the building and construction trades we love to pull away from the afl-cio. the president spoke to them and invited them to the white house. he invited them to the residence. not to the ground floor. not to the west wing office. to the residence. that was special. it had never been done before. it hadn't been done for eight years under reagan or the democrats with jimmy carter. nobody had done that. that made a major impact. it made a major impact on many other groups we did it with. the president knows and roman has talked about this in his books and papers. the president knew things about everyone he met with. i never seen anybody with a memory for people and events and caring about people. the first time the governor went with the president on the foreign policy trip to japan. and some other places. he came back and said i can't believe it he knows where the prime minister's son went to school and how many kids he has and if the kid is succeeding in school. he knows everything about him.

he knows if he likes chess or if he likes to play tennis. that is something you cannot bottle or sell. it was vintage george bush. it helped him in domestic policy. i know i'm going on too long. i have to tell you one funny story. that is relating to the labor unions. valencia was not president of poland but solidard. came to the white house and it was reemotional for him. i rode with him in the motorcade. when he got through the southeast gate and looked at the white house, this man started to cry. i mean it was just quite extraordinary. we went in and had a reception that included all of the old line labor leaders. the afl-cio people as well as the buildings, trades. we were having a very good time. the state dining room. it's not state up for state dinners had this very, very long oval table and you fill it with food. i don't mean to stereotype labor

leaders, but this very big labor leader from pittsburgh decided to lean against the table. he leaned against the table and it started to creak. the food started to move. jeff and i and the butlers all instinctively fell right under the table, holding this table up with our hands. the president's mouth just opened. he did not know what to say. to make a long story short. the table kind of collapsed. the food went all over the place. the labor leader left in good humor. lek thought it was the funniest thing he'd ever seen. afterwards, we were talking about mrs. bush. afterwards, mrs. bush looked at me. she said i don't believe that s.o.b. broke my table. it was absolutely phenomenal. what kind of a communicator was george bush? that relates to what happened in opl. he was constantly compared to

president reagan and criticized for not being the grand communicator that reagan was. that is true. his style was low key and personal and in depth. i have from my oral transcript. i remember when the president was vice president and him looking at me one day and saying how does president reagan do that? how does he reduce the most complex arguments to sound bites and everybody understand the core of what is going on here? president bush just couldn't do that nor did he want to do that. he had a very different approach. he hated sound bytes. he was not good at them. he did not read speeches well. boyden insist there's were a few speech he did deliver well. i'm sure that is true but generally those were not his shining moment. what was his shining moment was giving him note cards. you give him note cards with talking points and he would take off. he was fabulous. he related to the audience. he related to the topic. he knew it in depth he did not

need a speech. a speech was almost an impediment to him. we learned early on if he made a speech, he was better at smaller groups than larger groups. if he had a large group, and we learned no teleprompter. if you could avoid it, give him note cards and be sure lighting was such that he could see the faces in the front row. if he could see the faces, he could relate to the real people out there. not just in the crowd but people that he wanted to make a point to. he did that very well. he also disliked intensely press conferences. if you remember ronald reagan did most of these evening press conferences which were very nationally televised and were there to make a number of points. i think the president did three major evening press conferences the first year. and then he told marlon, and i'm quoting from transcript, marlon, i'm not going to do this mor. he sai why?

he said this is not a press conference. this is a show. i don't like this. i think he did one or two a year after that. he would go into the press room. twice a week and people forget this, but this was quite extraordinary. how on top of your game do you have to be with issues to go twice a week in front of the not exactly friendly press corps? and discuss topics. what he would do, he would come out, make a short owning statement and say, let's have a discussion. he was comfortable with that. he could answer primary questions and secondary questions and tertiary questions. i have never seen any other president who could do that, especially not president obama. you take president obama off his script, notes, teleprompter, he's gone. you put george bush in a policy discussion, and he is really on his own. he is fabulous. i want to close, because i know i have gone on way too long, i want to close just by saying something about the technology of communications in the white

house in 1989 to 1992. you have to remember, that was 20 years ago. we used our voices and words. we did not have cell phones or blackberry or e-mail. we called or mailed or faxed. you could not do a conference call from the white house. we had gerald ford phones. the president would not authorize new phones. we ate lunch together at the white house mess. we discussed things. today you e-mail, text or even twitter. it is interesting to see how george bush would operate in a social media environment. i don't think i sent more than five e-mails in the white house. we got intranet in 1992. boyden warned us that everything put there could be subpoenaed. >> it scared us. >> scared us to death. so we inclined not to want to do that to begin with. but, we also were not used to it. i didn't think anybody would read them. there was one guy, i don't know if it was you or somebody else. i'll use it. i'll schedule meetings this way.

