and fred kemp president, ceo of the atlantic council. 2024 marks arguably the most important year for democracy in

the in our lifetimes there will be elections where 50% of humanity will be voting representing more than 60% of global gdp. and and some 70 countries at a time when we them and freedom house are tracking the upward tragic story of authoritarianism and the downward trajectory of democracy and democratic rights rights, how we navigate this period and how we navigate this election in the united states has. generational consequences. in that spirit, i want to commend matt kroenig and dan negrea for significant contribution to the debate over future of america's role in the world, which ultimately will grow of the strength of our democracy and the strength of our and how we define ourselves

so read it. if you don't read it, buy. and give copies to your friends. it's a it's it's i've, i can't say i've read it all. i've skimmed through it, i've read quite a bit of it already and it's a very intelligent, lee argued, argued treatise. i only have a problem with the title, so but i don't have a problem. i have a problem explaining it to other people. so i'm going to explain it you as well. we win. they lose, we win. they lose. republican foreign policy cold. so let me take the win we win. they lose part in january this 1977, four years prior to becoming president president reagan bluntly stated in a conversation with richard valle, and i think i have this right, his basic expectation in

relation to the cold war quote my, idea of american policy toward the soviet union is simple and some would say simplistic. he said it is this we win and they lose. so it's the good guys win, the bad guys lose. i get it. some have interpreted resistance. republicans win, democrats lose america wins. everybody else loses. this is not what this title says. this title says good guys when bad guys should lose. so i embrace that. and then i've also stumbled over republican foreign policy. so the american council is nonpartisan. sometimes we're bipartisan. sometimes, you know, if there's independent party, we can be tripartisan. but but we there should be an american foreign policy, not a republican foreign policy. not a democratic foreign policy. and for most of the cold war it was the us. but we're not there yet. and i actually if this fusion of trump ism and reaganism can be

pulled off and i can't wait to hear the debate because. morgan you're going to have a wonderful to see morgan ortagus here. one of my favorite people. but this debate, i think, is a central debate for the future because for me, reaganism is engagement in the world. it's not isolationism. it's it's it's positive. it's sunny, it's forward looking. so i am now at peace with the entire title of the book. let me just say something else before i pass on. in the spirit of what i said and i know we're going to hear from congressman in a minute right after me, but i want to quote something he said the book, because i think it captures is enough that i said it. no but with gallagher saying very much what i'm saying about, an american foreign policy, let me quote him matthew kroenig. and then the great two of our nations sharpest foreign policy

minds, not only compellingly these threats, he's talking the threats of the axis of authoritarian powers, arrayed against the free world. not only connect these threats, but articulate a strategic framework for confronting them that can unite all americans. and to me, i was very pleased to see that, because i think that's where ultimately we hope to land, where how we approach the world and our foreign policy can consistent irrespective of what party relatively in the basic tenets consistent so so what the authors hope for is a trump reagan. i'll look forward to the debate on this concept. i think this is a time for big debates and big ideas and thinking it the beginning of a new era. we are on the cusp of the new era and we have the potential to shape it if we have the

political will and we have the unity of purpose. so i'm very grateful for all of our speakers for joining us today. others will introduce the other speakers, but i want to call a close with a special thanks to congressman mike gallagher for delivering virtual to kick us off. he represents wisconsin's eighth district. he's done so since 2017 and serves as the chairman of the select committee on strategic competition between the united states and the chinese communist party. so thank you all for joining us. and let me turn over now to congressman gallagher to say one's greatest role models are usually in the family and the cranie family provides two excellent models you, brad, who's not at the event today, but clearly got the looks in the quranic family and is actual model but friend matt is here to present a model of his own for how we can win the new cold war. his author, dan negrea came to the atlantic council from policy

planning at the state department where george kennan wisconsinite, i remind you worked. and for dan, this was a chance to give back to his adopted country after a career behind the iron curtain and then on wall street and in new book the two with you, just incredible backgrounds have provided a strategy to win our new cold war with the ccp and synthesize the reagan and trump schools of republican foreign policy into a new fusion approach that can unite a fractured party. unifying principles. when did this new cold war begin. academics continue to debate. when the old cold war began, did it begin when orwell first used the phrase? did it begin when the soviets tested a nuclear weapon in 49? did it begin with the korean war when it turned hot in 1950? who? but academics will continue to bet in the future when the new cold war with communist china began. but there's no debate that the ccp has been waging cold war against america for over a decade, since at least 2009, which predates xi jinping's rise power. the longer we did not of this

