hand side of your screen and you hit play on slick videos. this timeline tool makes it easy to get an idea of what was debated and decided in washington. scroll through and spend a few minutes on c-span points of interest. >> the ambassador who negotiated the you is taliban deal to withdraw military forces from afghanistan testified before the house foreign affairs committee and kohl's the afghan leadership mostly responsible for the taliban takeover after the withdrawal. by the time trump left office in 2021 he was troops in afghanistan had reduced to 2500. president biden completed the withdrawal a month later. this hearing is about two and half hours.

quotes a meeting of foreign affairs will come to order. discuss how the biden administration unconditionally handed over afghanistan to the taliban terrorist organization with his refusal to enforce the doha agreement. today's hearing comes at a crucial moment in this committee's >> the purpose of this meeting is to discuss how the biden administration unconditionally handed over afghanistan to the taliban and terrorist organization. with this refusal to enforce the agreement. today's hearing comes at a crucial moment in this committee's investigation into the biden administration catastrophic withdrawal from afghanistan. four months after president biden announced the withdrawal, his senior military advisers and his own intelligence committee repeatedly issued dire warnings about the damage this would create.

at the same time, i, along with other republican and democrat members of congress urged president biden to uphold the conditions of the doha agreement. and most importantly we urged him to prepare for the eventual fallout of our withdrawal. he ignored us and all including his own state department personnel who issued a dissent cable in july warning of the dire situation on the ground. instead, as the taliban takeover became imminent, the white house and state department leadership stuck their heads in the sand. it was so bad the state department waited until the day after the taliban captured kabul, to request an emergency evacuation, also known as a neo- . as a result of the failure of plan, the u.s. military was forced to conduct the emergency evacuation surrounded by tens of thousands of taliban terrorists. put simply, president biden and

secretary blinking but thousands of american lives at risk through their incompetence and willful blindness. in the worst possible outcome. a terrorist attack on august 26 2021 the killed 13 you servicemembers, wounded 45 more and killed more than 170 afghan civilians. it was the deadliest day for the u.s. in afghanistan in over a decade. today, we have some of the family members of the service members killed in the audience. they are here because they want accountability for their children's deaths. i'm going to get them answers, the answers they deserve. i anticipate my colleagues on the other side of the aisle will attempt to spin this disaster is all being president trump's fall. they will claim the doha agreement forced present bind to withdrawal and he had no choice.

but this is false. to that end i want to remind everyone of two critical facts. first the doha agreement was conditions based. conditions witnesses here today negotiated. as he can tell you, those conditions were not being met by the taliban. they are still not being met today. the taliban is allowing terrorists like al qaeda to flourish in afghanistan. and the truth is president biden wanted to withdraw from the doha agreement. if you wanted to, he could have. he did just that with many of president trump's other agreements. second, president biden himself said even if the doha agreement had never been signed, he would still have withdrawn all you was troops from afghanistan exactly the way he did. when asked by george stephanopoulos,", he said i would have, would you have withdrawn troops like this even

if president trump had not made the deal with the taliban? president biden replied, "i would've tried to figure out how to withdraw those troops, yes.". i witnessed today, mr. khalilzad, someone i have known for years, served as it you is special are presented for afghanistan, insulation under president trump, renegotiated the doha agreement and was asked to remain on by president biden. in november 2020 third he appeared before the committee for nearly 12 our closed door transcribed interview. and voluntarily, i might add. thank you. in that interview one thing was made clear. the core problem was not the doha agreement, it was a president who refused to enforce it. i want to thank our witness for being here today. ambassador mr. khalilzad, i believe you have variable information to share with the committee. i know you have chosen to do so

voluntarily. i hope you do so with the same candor showed in november. i really admire you, sir. you are not forced to appear here. we could have done that. you are doing this as a patriot and american. and someone who's in the middle of this from the beginning with so many facts to share. we thank you for being here today. with that i recognize the ranking member. november 2023 afn let me begin by also thanking fn you for hearing my call for transparency. november 23rd, november 2023, afghanistan hearing. yesterday your staff sent us written notice of your personal commitment to publicly released transcripts from interviews held under this congress and committees investigation and into the united states withdraw from afghanistan after they are finalized on february 29th. this indeed is the right thing

