculations in the future, especially when you have an actor like the houthis over which iran does not have as much command and control as is the case with some of these militias in iraq a special and a sonority we have a high number of casualties. i leave it here and look forward to conversation. >> thank you, ali. i am struck by recalling the history that when the united states suffered attacks by iranian proxies directed by irgc in beirut, marine barracks bombing at the two embassies we

didn't did retaliate at all. and there was a lot of talk but there was no actual action. i think the iranians have a long memory and if seeing a pattern of behavior on our part to him touching on your last part about how we react which makes me to mike. and how do you see the evolving pattern of iranian threats to u.s. interests and the various responses of the united states over the years? >> thanks david. it's going to be with everyone and i thought ali did a great job with this sort of description of what iraq has been up to in the region and the description of its four defense strategy, which i think it's important to understand that, in fact, to read as a strategy in the region, that the things were seen for a grant or not some sort of just random aligned asked with a different together in a pattern. and sometimes u.s. actions i think our putting less in pattern and it is a more randomness did you mention the marine barracks bombing, our filter retelling a the french

retaliated. >> relation they missed. >> but they retaliate. president reagan did retaliate and think most of the arena and maybe later was concerned in the late 1980s. so we've had highly variable responses. i think what we've seen is that the u.s. has never i think had a very sort of decisive strategy towards iran. iran has never been the number one party for the united states and the reason i would argue that we change our strategy over time. when i came into the nsc, national security council, and i was iran director, what of the things i could do was to determine what had come before me essentially? what was i inheriting? one thing come would wait in which actual service incumbent differs from say what you learn in in a public policy school as you know david and as jim knows is that you are never creating a policy a blank sheet of paper. you have a policy had to deal you can kind tweeted at the

margins and delete and replications can you really we write the policy. what i found was in the early 2000s there were many policy debates on iran in the wake of 9/11 but they really never resulted in much. it didn't result in any consensus on what should a policy towards iran be because the priorities from what i could tell was iraq in the middle east at that time. even though you had arguably much more compelling evidence of iran developing a nuclear weapon, certainly a long track record of the rent a be involved in terrorism against the united states iraq was a clear priority in the second priority was the broader global war on terrorism in which iran was a part but not really the primary part. kind was a focus at that time. these debates never really resolve. a lot of talk of regime change, talk of different strategies but ultimately the policy towards the nuclear program at least was to sort of trust the u.n. and the e3, the uk, france and

germany to handle what we attend to other matters as you will recall. that may have changed around say 2005, when i read sticker program became a much greater concern where as iran's support for terrorism have been our chief concern of its at least up until that time. maybe even through say the early 2000s it was iran's support for terrorism and it was our policy priority with regard to this particular threat. even after that we settled into a strategy which was i think a strategy which is very familiar to everyone here, , which was tt dual track diplomacy and coercion strategy, which was adopted by the bush administration and around 2005 with the aim of sort of compelling iran, let's say, to abandon its nuclear weapons aspirations and come to the negotiating table with the idea that then perhaps we could have some kind of come some sort of

accommodation or deal with iran that had eluded us for so many years between the u.s. and iran come since 1979. that policy was largely continued by president obama. we have since president obama had a radically different iran strategy than president bush. i would say not actually true. that he changed in some ways, engage the special indirect outreach to the supreme leader of the rent by writing letters but fundamentally the strategy that president obama pursued at first was that same dual track strategy aimed at offering carrots and sticks in an effort to get iran to the table largely to negotiate over the nuclear program. all the while the backdrop was that we had obvious if the u.s. and iran sort of killing each other actually in iraq. but i would argue that never really was the focus of american strategy with respect to iran. it was a big sort of elements of the policy, but i think the was a sense if we could get, and she