new cold war, the longer we allow the ccp to advance their totalitarian anti-american agenda under the cover of win win cooperation. and i think matt and dan deserve a lot of credit for just recognizing reality and nature of the competition we're in because. the ccp is history and ideology even among communist regimes make it an aggressive, paranoid regime that is laser focused on destroying our global position. shiba believes that the soviet union fell because its leaders did not understand they were engaged in an ideological war against capitalist democracy, and he will do anything he can to prevent the chinese party from facing the fate as communist russia. this is not a regime that's going to be content making a grand bargain, even with the stable balance of power in the indo-pacific or globally so, even if we wanted that to happen, i don't think it'd be feasible in the short term. the title of dan and matt's book also echoes ronald reagan's.

model in 1977 for how you end a cold war. we win and they lose. and many of their proposals for dealing with the ccp today echo reagan's strategy victory over the soviets as outlined in nsc 75, where and here i quote reagan's team u.s. policy toward the soviet union will consist of three elements external to soviet imperialism. internal pressure on the ussr to weaken the sources of soviet imperialism and negotiations to eliminate the basis of strict reciprocity, strict reciprocity, outstanding disagreement since reagan, kennan and other cold warriors understood that it would end. not necessarily through negotiations or military force, but when the soviet union was transformed internally to remove the of the conflict. and if you read dan and matt's book, i think is the closest we've come to actually having a meaningful about what our long the long term goal of u.s. strategy should be. there is consensus on near-term

goal, which is deterring a war over. and i would even say in the midterm there's an emerging consensus that we should control the commanding heights, critical technology. but there's been a a dearth of debate on what our long term goal looks like. and that and dan, really tease out what victory in new cold war looks like. and they say it comes the chinese government no longer has the will or the capacity to threaten core or united states interests. despite me and the ccp mellowing over time or a new generation of chinese leaders deciding that she's approach failed, and having concluded that, challenging the united states and its allies is simply too costly or offering a more cooperative path, the ccp might even collapse as the soviet union did did leaving a less threatening regime or even a peaceful liberal democracy. but to get there, our policy like reagan's must feature ideological thrust that clear the supremacy of, our values and at the same time what the trump

administration brought was an understanding that our national strength lay not in force of arms or in our values, in the strength of the american economy, from the degradation of the american industrial base, from ip theft to currency manipulation, countering ccp economic aggression is just as central to protecting our national security interests as deterring the prc in the taiwan strait. that's what makes this cold war far more difficult and complex than the old, because we never had to contemplate selective decoupling in the soviet union because our economies didn't really interact, whereas we are conjoined twins with china economically in the new cold war. and in their book, matt and dan call for this foreign reagan trump fusion. it combines that aggressive rebalance that will bring jobs to america while reducing ccp sources of leverage with a diplomatic approach that includes clear red lines for chinese behavior and is in peace through strength, both and reagan rejected a reliance on norms or mutually assured destruction in favor of a military buildup that aims but

hard power in the path of our adversaries. american weapons did not stop mao from sending troops into korea. brezhnev, afghanistan, or putin into ukraine. we have no reason to think that will stop xi's craft from crossing the taiwan strait. we need to restore our conventional deterrent in particular. i'm also reminded in reading dan's book that, famous moment, when ronald reagan traveled to moscow. in 1988 and he spoke at moscow university, where his goal was less than it was addressing the russian people directly at moscow state, which is where gorbachev went to school. he made the case standing the bust of lenin, i believe he made the case for freedom everywhere. and i think he gave us a model for how you do ideological warfare intelligently, smartly, and how candor and truth, far from being provocative, can actually be a core part of a deterrence strategy and a stabilizing factor.

and i think when american leaders speak about the united states and china relations or even to leaders of the ccp themselves, they should use it not as a moment to kowtow to our nation's foremost adversary or take the temperature, but to speak truth to the chinese people, truth of the ccp does not want them to hear, as dan and matt observe in their book domestic political stability. is an autocrat achilles heel and the u.s. government should identify what the ccp considers pillars of its regime stability and put them at risk. for example, they suggest that your cyber command should make it a daily mission to bring down the great firewall and provide access to information to the chinese people. this is a critical point that often ignored because it's difficult. people don't even want to talk about it because it's considered provocative. but there's a point at which the fear of provocation becomes itself because it signals weakness. and i would submit that if we want to set ourselves a path to victory, we have to define what

victory looks like. and dan and matt had done exactly that. and in the process they've done the nation lasting service. i hope my colleagues in washington and in fact all read this book and take up the cause of waging and winning new cold war. and i'll end with a thought i often get criticized for using that term new cold war. it has to remind people that there are things that are worse than cold war. one of those things is hot war. and a hot war with china would be absolutely horrific. it's even harder to wrap minds around even those of us who fought the wars in afghanistan and iraq struggled to comprehend what a great power war would look like. i would also submit that surrender, surrender american global leadership, a slow surrender of order that we built up, painstaking lee since the last time we fight great power, conflict would be worse. waging cold war and deterrence may be difficult, but war is.