to do. the american people have funded our bipartisan oversight work and we owe them full transparency, not just misleading cherry picked snippets. such transparency is critical for any investigation, so i strongly hope that your commitment to make transcripts public will extend to the other oversight investigations if initiated in this congress and in which witnesses have been questioned behind closed doors. we must not let this committee's activities become another typical move in a partisan game. with that, let's thank ambassador khalilzad for appeared before our committee. usurped under three different presidents and a variety of capacities under america's 20 years of war in effort at afghanistan. your insights on the august 2021 withdraw and the many decision points that led to the events of august 2021 are important to this committees

understanding. a 20 year war deserves comprehensive and bipartisan oversight. but the title of this hearing, how the biden administration failed to enforce the doha agreement is telling. it is not titled, the biden administration's failed doha agreement with the taliban. that is because it was not joe biden who crafted the taught 2020 deal. it was his republican predecessor that made the agreement with the taliban that committed the united states to withdraw all of our troops from afghanistan. nor is the hearing titled, how the trump administration failed to press the tell event to live up to its commitments in the doha agreement. but withdrew troops anyway. that would require scrutiny of the doha deal since its inception under the trump administration. in i must say this because for some of my republican colleagues, the challenges of afghanistan began the day of joe biden's inauguration.

that is not to say that the biden administration is beyond congressional review. or that there is nothing to learn from those eight months. that is an eight month snapshot out of 20 years. at best, this fixation is oversight malpractice, at worst, historical revisionism, politically motivated to place the withdraw with president which resident by inherited. solely at his feet. let's be clear, both president biden and president trump sought to end our forever war in afghanistan. president biden ultimately achieved that goal. our presence in afghanistan has changed but our core interest have not. the united states continues to pursue those interests as it has demonstrated with the killing of al qaeda and 9/11 masterminds in 2022. this is

not about pointing blame. this is about grappling with reality , with the facts we like as well as the ones we don't. with the sacred constitution of responsibility, we have to oversee the state department and the u.s. foreign policy. to that end, i want to acknowledge ambassador dance misstatement, which is submitted for today's record. ambassador smith served for almost four decades at the state department and returned secretary blankets request to lead it after action review and independent review of the department's actions over the course of january 20 to august 20 2021. related to the united states withdraw. the result of his review, drawn from over 150 interviews are not just invaluable but

actionable and provide a road map, we all should consult regularly to support the departments crisis management capacity and single greatest assets, it's people. now, ambassador khalilzad, i know you have set for transcript interview on today's subject that lasted over 10 hours and we thank you for that. that's a testimony to both your best knowledge and deep commitment to america. and our national security. i look forward to your testimony and i hope the american people can here today what we have already heard behind closed doors. and with that i yield. >> other members of the committee are reminded that statement can be submitted for the record. were pleased to have the honorable zalmay khalilzad before us today. he served as a special ur

representative for afghanistan reconciliation at the state department from september 18 to october 2021. your full statement will be made part of the record. i know recognize ambassador khalilzad for his opening statement. >> thank you. mr. chairman, ranking member and distinguished members of the committee, i welcome the opportunity to talk with you about america's strategy in afghanistan during my service as between 2018 and 2021. in september 2018, the trump administration asked me to help negotiate the framework agreement or the safe withdraw of u.s. forces. obtain commitment on both of the tell event at afghan

government on u.s. counterterrorism concerns. and set the stage for afghans to start negotiating an and to the war in their country. by the end of 2018, the president's decision was to bring the american forces home. several factors that contributed to this decision, the conclusion that this war had gone on for too long with no end in sight. om the opportunity cost was too high. the united states needed to focus on great power competition that is china, russia, and the threat from iran . afghanistan no longer was central to the war on terror. the goal of transforming afghanistan into a modern and

democratic state had been unrealistic despite best efforts the country had huge governance problems and rampant levels of corruption. w the administration recognized the potential risks involved in this policy. the greatest risk was the potential threat to u.s. forces during withdraw. the british withdraw in 1842 and the soviet withdraw in 1988 and 1989 had been very bloody. a second risk was from afghanistan once again becoming the big platform for a terrorist threat against the united states homeland, u.s. interest and our allies. a third was the loss of [ indiscernible ] both inside

the government and outside, but the president determined that the withdraw was in the u.s. national interest. after more than a year of negotiations, on february 29th, 2020, we reached two agreements. one with the e taliban and the other with the afghan government. these provided a framework for u.s. withdraw dealing with terrorism entering afghan negotiations within the taliban and afghan republic, a permanent cease-fire and future relations between the united states and afghanistan. key features of the agreement were, phased withdrawal of u.s. forces over a 14 month period, afghanistan was not to be used by any group or individual to threaten the security of the