everybody come to a meeting. this poor guy. i think it was roger porter. sat for an hour wondering why nobody came to his meeting. none of us read the e-mails. none of us had any idea meeting was taking place. we didn't utilize it. we worked face-to-face in meetings. i think that probably was much better. lastly, george bush's respect for the institution of the presidency. he was really in awe of the office and he told us all almost every day that the day we did not feel that same sense of awe when we walked into the oval office was the day when we should leave. his respect for the institution of the presidency and the building, i think, was really remarkable. i'm going to close by one story, again, goes from the oral history. one time i had something i needed to do and tim mcbride

the president's personal aide said to me, just go down. the president is at the tennis court. i said that paper is on my desk. i'll tell tim and he'll get it. he said, no, no, you guys won't know where it is. i'll get it. the tennis game is over. the tennis court are here. the south entrance where you go for the residence is here. the oval office is there. we started to walk back up. i started that walk to the oval office. the president said where are you going? i said i'm going to your office. he said, no, no, time in tennis shorts. i said so? he said no. just wait. i'll be back. he went into the residence. this is a true story. he got dressed. put on a coat and tie. walked into the oval office. handed me the paper and left. he would not go into the office in tennis jogs. he didn't believe it was appropriate. he had such respect for the physical office which was representative of the institution of the presidency.

i don't think as a society we produce george bush and barbara bushes anymore. they are almost from a time and place we don't have any longer. i think that is a shame. i think the country and world would be a better place if we have a new generation of george and barbara bushes. thank you. >> ladies and gentlemen, being the clean-up hitter today, i take everything back i said in my oral history. we thank you all for being here. good day. >> don't you dare! >> first of all, i would like to add my thanks to the miller center for supporting and putting together not only this oral history project, but this symposium today. as a member of the board of directors of the george bush library foundation we are grateful to support this effort. we think it is a fitting tribute to the history, the fabric, that

surrounds a guy who and his wife who meant a lot to a number of us who had the great pleasure of serving with him. i'm probably the only person -- i think i can say this without anyone contravening me. i think i'm probably one of the people on the face of the earth where the president of the united states took a personal call for me. it goes to what bobbie was saying in terms of the president's opening up of the white house when we first began in 1989. one of the things he basically told me was mcclure, i want all of the members of congress to get through here and come up here and be part of the people's house. on a particular day, we had a number of senators there for a reception. it was in a middle of an important vote where we needed people to get back. the phone rings in the residence. the only person that answers the phone is the president or first lady. the president picks up the phone.

the white house operator say, mr. president, i have a phone call for fred mcclure, can you get him for me, please? the president thought that was kind of funny. let me tell you a bit about my job. that probably gives you a feel for the prism through which, at least i view, the president's relationships with congress. there wasn't an office of legislative affairs until 1954. it occurred after president eisenhower woke up after the mid-term elections and realized for the first time the political party control in congress was different from him. at that point in time, the numbers changed from 203 to 232 in the house of representatives and 47 to 49 in the united states senate. no, alaska and hawaii were not states yet. why is why it didn't add up to 100. that office was created 57 years ago. it was designed to create a low-key approach as it was originally described of communicating the president's views to congress.

i had 20 predecessors when i started working with the president in '89. frankly, only one served a full four-year term. i lasted three years and three weeks and that's i tht second longest tenure. the reason being, it is a high turnover job that is created by a situation where, believe it or not, you feel like you have two constituencies. you know who your real constituent is, the president. and the responsibility of communicating his views to the congress of the united states. but let me tell you, there are 535 other people who think they ought to be president of the united states and spent a great deal of time communicating their views back to you. i like the analogy that prince phillip told me when barbara bush describeded what my job was. he looked at me and said, you're the ping-pong ball. frankly, that's the way i felt. i looked at it more like crystal ball gazing. we had to put together the

numbers that we needed to be able to have success with the president. a look at the 1988 elections. the house of representatives was a 260-175 split in terms of democrats and republicans. the senate was a 54/46 split in terms of democrats and republicans. even though george bush won 53% of the popular vote and 79% of the electoral vote that was the situation we faced as we began service in 1989. we probably were the victims of our own success. i served for a couple of years on the senate legislative team for president reagan. during a period of time when we had control of the united states senate. from 1980 to 1986. at that point in time, i say we were products of our own success. it was sort of the beginning of a number of southern democrats, in particular, who decided being a southern democrat was getting more and more into the situation