and surrender is unacceptable. so thank you to matt and dan for their critical work for outlining for giving us a sense of what victory looks like and then identifying a path for how we achieve victory. i look forward to engaging in the debate that i'm sure this debate, this book will will provoke. and it's a debate that we need to be having in dc. and i'm honored that i could join you, albeit virtually today. and i look forward to seeing you all in person. well, thanks to everybody are here in person and all of you watching online. i'm morgan ortagus, the moderator of this event. i'm going to quickly introduce our panelists and then going to get right into the debate. we're going to take audience questions as well. we may even have questions online. so i'm not going to be long on the bios. but you've heard authors reference dr. matt kroenig, vice president and senior director here at the atlantic council, also thought this was interesting. i thought i was one of the only people who could say this. but you have served the bush obama and trump admin situations at various levels.

we also have dan negrea, who's a senior director here at the atlantic council. he worked in policy planning at the state department, but much more. he defected from communist romania and is now a great american. and so we're thrilled to you next to me here in person, have miss elizabeth brar. she is a senior fellow here at the transatlantic security initiative, where she focuses on gray zone and hybrid threats at the atlantic council. an expert on europe an expert on the intersection of geopolitics and the economy. excited to have your take especially the european perspective and virtually we have ambassador gina abercrombie went stanley her resume is way too long we can take the whole hour talking about all of her achievements she's a 30 year diplomat former u.s. ambassador to the republic of malta and she's a nonresident senior fellow here at the atlantic council and has served all over the world. and most impressively, i like this about her bio. she has the department of state

meritorious and superior honor awards for acts of courage during an al qaida on the u.s. consulate in jeddah, saudi arabia 2004. so thank you ambassador. good for you. okay. i think we should jump right in. first of all, you can tell i host a sunday radio show, which, by the way, is on sirius patriot channel one 2511 two one every sunday. and we're going to take your show. so we have to talk about the where do you get the book before we get into everything? everyone's here watching, listening. do you buy it? it's available on amazon and it's the number one new release in international relations currently. so some people are buying it already, but encourage everybody to go out and get their copy on amazon. amazon, that's easy. my husband would say i don't get nearly enough amazon packages. so now i have a new awesome. thank you. well i think that's incredibly important. so let's right in. i'm really interested in. and what for example is talking about, which is the well, what it may be the intersection of trump reagan policy.

can you sort of tell us what exactly that means? are the similarities and what are the differences? well, the idea for the central argument of the book came at a retreat. republican foreign policy experts and had kind of never trumpers people who had served in past republican administration and trump administration officials. and there was a lot of agreement, a few heated debates, but a lot of agreement. and prominent u.s. senators said what we really need is a trump reagan. and i thought that was an interesting idea what would a trump reagan fusion look like? and so that's what dan and i try to articulate in the book. and i think there's this conventional wisdom that the party is very much divided between kind of the trumpian wing and the reaganite wing. and actually in doing the research in the book, dan and i came to the conclusion the party is more united than people think. yes, on ukraine or other issues, there are big fights, but when it comes to just kind of basic worldview, i think there is a conservative that's different from a progressive worldview, brings them together, and then

we go through and talk about peace through strength in defense policy of free and fair trade and economic policy. american exceptional, its kind of major pillars. but then china, iran, north korea, border, immigration, climate. i think these are all issues where, both the kind of trumpian and reaganite of the party really do agree. and that's we try to articulate in this book what often seems like we're having such a food fight. and the republican party as, it relates to our foreign policy. so i'm that you have found areas of commonality which is what you do here at the atlantic. dan i had you and i worked together in the trump administration at the state department. i had the very fun job of explaining to the world what an america first foreign policy actually meant. so that was a great job, a daily basis, i joke, but in a trump and a potential term too, fred was just talking about we have an election it's very close no one knows which way it's going to go, how would a trump a second term from a foreign

policy perspective? how do you think that would differ from what we did? for example, mike pompeo, state department in the first term? well, first of all, delighted to see you here were such a star at the state department and i follow i see you on fox and so on, so forth. so delighted that you agreed to to do this. i think we already some of the priorities that president trump former president trump is outlining for his second term and they're driven by what the voters are saying the priorities are. so for example, if you look at exit polls that different primary scrutiny in is immigration is a big issue. so in the book we argue that immigration in the united states unregulated in an open southern border is a national security risk in a variety of of ways.