will have a few on this, if we could get a sort of strong and confident governor stitt at an iraq that was the solution for that problem in the longer run. and efforts to say she would not push backorder, she would not retaliate more directed against iran for what he was doing in iraq, i would say were not seriously contemplated, not seriously considered. i think what's change was around the middle of the obama administration that balance of how we looked at the threat andd i would look at our own capabilities change a bit. i think the was a sense after sort of the amount of time we've spent i get in sort of proxy combat with the iranians in iraq, that, in fact, the threat was greater from iran than we anticipated. the made a lot of progress other nuclear program. which suffered a lot of casualties in iraq at the hands of iranians or iranian proxies, but he think it was a declining also declining view of our own ability to deal with it. we have not had the success in

iraq we hope for. president obama campaigned in part on that idea, that we weren't successful and her back. so there's a real shift in our strategy towards iran, , away fm that dual track policy and more towards president obama's sort of second policy of let's negotiate bilaterally with the iranians because we really were worried this is headed towards war and, frankly, we don't want that war. we want to get out of the middle east to the extent we can. not out of the middle east and a grand sense, , that's exaggerat, but i think by that time the president obama's administration, 2011, 2012 there was a sense the risk is greater than the reward at that necessitated a change in strategy. that ultimately is what produced the jpo way and the jcpoa. this idea of this is the most risky most dangerous issue, nuclear issue, let's just sort of did it but to the side so we

can then pursue the middle east strategy with what we want which is decreasing commitment to the region. that's a strategy that in some ways have changed the united states still is looking to increase our footprint in middle east for sure. that's been a matter of bipartisan consensus but obvious if their approach towards iran has changed because there's been a few that that strategy of, well, let's engage in diplomacy to avoid war hasn't really been successful. i think that's not just a republican view, not just a trump view but you can see that from the biden administration to some extent as well. the sense that the idea that summer we would come to a nuclear agreement and that would lead to a warming of relations between the united states and arrest as we sort of gone away. so in a way we are back to this idea of a dual track policy, and dangling the idea of diplomacy while pairing that with threats. but i think perhaps ultimately a

bit of a low estimation of what we can ultimately achieve in the region and with respect to iran. so we've seen sort of these different eras of american policy towards iran but i would argue against and none of these eras was iran actually the priority for the united states. iran was always in a sense a risk we were trying to manage. so even today is a look at what's unfolding in the middle east, yes, iran is at the center of all the different things that all he was talking about. iran is at the center argument of the attacks in the red sea. those attacks couldn't be taken place. without a ring help and without iranian complicity. there that the center of the story of northern israel on the lebanon border because the hezbollah as a strategic asset. why do not see hezbollah firing all its missiles against israel? hezbollah is held in reserve, there to protect iran. iran is serving at the center of

the story of iraq and syrian militias clashing with the united states. iran may also be the senate franco of the cost of storage i'm sure iran necessarily knew exactly when hamas would factor when we do but could hamas have acted without iranian help? i think most of us would say no. and if iran is accountable for that. and yet if you look at the international response, so little of it as had anything to do with iran. iran has arguably made significant strategic gains throughout this process, in fact, over seven. it has driven a wedge between u.s. and israel. it has isolated u.s. conditional on the world stage. it has elevated hamas i would say in the palestinian sphere and the houthis have gained in their profile and the price iran has paid, the price that we the united states have exacted on iran, it's been pretty low for argument has been basically zilch. so we see sort of this era of one study to the next what iran

is never really the top priority for the united states, which i think since i ran just fine. i think if you go back to what all he was talking about, part of iran strategy is to keep its adversaries including the united states preoccupied with other things so they are not focused on iran. let me say briefly, i do think that we again are saying, we are seeing interesting things on the rent in terms of iraq's own strategy shifting. one question that race is what will that produce from the united states and from the west in general? we see interesting shifts. we see a much clearer alignment from iran with china and russia, which is something i hope we will talk more about. iran has always been so diplomatically available in a sense, we haven't gotten very far often with a diplomacy with iran but iran has always sort of kept the door open with the west. that may have to do with the desire for craig picked me to do with the populations inclination towards the west.