of an endangered species. they decided to become republicans. as this change started to take place, particularly in the south, it made the environment where we had to get the legislation accomplished a little bit more difficult. it set the stage, if you will, for the beginning of the president's term. this is something i think hasn't been mentioned for the past two days. trying to figure out something left to say. the leadership was in disarray in the house of representatives on the democratic side when the president took office in 1989. a gentleman whom i had known for a long time, as had the president, jim wright, was speaker of the house of representatives. he written a book. this guy, gingrich, newt, that is, was firing at him on all cylinders. there were ethics clouds surrounding payment associated with jim wright's book. before you knew it, because this is where the institution had

changed because the days of friendship and relationships that were driven much like president bush had with sonny montgomery and others when he was in congress of the united states, those friendships had started fading away. it found itself manifest early on in jim wright's efforts to hang on as the speaker of the house of representatives. jim ultimately had to step down. and soon quickly followed by tony qualo. the first couple of months. there is disarray in the house of representatives. tom foley is speaker and dick gephardt is majority leader. that is what we were looking at in the house democrats. there was somewhat of a bit of leadership stability in the senate but george mitchell, though he created a calm demeanor in terms of dealing with you was a cagey character in terms of dealing with some of

the political issues and the combination of him and dick gephardt made it difficult for us. fortunately bob dole was around which was an anchor for us at that period of time. now this was going on, this distraction was going on with the nomination of john tower who was my political mentor, as secretary of defense. the bottom issue was a question that sam nunn and other democrats in the house -- in the senate of the united states reached the conclusion that we're going to answer this question for you, mr. president. who is going to control national security and national defense? we are, so therefore we're not going to confirm john tower, who had been involved in the armed services committee for a number of years. that leadership disarray. then we created leadership disarray in the house of representatives because when senator tower's nomination was defeated by the senate, the

president chose dick cheney. cheney became secretary of defense. this guy named newt gingrich by a two-vote margin beat a guy named ed madigan from illinois. there was a changing in the guard of the house of representatives. cha cha inc. changing of the guard had significant impact how we dealt with the congress of the united states. despite our efforts over the last two days to focus on the foreign versus domestic, which has been very enjoyable and illuminating. it difficult to separate when talking about it from the standpoint of dealing with congress because early on, we had to deal with the really nasty hangover issue from the reagan administration the question of nicaragua funding for the contras. eliminating that, getting that off of the table, began to pave the way for other public policy issues and cooperation across the aisle. there is a link between the two. whether it is funding for the

department of defense or free trade initiatives, including nafta or trade initiatives regarding textiles, something else that was front and drcente. i remember it was during the christmas holidays before the president became president of the united states and i get this phone call. it is like, can you meet the vice president up in his office on capitol hill? yeah. i drop what i was doing. i met the vice president not knowing what it was about. it was a time when strom thurman was explaining what we had to and must do to protect the textile industry in south carolina. that was also an early issue which caused great discord to try to keep republicans together. despite our efforts to make everything bipartisan, we had no choice if we wanted to succeed. bobbie and others have mentioned the excellence in education act. the summit that the governor has

hosted here back in 1989. you know it was only the third time in history that the president called together the nation's governors. roosevelts did it in '08 and '33. we were talking about choice and talking about alternative certifications for teachers and principals and talking about promoting flexibility, local control in exchange for enhanced accountability. 3 many of the things we see today in the no child left behind and versions of it that have followed. clean air. the savings and loan crisis. ada, the federal highway system reauthorization. we have not talked about the enterprise zone. another part of the president's initiatives on domestic policy front which was invented to create jobs in inner cities. increasing tenant ownership. increasing tenant control of public housing. some ag legislation with the farm bill. a precursor to the commission on

national and community service and americorps and now the usa freedom corps. part of the democrats, the opposition to put the president on the spot was something we dealt with on a daily basis. it was 36 years, only 12 of those 36 years, there had been democratic presidents and all of a sudden they had four more years to go and this guy named george bush. also in 1954 it had been the last time that the senate had been in those hands except for that six-year stint. we started out arguing about nickels and dimes, that is, whether or not we were going to increase the minimum wage. it was probably the first sign of one of our threats ever vetoes because it was whether it was going to be 4-10 versus 4-15 versus 4-25. an issue where the president was tested and republicans having to deal with whether or not they were going to increase the minimum wage and what impact that would have on the economy. and on jobs and on small

business. we dealt with issues associated with parental leave, we had the chinese students doing their thing. and the impact that had. we had most favored nation. the president because of his background had a tremendous interest and was what i would describe as more than expert in terms of our relationships with china. we dwelt the fsx fighter and something called ultimately civil rights legislation. correct me if i'm wrong it started out on an effort to try to deal with a decision of the supreme court and the question of where burden of proof was going to lie in the beginning. it's ultimately then became a huge thing called civil rights legislation. and we vetoed it three times. and we kept vetoing it and vetoing it until congress got it right, thanks to the effort of boyden and others. then there was that thing called abortion.