united states and its allies, enter afghan negotiations and the taliban committed not only to attack u.s. forces once the agreement was signed. this was critical and the tell event adhere to it killing no coalition fighter or u.s. soldier during the entire withdrawal period. the first phase of withdrawal lasted 135 days in which the u.s. forces would reduce it to 8600. by the time president trump left office, u.s. forces in afghanistan had been reduced to 2500. the u.s. retained the right to come to the defense of the afghan forces if the taliban attacks them. we exercise this right as needed. during the negotiations between the afghan republic and the taliban, which started on

september 12, 2020, they did not make any significant progress. after the november 2020 elections, president-elect biden's team asked me to stay on . the administration had three options, one, withdraw from the doha agreement. two, implemented the agreement but with changes such as the extension of the agreed timeline , linking the withdrawal of remaining forces to the conclusion of a political agreement between the taliban and the afghan government, or insisting on leaving behind an afghanistan counterterror force , or withdraw the remaining forces without linkages. the president announced in april of 2021 that we would add four months to the timetable for withdraw for a total of 18

months. the withdrawal was not conditioned on a political agreement between the two afghan sides because it was believed that such conditionality would risk a return to war without end and entrap the united states into reversing course and sending more forces again. it was also decided that our over the horizon capabilities would allow us to monitor and respond to terror threats to the u.s. from afghan territory. on protecting social and political gains, the approach was to advocate for key values in the course of afghan negotiations by pressing the taliban on responding -- on respecting women's rights and human rights. the withdrawal proceeded based on the new

extended timeline. the assessment was the afghan government would remain in power and it's forces would defend it and fight the taliban during the withdrawal for some time afterwards. this assumption informed our plans. although reasonable, the assumption turned out to be wrong. the situation on the ground began to shift significantly and rapidly in favor of the taliban. they took over one province after another and by mid august of 2021 were at the gaetz of kabul. we had a last-minute success in persuading the taliban to return is to refrain from entering couple and instead to hold talks with government to reach a lyrical

deal for a shared government, a step to which both sides agreed. but this fell apart when president surprisingly fred the country which caused the no leaderless afghan military and police to instantly disintegrate . these developments lead to the taliban enter into kabul and this series of events of why the u.s. to react adapt and improvise as none of this had been foreseen in our plans to withdraw by the end of august. as we all remember, the final two weeks of chaos at the airport and the tragic loss of 13 brave americans and isis kate terrorist attack were difficult and what remains hardly debated. the events of those final days should not diminish the

achievements made. we must remember that after 9/11, we sent our forces to afghanistan to decimate al qaeda. this was accomplished and represents a major win for the security of the united states. we all are grateful to those who sacrifice made this possible and to their families. the struggle for afghanistan is not over and afghanistan's final chapter is certainly not written. the seed of the values we planted may well bear fruit overtime. it would be a mistake to turn our back on the country . the american approach going forward must take current realities in afghanistan, the region and the world into account, while remaining guided elsewhere by our interests and

enduring values. thank you, mr. chairman. >> thank you, ambassador. i want to echo your comments to our veterans that their service was not in vain. they protected this nation for 20 years from a major terrorist attack like 9/11 and we thank them for that. we also want to thank the parents of the marine corps corporal hunter lopez and core sergeant nicole g who are here today and to the lopez family, miss shayla and the rest of the gold star families, we honor your sacrifice and your children. in november you testified before this committee in a transcribed interview and you restated, you presented to the biden administration and to the president three options on the doha agreement. one, to basically ignore it and

unconditionally withdraw. two, tarried up. three, enforce it, it's conditions against the taliban. you also testified that you and secretary blanket both recommended to president biden that he enforce the doha condition. but instead, the president ignored your advice or disagreed and chose to ignore that doha conditions and unconditionally withdraw. is that correct? >> i think there was an opportunity for me to brief the president, and the options that he had and it was clear that it would be desirable the final withdraw happens after there is

an agreement between the government and the taliban. that was broadly supported, that idea, but upon discussion and deliberation and consultations with allies and others, the allies two favorite withdraw after there was an agreement between the government and the taliban. but, there was a judgment that if we did that, since that was not part of the doha agreement, that it could result in a protracted delay and we couldn't be certain when and if the afghans would reach an agreement. if there was a risk of going back to war and sending more troops, the decision was not to pursue that and there was broad support for that decision.