there may be multiple reasons for it but it seems as though the door is increasingly shut, for lots of reasons, and it is aligning much more closely with china and russia and all the other actors that are part of that sphere. we see iran increasingly becoming a player in the global arms market providing drones and maybe ballistic missiles to russia. and we hit the same time iran being interested in conventional systems that it hasn't really fielded before, fighter jets and things like this. that's the big shift from iran as well. at the same time we see inside iran not just the crackdown on the populace of what i think most question to post this as a sort of hardline turn as well as a preoccupation with succession. we may soon find ourselves dealing with iran which isn't lead by this supreme leader or any supreme leader but looks very different, something like a military dictatorship or something like that that is more hardline and again more aligned with big american adversaries that it has been in the past.

i'm not sure, david, what the conclusion is for my remarks. we had a shift in american strategy from one area to the next. never i would say a very close focus on iran which is in part when you see the some scattered american response and the reluctance to sort of go all in and to take big risks in our response to iran. at the scene to shift in strategy from iran itself and that you wonder whether those shifts in strategy will prompt something different from the united states and the west going forward. >> thank you, mike. very helpful. jim, i'll turn fubo leverages comment briefly, keeping the focus our attention of the situation today and what you think u.s. policy should be addressing in terms of threats. >> thank you very much. first of all i agree with everything ali and mike said, and of going to answer your question that it's going to be a frustrating two minutes. >> okay. >> okay.

so here's the scenario. a powerful hostile regional state allied with global opponents of the american-led global order with both ideological and geopolitical interests and expanding in its region by challenging the u.s. and its partners. after huge losses initially as it started this quest in direct action against the u.s. and its partners, this regional state shifted to a proxy effort throughout its region in country after country, finding ideological or other linked forces, and worked against the local governments and the overall u.s. interests in an indirect way while never exposing itself directly to the

point of actual combat with the united states. who am i talking about, audience? [inaudible] >> who? [inaudible] >> no. although cuba isn't bad. no. [inaudible] >> communist china. that's what they did throughout the region, it even though i was involved in that, because of been around for so long, that also challenge, i added up about nine different countries from korea all the way to inject, of which the u.s. was involved in all of them except india and only partially because it was very complicated burma. philippines twice, southeast asia two major conflict there, thailand, indonesia. but here's the difference. the chinese got nowhere up to

1972. no clear-cut victory after the limited successes with korea at great cost. that's why they lost almost 1 million people and french indochina up to 1954. beyond that, every, every place they either lost, 1932 i was there in vietnam, they either lost or the jury is still out. and that was a fact i'm not the major but a factor in their of course historic flip. so in looking, my answer to your question, david, is if we want to do with an extraordinarily similar situation, we have to look at how we dealt with communist china. and folks, you are not going to like the answer. first of all, for those people who keep on saying we have two

wac iran whenever one of their surrogates hit us, and i've been one of those from time to time,, we never actually did that. we came close in a direct confrontation in 1958, but beyond that we never really contemplated, including repeatedly when the chinese shot down american aircraft. rather, what we did is conclude that it was an existential american interest to stop these people and, therefore, we engage with her own circuits throughout the region and several times threat vietnam, reality, korea, limited direct combat involvement, if necessarily put our own troops in harm's way but most of the time we fought through surrogates and extremely

messy, expensive war. we had to deal with all kinds of corrupt forces. we didn't care. we had to smash people who could make claims that they were the local agrarian farmers. we didn't care. this led to take it the with vietnam but on other issues as well, huge dissent within the united states. ..