for example we don't know who these people are. i mean, there are something like million people who have entered the united states illegally because they're not going through normal channels. but in addition to this, there is the so-called one and a half million of known gateways, meaning people who don't come to the border agents, but the border agents see them crossing the border. now, the border agents right now are very friendly so that so so that people who are not talking to them have something to hide have a nefarious reason. and then there are then not known gateways which are estimated to be in the hundreds of thousands in our book on first page in the subtitle we say that we are in the new cold war. if we accept the premise that we are in a new cold war, this implies a serious loss of

purpose on what our policies be and sort of the basic that we have to do is to have a secure border. we also identify new axis of evil led by the chinese communist party, the dictatorial power in communist china. well, there are 35,000 chinese citizen who entered the united states just last year, 21,000 just since october. knowing how there are laws in china that have to collaborate with the secret service, their it's a reasonable assumption. some of these people are plants and then there the whole discussion with tick tock and so on so there will be priorities that are derived from the reality of what we call a new cold. there are also priorities that are derived from what the american people say are their

priorities. which do you think is immigration and border security? one of them, yeah, elizabeth, you know, it's no secret if you read politico, europe that there are some heart palpitations in the continent about a second trump presidency we tend to spend lot of time focusing on the 2% number of what of what countries are paying. and i think about 18 of 31 are reading. there are 2% threshold, but i think the more important metric on naito and on and on. europe writ large, where will they be with the united if there is a second term presidency on china? i think that is clearly has been defined. now, both trump and biden houses in their national security strategies is clearly the leading threat to the united states and there are some concern that while the united states has stood by the europeans as it relates to the russian invasion of ukraine that there won't be the same solidarity. god forbid there is a military

incursion by china over taiwan or some other. you're right about the heart palpitations and thank you for for mentioning that there is that concern, i think at the challenge is if you look at business they always want things to be predictable they want things to be stable so that they can plan what governments want predictability to. and this is, i think what's caused a lot of heart palpitations, heartburn, all those unpleasant things in the first trump administration that may be, you know, that were agreed. and so various issues that it was a lack of predictable but trump was going to do was planning to do so you could you saw agreement among various western governments with the us went one and trump to try to take on china approach to

globalize and he did it in his own way. yet there was agreement that something to be done because we all knew that the globalized economy the way it had been set up or just established itself wasn't really working very well. but then we got things like the tariffs on on america's closest allies and that seemed to make no sense. in fact, cost a lot of offense. and so if we look at a potential second term, i i think for that, for the sake allied unity, it would be a good thing if whatever trump lands and his administration plans, if that's community to do clearly, and if steps that may offend or harm allies if they are communicated clearly and if they are explained if it is explained why they are considered necessary and if that's not done, then a

steps that may be positive will be lost in the public debate. so for example, the additional spending, defense spending that trump committed to europe that just got completely lost because. people focused the language rather than the actions. and that is extremely unfortunate, not just from front, i would think from an american perspective, but from an alliance perspective i am hearing you right then that it's less of a policy issue and more of a communications. yet you need your job. clearly, i needed to do a better job. oh, well, you need to speak more. yeah, well, we're that at a communications issue and also an issue of establishing a strategy and presenting its people know what to expect that they don't have to worry about waking up with heart palpitations when they read politico and the following morning. i guess i would argue to or the times of london. i don't i don't speak for

secretary pompeo anymore, but i think he would probably argue that some of that. the you know, the unpredictability actually used to our favorite it to our advantage. but i understand how that makes the europeans feel i want to make sure that we get the ambassador and ambassador thank you for your storied career in service to the united states. you've spent a lot of time in the east and in africa as well, and can't have a discussion about what's happening without talking about the middle east. and one of the last things that i did, i took maternity leave in the trump administration was the abraham accords. and, of course, we have had october 7th and we have just i think even the biden administration were met. what it is, it's unsustainable relationship with iran. know we can't have u.s. troops shot at whether it's on our ships whether it's in jordan. so how do you see whether it's a second biden administration or a trump term, too?