there are five -- four, four bills appropriations bills, both of which are considered in the house and the senate, each year assuming that they get their work done, that have something to do with whether or not the federal government is involved in the funding of abortion. it's hs swrrks it makes sense but then we got to the issue whether or not abortions could be performed on department of defense facilities all around the world, there was a foreign operations bill which had to do with the family planning conference in the mexico city situation and ultimately the district of columbia because of the fudgeability of dollars. so at least ten time as year we had to deal with the question of whether or not the federal government would be engaged in funding of abortion. and as a result we had to wield the veto pen a number of times to keep that law in place in terms of how the hyde amendment had been administered over time.

people talked about the shutdown a few weeks ago. we had to shut down in -- one in 1995 was nothing new because we actually had a similar shutdown during our four years. more often than not we used the veto threat and also votes on amendments to bills, to show what strength we had. it was necessary in terms of having these test votes that we get to 34 or get to 146, in other words, denying the two-thirds that's required to override the veto so we could go back and get legislation changed. and move it more in the direction that we wanted it to go. then there was also some vetoes that was just bad legislation and the president chose to do that. there were 44 vetoes if you count the pocket vetoes of the president. 15 of those 44 vetoes were pocket vetoes. 29 of them were regular vetoes,

13 override attempts of those 29 regular vetoes, none were overridden while i was there. shortly after i left the president was veto was overridden. the system fell apart once i departed. it was on a transportation bill. budget deal. i think that what we did the most ineffectively and i'm sort of like the people that lifted this from my oral history and i understand it's been in the media the last couple of days, i think the issue that we face more after that, the 1990 budget deal which was occasioned primarily by newt gingrich and others deserting us on the first deal which is a pretty darn good deal, it had child care stuff in it, it had capital gains tax reductions, lots of good stuff i

think for the government of the united states and our direction, our brand of conservatism. i think we blew it by not fessing up and describing what we had done and said you know, and it's been alluded to in the term of the president's character, i made that pledge, i broke that pledge, it's time for us to move down the road because it's the best thing to do for this country. i think we failed him in positioning him in such a fashion where he was able to communicate those views effectively. even if we did have to write them down for him the words. i think that was a problem on our part. do i believe that would have ensured that the president would have been re-elected in 1992? no. because there were a number of other factors that led to it. one other thing i'm going to talk about. yes. supreme court. i guess i should say a little bit about that. i had the distinct pleasure of and honor of having had the

opportunity to handle the nominations of three supreme court justices. the first was anton scalia, it happened at a great time, working for president reagan at the time but it happened at a time when william rehnquist had been elevated to chief and nobody was handling scalia. and scalia set a standard for future supreme court -- scalia didn't even want to admit that marbury versus madison was set in law that allowed him to have a job in the first place. i said you got to give him that. because otherwise you don't have a job. and i'm still not sure he ever said that he would agree that was settled law. but that sort of set the standard and then after he was confirmed i think by 9-0 the democrats started digging in in some of the other nominations that were to follow him and sort of like we're never ever going to let anybody answer as few questions as scalia did ever again in the history of the congress of the united states.

and then we had in between before i got back to the white house the bourque fee as co. he did not realize he didn't need to explain anything to the senate of the united states, the judiciary committee and he talked himself into oblivion. and i think it was poor judgment on his part. so now we get the situation that is created by the nomination of david souter. frankly, after spending as much time as i spent with david during the confirmation process and visiting members of the united states senate i was not surprised at all or have not been surprised by any of the while he was a member of the united states supreme court for 19 years. likewise, i am not surprised by any of the votes that clarence thomas has cast during that time. one of the biggest hurdles we had were the words the president used to describe clarence thomas when he sort of announced him.

my view would have been like he's my guy and that's the way it is. but it kind of set a standard which was alluded to earlier, thomas was a great e more aren nomination by this president, and he will have a longer lasting impact, i think, upon the domestic policy agenda of the president of the united states than any one else left behind despite the great efforts that we made during our time there. i'm done. thank you. >> was i right or not? these are the people who make representation work in this country. and if you were president wouldn't you hire them first. we actually started late, so there is some time for questions. yes.

>> it isn't really a question, as much as it is a comment. i can't remember which of you pointed out at the beginning there were four for the first nomination, thomas, star, jones, and then suitor. i think we were all agreed, i think it's publicly understood that president bush wanted thomas then, because he sort of intuitively understood that maybe the next opening would be -- would be marshall and he didn't want to do what might look like a quota since he was opposed to quotas. we told him, a lot of people, he just wasn't ready and it was the right choice because it turned out after a year, 18 months, he was seasoned. but a couple points out of that. still that situation, what happened to star? and