sometimes against the will of the mother, ideological supporter but the end of the day in the case of the middle east a limited exception where we were both in the administration and they are mainly in iraq and syria were taken on a push back against these guys and essentially everything that will make them happy we have to challenge. we are not there in the normal we will be to finish up, because we have not pushed back, exactly what we thought what happened,

it has metastasized with first hamas attack which was an existential threat and the cooties shut it down. these are dramatic steps and for the first time we are getting significant pushback. it is shift in u.s. policy and some degree so the jury is still out on where we will go from here. >> building on comparison,

building around china we have attempted some of the same in the middle east but less structured and a lot of our allies will turn it over the interest in behavior and they have normalized this relationship around last year also normalizations was israel and israel itself is going through soul-searching and/or strategies will be needed and they are less likely to accept

has a lot and hamas and others posing a threat. could you delve into some of those questions? >> let me just say in response that may be one reason china failed in this affidavit by the nuclear weapon in the existential threat resulted in them agreeing which is a factor but probably don't have enough time to talk about with the panel but iran is not a priority but even russia and china were

engaged and now iran is closer and it's not even new anymore so that is what we have to take into consideration. it is what they want to get out of normalization and reduce the threat posed in this economic plan because they are not given current anything in this economic investment and trade none of that has happened in that imbalance i see this and until they can figure out a way

of adding to the relationship either they are involved in what is happening on the political process along with egypt and etc. could bring in iran there is a way forward. otherwise a matter of time and the same applies to iraq he's and a degree of iraqis will get themselves out of the line of fire and it is the pensions we have seen. iran does not want iraq to be undermined and the leader of

iran and from my research one reason they have stopped in the aftermath of what happened. i think that covers a lot of bases. >> do you have any thoughts on this? >> the hager and erin. >> i think for a long time partners especially hope united states will do something about karen and getting into these and now we have the united states isn't going and i think it is

proven correct but i think there is a view of karen but not just the regime is there to stay and i think it is produced d.c. normalization process because no one really has normal religious iran engaged alliances with diplomatic or ballistic from corporation and alluded to that diplomatically they are and normalization cashless on the

solution to him that existed for long and is the efforts. it's largely for the united states and the military and they talk about pursuing their own and they are directed at iran. i think we see versions of this and they are the only ones participating. they have embraced the united states closely it's a little more complicated and it goes

back to russia and it's a troublesome at but as you see that there operated written. we are triumphant and touring the region but i think it is shortsighted. they may take pleasure in the fact that the united states wants to shift the focus away from the middle east but i think iran is aligning themselves with china and russia so have consequences they have not fully

thought about worked out with a sense but i also think the response in the region the one that doesn't serve the interests very well, their adversaries are trying to use their own capability. that will serve the training regime interest very well. >> i like to ask you about israel and it will come to an end but the soul-searching not for the national security strategy and hopefully taken out of the shadow and whether that is feasible or not of course is an open question. >> that's a tough one because the jury is still out. the israelis achieved their

military goal of dismantling the military force actions and territorial control of gaza, they will be very different such as the right to spare, this frustration goal my bondsman achieved of gaza can be more the judge everywhere. the obvious example the administration knows well is the islamic state. when we they were a different

group of people then 2014 and in your later launching attacks less threatening and easier to control the another analogy, hamas is all over the west bank but 3000 attacks backed up by 5000 rockets into israel. it israelis achieved that, they will often something for the first time in 20 is in the region. i would say that i'm biased on this but everywhere else rename back forces, this will be the

first time. the problem is is the problem i keep coming back to, vietnam is the west. you have somebody approaching civil law that goes beyond iran and you cannot separate the two. israel some degree and focus on the iranian threat. so that's the problem kind of figuring out where this goes that not one 100% sure israel will be successful because it

requires israel doing with the civil war as well as the iranian team and offensive capability, israel sees itself on the top. >> a lot of conundrums there. i think we would like to turn it over to you to ask questions of the panel. >> thank you. we will take questions from our audience had incoming questions from our online audience so please identify yourself. >> my name is louis and i am the u.s. customs, a lot of economic agreements in the middle east