how do you see the middle east shaping up in 2025? and i guess what would be your advice for a second trump term to on the middle east if he were to be reelected now. well thank you so for having me and i want to add that i had the pleasure of working in the biden administration, the trump administration an obama or clinton, bush and reagan. so from from reagan to trump, it is a really interesting pathway to be looking at or reviewing it were, you know, the challenge and it was wonderful policy and a wonderful achievement to get the abraham accords don't think you will find anyone who won't give props to that i was one of the high achievements of the trump administration. i think we all see at this point that there was a fundamental flaw in the thinking about hind

it and that you could move forward with all of these countries and ignored the palestinians and that is what is tripped us all at this point to to state it very lightly. the key as well as a block to expanding the abraham accords and really having them cemented and enriched goes to palestinians treatment the gaza strip and the day after this is over. so do you think before october 7th, the only countries according to the israeli government, that they did not have some sort of diplomatic or other relationship with were syria, lebanon, including saudi arabia quietly? we had billion and $10 billion worth of investment in. israel being discussed from the united arab emirates. we had morocco setting up a cyber agreement with israel and

military cooperation. the sudanese talking about military cooperation. of course, bahrain has a strong incentive to keep those reports going for balance the region and offsetting iran's influence in the region. so we start with that that really strong out and we get to today because they did not take the palestinian issue into account people thought we could set it ignore that it would truck along. we heard that the biden administration's senior official on national security advisor say. it's going well in the middle east and, moving on and hoping to get the saudis involved and of course, changed that. so if nothing else, unfortunately doing it this way. hamas reminded us all that the situation between the israelis and the palestinians is not sustainable. and whether you are republican

or democrat repressive evangelical matter as human beings all understand, number one, this level of and destruction is a terrible thing. and we as an international community need to see it arrested and more so for those of us in the united states the united states as close allies with israel. this conflict is not good for israelis stop it for palestinians and it's not good for the region. so this conflict we have seen discussions go from $10 billion of investment from the uae and cooperation with israel to, i think at the beginning of last week or maybe the end of the week before the uae announcing that they were. suspending $2 billion worth of investment with bp and with an israeli firm that that's a terrible stumble in that relationship. it isn't that. it can't be put on track again,

but it's not going to be able to be put on track as long as this conflict continues in this way. morocco had significant plans. it had a steady protest within the country. and so the moroccan government is having to navigate between their people and their desire to maintain this relationship. so citizens have called a break. all flights have been canceled between morocco and israel but the that they got for the western sahara is likely to them on track but certainly slow it down. bahrain has also had demonstrations in the country. again, they've got this balancing act. bahrain is tidy and in the midst of some strong neighbors, so they're used that balancing act and i think they'll be able to navigate it. all right. the uae sorry that sudan has paused on some of the cooperation that it intended.

do with israel as i would also say, i think the interest office i think it is in morocco that also not been set up and certainly next step that the trump administration anticipated and the biden administration certainly wants to get done is a clear established measure of relations with the saudis and not going to happen as well until. we get to the day the cease fire and the day after. so all of those have an impact, all of that. and then iraq and syria and lebanon is broad conflict in the region is upsetting the plans of the biden administration. and if have a second trump administration without getting cease fire in place and finding a credible alternative to hamas it is going to be difficult a trump administration to move

forward in the way that it would like to as well. you know, we have about seven, 8 minutes before i'm going to go to audience questions and i want to stay on the middle east, but we need to go to china. that's sort of of our foreign policy. we keep to go to china, but we get stuck on the middle east. but as as our friend. mike gallagher talked about in the intro about the new cold war, as he calls it, and you, of course, in your book, we when they lose, you're talking about the future of republican policy. what is the future of foreign policy as it relates to countering the chinese communist party? well, i think this is an area of bipartisan consensus. china is the biggest state based threat facing the united states and. i think a concern that dan and i had as we recognized the trump administration recognized great power competition as, the greatest priority in the 2017 national security strategy. the biden administration has continued that with with strategic competition. but competition's not a strategy what is the goal? what does victory look like?