and conflict in gaza, to what extent do you believe can we see the resumption about the middle east, your? >> would like to collect? >> i think we saw prior view of regional inspiration economically from a security perspective and a political monoxide you saw free-trade agreement and israel and the uae and employees we hoped in

washington that would have significant security as well as economic aspects it's a game changer benefiting third-party. we also saw increasing involvement of states outside the region, india, so we have this initiative was not so filled initially but was a vehicle with economic activity which is quite promising and some road initiatives think are good because it's often

exaggerated. i think this will continue, element will be politically more difficult because of what's happened in gaza and her to resume until we have an end to the gaza conflict but these are not just demonic, peace represented warships happening in the region, these are stage in which he basically they have a shared view that it's good for them. i think you see, threat perceptions but more than anything states like israel that see themselves more in a global conflict and you often had been

trapped in looking at pakistan and they have emerged a little bit and see themselves as a global player and so does the uae so they bring a different perspective than previously. >> i think the future of the middle east will be decided in the next three months. i do not think this is a never ending series of palestinians. southern lebanon in 2006 and how many times israel goes into gaza. israel pulls out of gaza with hamas left in charge of the ruins there will be no tuesday

process. there will be spent in the region all countries politically voting for cease-fire will be reluctant to go into a region dragged into violence and that's one reason i believe it is extraordinary and tolerant of egypt, jordan and israeli arabs. the slaughter of 30,000 gazans or more is based on the fact that they understand this, they do not want hamas to win. >> and i just read an online question? iran's deep alliance for financial institute demonstrates

would result this chinese consent and bring american iranian leaders to negotiate. >> known as far as i can tell. i don't want to be blunt about it but what role does india play? just briefly i think india played an increasing role in this middle east are in away but india has chosen not to involve itself in the diplomatic dispute and i don't see that changing anytime soon. >> what about china? >> china think is a beneficiary the currency a recent for china to intervene the u.s. wanted to

get away from the region and every now and then there's an incident dragging the u.s. back in the russians are benefiting the same way. beneficial because china get away from iran that they wouldn't and other areas and forcing the rent get low-quality chinese goods so i've not seen any effort on the side of the chinese even with the red sea incident, they got free pass for themselves and convince iran to

rein in the houthis. on india the problem is india has leverage. china has leverage but india stops importing from iran and i don't think they have much leverage. >> one thing i would not agree, china itself not sure has leverage over rent. smaller states have more maneuvers. iran is essential because if you look at china's dependence on oil from the region and all the other states on the portion growth, they are all american

allies. the one the chinese really rely upon and the geography being what it is and they have a great economic relationship and they want to make the deal, they will not. >> another very important country, turkey and iran have complex relationships discuss the regional landscape, how can the u.s. approach this?

>> i assume have to take it but please, somebody else. i'm going to answer this indirectly by taking up on something mike said because it he put his your own it, iran doesn't practice diplomacy, this is the conscious and subconscious in the introduction about the international relations. you're dealing with the wants to

overthrow that as well and erdogan, after all of the bluff, it's a status quo country that's done very well and it doesn't see interest in forming any alliance with iran in northern iraq and it operates against iran and its a complex

relationship because there are economic benefits, oil and gas especially oil imports. both sides know they are vulnerable to asymmetric interference and it limits the attention significantly but at the end of the day israel is wary of iran. >> the end of our time here so if you could wrap up a one or two minute summation. >> this isn't going away, it's

one as i mentioned from the outset, policymakers have struggled grappled with and we have an idea we were talking about links between china and iran, that will lead us back iran see them selling to russia so we have to think about the world in terms of threats but try as we might, putting affect any strategy, and focused on

immigration trying to promote the next step in the abraham accords but strategies are competitive and that's what you see now, the conflict in gaza by those opposed trying to instruct our own and so whether they are involved in the middle east were not, whether you pursue this strategy or not we have to take into account what iran is doing and come up with a response we haven't in the past. >> i underline what mike said for strategy the bipartisan

strategy and it's based on two key understandings. if we give iran what iran is trying to achieve, it will be misguided. it's not an expansion of power, it's an opportunistic power and they are very good at exploiting chaos. the more we contribute, the more we are hoping iran. assessment i would argue the

only thing that has resulted come up with mutually beneficial and it is beneficial. talking about israel destroying 90%, it would be a victory and i would create so much judgment. >> even if the biden, it is not

a status quo state that necessary but not sufficient, you need to figure out what to do about it. the negotiations and they would have to figure out what they are negotiating about and they are aided by the chinese and they are paying money the room undermining their economic waste. they are not embracing iran because they understand it is a problem.

i never rule out military. in it will not edit. for. >> thank you very much and principal david each insistence court the state department will continue and a minute so please they seated. [applause]

>> we are just a couple minutes late know the principal deputy assistant.

number two the bureau and never a dull moment in the bureau but we have been grateful for that. i know the audience will as well. >> is there any number of things i could provide to you? this way to say is we focus on three things and our policy. one goes to diplomacy and deterrence and pressure so the building blocks will give a good framework for understanding what it is we do and try to do as we have been for some number of years.

rather than broadcasting a lot, i am prepared to go to that event the first question is how the biden administration has viewed but a strong commitment to work on regional integration is the administration trying to do, what is our goal? >> stop the spread making the situation so were not military commanders for multiple dilemmas, we don't want anymore dilemmas much less of the moment

wide-awake to what we are worked in the middle of october 7 hamas conflict on all of our time and energy into iran does figure into relationship and what everyone is seeing in their hostility all enabled and trained and equipped by the irradiance so we don't want to see conflict widening know it is long-standing any number of groups and in iraq we have

limitations so our goal toward conflict is not good and in the wake of irradiance revolution and modern era number one is event ran from 11 the mud obviously october 7 was a moment of great shock to everyone, particularly israelis going through the process is the war winds down the holiday avoid living in the threats of the

future? it will not go back to business as usual you are in touch with the israelis, your leadership is, what can you share with us? >> the two state solution many of you have known for decades the idea is very fundamental, you mentioned in your own quote marks, there's no going back that everything going forward is difficult and probably good gross understatement given the nature of the region but what we are aiming for is this no more talk about political horizon but set a pathway to move toward to

state. that is the plan but sure the audience will recognize nothing ever quite goes according to plan and never linear but that's where we want to go and we also the status quo doesn't work. there's no other fix so the two states this optimal, it is the optimal path forward. >> a photo of that strategy, they've done everything to prevent us, how would be inflate this threat lacks do not the

best mechanism is to work with the coalition as broad as possible and get as many allies as we can. an emphasis on multilateralism and that's where we are and there is beauty in numbers. understand this is not recorded by eddie or not without its own challenges but we are building toward adoptable solution and note down the sharp edges and best opportunity in regard to depredations course many bookstore partners and allies. who have convergent interest will work toward those together. >> we will turn to the audience in a moment in touch on internal

affairs. biological factors. could you give your respective on human rights issues and other groups on howie improve this situation? >> you will not be shocked to hear it's not a good news lori. let's start with the election, the regime placed legitimacy and wanting to broadcast in the elections and it turns out it's

grossly insufficient to meet the standards of international free and fair transparent elections but that's not a newsflash for anybody familiar with iran, it's not for the triumph of the best idea because i thought for any regime but it's about. in the methodologies are available online. you can look up the recording at the conclusion the letter but

gross violations because the rent from the u.s. is not a holy subsidiary auto. the conclusion they have come to we encourage them to maintain role and pull on these threats and examining with regard to the treatment and a word, egregious, everyone is familiar is any attention in the fall of 2022 and the result. all of you will have iran