and so dan and i were wrestling with that and we thought could do no better than reagan's clear statement for the goal of the first cold war. we win, they lose. and so we grappled with what does look like. and we essentially argue that and we haven't heard a really clear statement this from the us government. does success look like but essentially we argue is getting to a place where china lacks either the ability and or will to threaten us core would be success and we lay out a bunch of different ways you could get there. but we think by pursuing a kind of dual track strategy, strategy, deterrence and diplomacy, strengthening ourselves, working with our allies to defend ourselves from the threats poses, pushing back where they're violating widely held international standards, but also a diplomacy track willingness to engage with china when. they're willing to come to the table and be constructive that over time that could put them in a position where either they are

squeezed and lack the ability to threaten us the way they do today or that a new generation of chinese leadership says you know what that work challenging the united states its allies is too difficult. we try a different path. you, dan, we've talked about this a little bit today, but we have this sort of newer axis of resistance it's china, russia, iran. you even see it playing out in the wars in the middle east and in europe today with iranian suicide drones, ballistic missiles right there, all all of them exchanging military hardware, technology secrets, etc. how does the united states tackle that axis of resistance? happy to answer the question, if i may come back to the middle east, despite the fact that we don't want to go to the middle, one of the things that we make very clear in the book is that behind all the troubles in the middle east is iran. iran its with its policy causing

instability to supporting terrorism in the form of hamas, hezbollah, who is in in iraq, syria. so that's the nefarious force in the middle east. and we need to address that. the we did in the in the trump administration through extreme economic pressure. so they they have money to support the terrorist that are causing the massacre in october attacks on shipping in in the red sea and all these issues but coming now to your to your question what do we with the axis of evil? the first thing we need to do is to recognize there is such a thing. and i think it's important then to figure out how they work. there is no alliance. there is an alignment. what an entente as some people

call, and we need to counter them with all the tools of statecraft. in the case of iran, north korea and russia, it's mostly military. that's how they oppose us. so it is in that sphere, but in case of of china, it very much in the economic sphere. there is all this talk about decoupling or selective decoupling or de-risking. so in the case of china, we to use all the tools of state craft, economic, military ideas, which is very important, and diplomacy. and then in the in the case of the others, more selectively, some of these tools can do something go through, which is that actually the chinese leadership is unwittingly providing help for what you're just describing down, which is that the risk of doing business in china already increasing and.

so that makes it it's making it less attractive for western businesses. the western companies to do business there. and that's nothing to do with what anybody has said, washington, washington or any capital has to do with with the chinese leadership's view of free enterprise and the power that that the private sector has reached in china. so that's why there is a crackdown going on, which is making it less attractive of western. but we're actually less safe for western and other companies, too, to business there. and in fact and this is an interesting of our times i think it's impossible to get political risk insurance in china today. so if you have political risk it sure is great. and these roundabouts of 5 to 10 or even 20 years. but if don't have it, you need it and you can't it because even the underwriters, it's too risky to to underwrite business. well business operations in china. so that is a sign of how

business is across the board view china and so unwittingly chinese the chinese leadership as of helping along this this decoupling that is desired by it by some people and whether we want it or not it is happening for these combined reasons which is extraordinary. what would have what would the case today if people in washington, republican strategists like you and maybe democratic strategists, were saying, well, you know, we need less exposure to china because that's making us too vulnerable and. the chinese government, we're making it as attractive as it was in nineties. then we would have a problem. they are actually helping an extraordinary confluence events, but absolutely just to stay on sort of our alliances, not only in europe but in asia. just following up on that question, you just answered and then i'm going to get the ambassador in before we turn it over to the audience.

i was actually quite pleasantly surprised and very of orcus whenever the deal was announced. it, of course, did cause a lot of heart palpitations for some members in europe who are not a part of orcus. but is that the kind of ally and building that you would encourage a trump term to to do or do you actually think it was counterproductive to by not including more in europe? well, i think the french would say was deeply unproductive and and disloyal, but we have reached the point where. nato is has a lot of members, as many as many more than anybody had ever expected. but it also makes it slightly unwieldy alliance, because everybody to agree to whatever it is that that alliance is expected to do. so i think whether we like it or not, it's natural that we will see more informal and and even formal groupings emerge among the existing that member states and even nonmember states.

and that's not a bad thing because nature be all things to all people. you can't respond every challenge. so we'll see. we are seeing orcas. we are also seeing the deaf which is completely different. the joint force, which involves other european countries and has nothing to do with with submarine it's an expeditionary force, as it says on the chin. and so we'll see more groupings like that and more power to everybody still believes in nature. nature can't be everything everywhere all the time. you know, ambassador, you've probably spent more time the ground in the global south than anybody in this room. you know, what is your perception of how the global south, this competition strategic competition what global competition, whatever whatever administration you're in wants to what is your perspective of how they view this competition and? where are they citing china, the united somewhere in the middle. yeah, i would argue that.