followed for the reporting there and how situation has been. has not been good. >> i will open it up. >> i think everybody would agree if you look at iran in the region, it's a better place today in lebanon, syria, iraq the seventh of october, gaza, it was 20 years ago. i would assume the pressure policy is the further advances over the next, boldly do wrong

and what are we doing now sure we don't have former humans, iraq, syria? >> there was in the united states, a level of national security strategy, a turn going on no single administration attorney to asia for reasons of make sense geopolitically and we had to go through surgery issues with teaching challenges that are ongoing with an enormous amount of time here in washington. not unique to any single one of

them. the middle east for a while with displaced from top-level attention. we had some of the things occupying us and then we had seven october like yourself and we have had the black swan event that has come along and we have changed direction and it's become one of those moments so there is closer scrutiny so among the things we did, we now our focus more clearly on the region and all of the gaps that have been there for a while,

they weren't like gaza and the perimeter, it was okay until it wasn't okay so that is receiving renewed attention and with any problem once you turn to it again and scrutinize it, you begin to find a few things and cover things that had you been looking for for camera might have seen. there would have been no 911, no gaza? probably not but all of these areas, they suffer from -- neglect is too harsh a word but when you turn your attention away, things happen. not all of them but things begin to happen once they accrue, they can become the bigger events we

have seen. so lessons learned, how to apply them. the truth is these institutions we call governments are comprised of without getting too philosophical, i don't know that they could ever one area. figure out and tomorrow things will be said that not going to happen, history demonstrated they just that it never happens. will we be smarter? absolutely veritably learn things let's absolutely. the benefit of hindsight would be better, stronger, flock

coherent heavy not missed this, we are already seeing those things but can't.to the arch says you, we've discovered this and now that we know this, it's a known variable going forward, we got this. >> we have a question so please go ahead. >> hello, ambassador. iran is on track to ukraine, does that mean the administration policy cooperates

when russia failed? the other question but the human rights council, the report was read the crimes against humanity and the u.s. was a driving force to create that, is the u.s. willing to take the security council? >> two questions i heard you correctly, the first one about ballistic missiles on the second about human rights and icj, is that right? icc, correction. on the ballistic missiles, the missiles have not yet -- there's various reporting, a misleading story i think in reuters is said this had occurred past tense and

this shipment for sale of these weapons occurred, that is not the case. we have been clear about the national security advisor and secretary of state katella sale of ballistic missile weaponry or strategic weaponry if you will between these two countries iran to russia aiding and abetting its attack on ukraine, it's not a good thing and it's a threat not merely to ukraine but all of europe and i would argue a threat because if this continues but the range of weaponry and you would have a threat not merely to all of europe but another example of the iranian

state, we seen it for decades, the pattern that keeps getting worse every time you hit the bottom of the basement it goes deeper regrettably. on the matter of geneva to early whether or not the united states would be willing to take iran to the icc. it's not a position to make that judgment today but it's a case of enormous concern to the united states and one well documented for decades. this. >> is in addition to what you commented on. early on the biden administration makes top priority, the ukraine war and october 7 street at they cannot

be delayed, d.c. the administration making this a top priority? >> any date in violation of priority u.s. administration so top priority because we can't afford to not let it a priority for the interest of the broader community of international standards so the easy and quick answer is always going to be concern to the united states. displacing ukraine or china or russia, i wouldn't think about it that way, a constellation of variables that don't have to take precedence at any given

moment and there are other times, in the middle east was taking president is the gaza conflict because we have to tend to it first. i wouldn't think of it as a totem pole hierarchy the simple answer is it remains an interest of the united states thank you. we are coming to a close. >> thank you for hosting, i'm sorry, i am in a jam. so got to make a transition. i think this is a more dynamic exchange in the best way to make a chat.

all of these issues, what is on people's minds with your own service and there is a time in this world of everyone who is in the echo chamber so it is refreshing to get outside. when you step aside, they are the same or slightly variance in terms of interest so really grateful to be out here today. >> we have a short coffee break before our panel begins at 1230.