maybe heading toward china, but reluctant because we in spite of all of our historic missteps and people out to us that we're not standing up for our values. so we're not living our values when it comes to human rights or so on and so forth. people still rather be with us and i would argue as diplomat and for every for which i have worked. the key for the united states is not to abandon the field, not to abandon the field. that means putting money and person into being out there and making the case for the united states for making sure that would be partners, allies and others understand the benefits of aligning with us align with us and simply absorbing and

trumpeting the sorts of values that we have traditionally stood for. but i would argue an and i don't know if this is trump or or obama or clinton or bush or biden for that matter, about importance of not abandoning the field as americans. i think we cannot do that. great. so let's jump in to audience questions. i know i have some on here, but i think we're also going we can take them from the audience. right. okay. you've been waiting patiently with your hand up in the back. yeah. thanks much. yeah, i'll. i'm happy to take it so i'm job done working for the university. i see two big challenges to a new report in foreign policy. and one of them i'll be very quick, i think is what i call the beer china doctrine. you try to address both of these, the challenges being, you know, this is convincing. it seems lot of policymakers

fact that somehow it's the fault of democratic countries, native countries, that putin has become, you know what he has become as somehow we should have just left of eastern europe after the end, the cold war, without the protection of nato's, which to me and think probably many people in this room would be morally unimaginable. right. but the second challenge, i guess this might be, you know, in line of bringing in john mccain's thoughts. so trump, reagan but about mccain as was just mentioned could it helpful to think in a in a new trump administration perhaps about a new alliance of some kind, given that nato's necessarily be this if we had, you know, 50 countries let's say that included most of nato's most of the eu, but britain and partners in southeast asia and

perhaps you know a couple in africa and south america, we would have an economic alliance that would be on beatable i think. right that would be enough to really put kind of pressure on china that sounds like you want. thanks then. go ahead. so nice to meet you in person. professor. we've been congress so so a few thoughts what we talk about in the book is we recognize the fact that the second invasion of ukraine in 22 crystallized again the world in terms we are recognizing from the first cold war a free world on the one hand the guys, the new axis of evil, but then the appearance of what we can call new nonaligned movement. now the question is, how do we deal with the new axis of evil

and coming to the question that morgan asked the ambassador, how do we deal with the global of flexible constellation of of partnerships, of ad hoc alliances, alliances, coalitions of the willing? there is talk for of a t 12 technol or de 12 a number of countries that morgan talked about. that's another there was a group of of countries that saying sort of an economic league. so when china wants to economically coerce whether australia not buying their beef for their south korean or not allowing tourists to go there or japan not selling then there will be counter sanctions or actions from from those countries. but underlining all this no there is no replacement later but the naito countries have to spend significant more.

and in an article that matt and i wrote subsequent the book we argued that we have to forget the 2%. it's time to go to. 3% we're going to go into some of the questions here. and let me i think maybe matt and maybe you both might want to take this one on our former trump's recent comments on naito indicative of what his policy will be toward the alliance should he take office or would he have a different. well, the first thing i think he said in his recent comment is the naito allies need to spend more. and i think he's right about that. the naito allies agreed to all hit this percent target, as you in your opening, only 18 of the 32 have are expected do that this year. so the other third need to hit that target. and then also last year at the vilnius summit naito and nancy's new regional plans agreed to new essentially the first serious defense plans for europe since the end of the cold war. the economist magazine estimated that to provide the capabilities

for those plans that naito will probably have to increase the defense level to something like 3%. so i do think the allies need to do more. and it's not just a matter of fairness about effective global strategy. if the united states and its allies are going to take on china, russia, iran, north korea, the united can't do it on its own. the allies need to step up. and then in terms of the more inflammatory parts of his statements, i think we learned trump's negotiating style in the first term, and i think we were understood that and i think we've forgotten lessons. but he often starts with kind of an extreme statement and that's not the final position. i think that's to begin a conversation, to begin a negotiation and to encourage his negotiating partners in this in this case, the nato allies, to to meet in the middle and increase defense spending. i'm glad eight years later we're still having the discussion about whether we should take him literally or figuratively. we haven't learned that lesson yet. you know, one of the things i was thinking about, elizabeth, as i to the ambassador speak, i

thought that her comments were so moving about america's role, especially at the global south, and how they're reluctantly to. but there is a place for us when i hear that i think all that makes me want to get in the fight right. however i also think and i don't live in d.c. i live in nashville, tennessee. and i think about the moms going to the grocery store and how much it costs to them to fill up their grocery. i think about how much it costs, you know, a dad who's working two jobs because he can't make ends meet to up his gas tank and people are worried about crime. people are worried about the border. so how do we as make the that we need to care about ukraine and europe when whenever there seems to be so much domestic turmoil. you know i i think i think there may be some form of journalists, including you here in the room, morgan, who know that order to interest people in, something you have to help them relate to

other people. it's an abstraction, right? i mean, ukraine is not an abstraction. it's people. so i'm not saying it would be possible to transport lot of ukrainians to to every every town in america. but that is the case. you have make, because otherwise what is 2%? i mean, it's like a figure and why should anybody why should why should people care about sounds like you as a nerdy that is being had in various capitals among people and think tanks and actually it matters way outside think and by the way when it comes to what we spend that to percent on i think if people were helped to understand actually it's not just expenditure it's it's jobs and incidentally, the money that germany is now as part of those under from the reagan, a lot of it is going to america the defense manufacturers because that's where you can buy off the shelf defense manufacturing. so that's coming back to your point. i think we have to have people

relate to other people, whether it be ukrainians whether it be defense, manufacturing workers or anybody else to help them get out have a perspective on whatever the issue is of the day. now it's ukraine. who knows where they will be next? it's if we could be china and just one more point on. since since you mentioned defense manufacturing earlier, i think it's extraordinary that we just that the people who will make the weapons will somehow turn up in the factories and make weapons. who are they? where they. so if we are going to make this sort of committee into national security in our countries, we should also talk about the people who are supposed to make these weapons on which we spend 2% and ask ourselves what would i be willing to wear? would have the skills to work in a in a defense factory, would i encourage my children to go to work in a defense factory. and these skilled jobs. but but who going to do them. we don't have those people. so do something for your country going to go and work in the

defense factory train yourself accordingly. ambassador, we have another question here that has been written. what would a win win outcome for the united states look like with respect to, china? we still our oh, i think we lost our audio. okay. ambassador, can you hear us? i think she can hear us. okay. can we can't hear you for some reason. do you want to answer that? why? they're trying to fix her audio? well, i think when win is a term that the chinese use. i think maybe they meant win when they were in the west, when think when china uses that, they mean china wins. and i want to steal that. that's a good line. so i think win lose is down and i say it is what we should be aiming for and you know the biden administration has said that they just see our relationship with china as a mix of competition, cooperation and

confrontation. but competition to me, sounds a tennis match. their agreed rules, i'm not sure there's much real competition. the united states and china, if you look at the internationally system, they're systematically cheat, cheating, cooperation. there are areas where we'd like to cooperate climate change, global pandemics, arms control. but but not much going on there. you know, china, the biggest greenhouse gas emitter. it's preventing the w.h.o. from conducting an effective investigation into covid origins. it won't even talk seriously about arms control. and so unfortunately, that and i argue in the book that we see that you know the statement that it's kind of three parts is really about a third. right. that increasingly the relationship is defined, its more most confrontational elements. you know, dan, every two years politicians in the united states from both parties go before their constituents, their donors, and they're giving grass roots speeches. they say this is the most important election of our lifetime. frank kim did that for us

earlier. but fred seems to argue that it is the most important election of our lifetimes because it will have generational consequences for democracy. do you agree that and if so, what are the possible outcomes. matt and i just. had an exceptionally interesting podcast with newt gingrich to talk about our book, and newt asked a similar question, and i did. i read his book, trump versus china before. so i quoted his answer it. so you can't lose when you are doing that. i can't hear anything now. so newt argues that china is an existential threat to the united states. comparable to the other four major threats, that this republic of ours that's in its

history starting with fighting the british, the civil war, the second world war. he doesn't mention the first world war. the second world war. and the cold war. so indeed. and then and then he argues in his book that trump has the right approach in opposing china in a departure from the obama policy, which was emphasizing cooperation. as matt said, we need to focus on the confrontation because china is confronting us. so newt argues this is the gravest threat the united states has ever faced with an adversary that more dangerous than any other that we've ever faced. so it is an election where we need a strong leader such that we can prevail in this existential threat to, the united states. well, i'm going to get the hook if i go past 5:00. so i want to thank of you. if you're watching online, we

have the book here in person. you're missing out on, signed autographs from the brother to a supermodel. sorry. that's. that's me, right? oh, i'm sorry. sorry, dad. but the book is we win lose republican foreign policy in the new cold war. you can get it on amazon and can also listen to matt on sunday. he will be on the morgan ortagus show, sirius xm, sometime between 11 and one. i don't know. so you'll just have to listen to the show. so thank you so much. thank you for letting moderate. thank you, elizabeth. thank you, ambassador for your service. and thank you to the atlantic council.

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