>> your recommendation to the president was to enforce doha's conditions, correct? >> that was part of the agreement, and we restated that that this was a condition based agreement and was a package deal and there were linkages, what we did depended on the taliban delivering on their commitment. spin-up the president disagree with you and chose not to enforce the conditions? >> i described the discussion that occurred and the judgment that was made. >> the conditions were not enforced and as a result the taliban is in control of afghanistan today, correct? >> i would say, it's clear that the taliban are in control, but i would put the responsibility for what happened largely on

the shoulders of the afghan government leadership for not standing for their government, their system, and for the values that they believed in. >> i agree. i think the president's actions were cowardice and fleeing his country as a coward. that is not a good example. let me turn to the meeting you had in doha between yourself, general mckenzie and the taliban leader. he said the taliban offer to give the united states control of kabul for the purposes of evacuation, but that offer was turned down. when asked by my committee at your interview, whether the taliban viewed that as a quote, greenlight to take over kabul, you said , i think that is clear. do you agree with that

statement? >> i agree we had made an agreement for the taliban not to enter kabul , for a delegation to come from kabul , and president had to agree to it as well for a power-sharing of government to take over on september one and a meeting of 200 afghan notables president -- present. >> mckenzie says that is not my mission because his orders are not to secure kabul for evacuation . his orders were to evacuate by july 4th and he did not have the troops allocated for that. he could have raised that to the president. was this meeting to your knowledge ever reported to the white house? >> it was reported clearly to the entire government, but it was reported after general mckenzie said on the spot that

it was not as he said, chairman, his mission to secure kabul . the initial goal was for taliban not to be in kabul. i presented them with a map of some 20 to 25 miles away from the center, within that area, that there should be no taliban present. but the portion of the president and increased the widespread concern by afghans in kabul about law and order with the disintegration of the security forces, the options were either that the taliban's offer we take responsibility. you said correctly, chairman, i was present in the meeting and was not part of his mission and the discussion shifted to where the taliban could go. >> his understanding,

mckenzie's understanding was the president would not authorize more troops to take over kabul for the evacuation. >> i can't comment on that because i wasn't present in any discussion he may have had. >> if that had happened, would that have been a little different? we take over kabul for evacuation. the taliban agree to stay out in those 20 mile radius and they don't take reach of al qaeda. they are not part of this chaos at the very end and the suicide bomber coming from this prison out of bagram, i'm not asking you to speculate, but it is very foreseeable that may never have happened. and yet in this report does go to the white house and nothing is done to change the course of events, correct? >> your account is correct, but we don't know what else could have happened. if that decision was made. we were entering speculation now. >> you really can't trust the

taliban, then. i see my time has expired and i know recognize ranking member mr. meeks. >> thank you. i'm not going to speculate because i don't think we should be speculating or giving our own opinions, or paraphrasing of what you are saying. i'm going to take you for what you are saying and not going to guess on what my thoughts are, e because we want to do an investigation to determine what we should learn from this. let me join that chairman and say to our gold star families how much we appreciate you and the heroes that lost their lives . i know there is nothing we can do to bring them back. they are indeed heroes for our country and i thank you for your sacrifices. i will tell you that no matter whether it is a democrat or a

republican, i truly believe that we will always hold them dear and acknowledge the heroes that they are. thank you for being here. ambassador, you have worked tirelessly over the years to negotiate and implement the doha deal, as did many others in our government. i have some questions i want to ask, and based upon your experience, they are mostly yes or no. we don't have to get into speculation. secretarial pompeo himself had gone to doha to sign the agreement and a photo op with the taliban leader after nearly two decades of being at war with them and despite any criticisms of it, it is fair to say, including the doha deal was a significant event, is that correct? >> yes, signing was a

significant event. >> with the conclusion of a doha deal, the taliban and then stopped attacking u.s. forces inside afghanistan, fulfilling the top condition placed on it in the deal, is that also correct? >> correct. >> the united states committed in the doha deal to quote, withdraw from afghanistan all military forces of the united states, its allies and coalition partners, including all non-diplomatic civilian personnel, private security contractors, trainers, advisers , and supporting services personnel, is that not correct? >> correct. >> arguably, that withdraw was well underway in january of

2021 after president trump, according to ambassador smith's statement for the record come a quote, steadily withdrew u.s. forces notwithstanding concerns about the taliban's behavior. is that correct? >> correct. we were down to 2500. >> in your expert opinion, what did you think the taliban would have done if president biden, just a few months before the original may deadline, that his predecessor had set for a full withdrawal, had just walked away entirely from the doha agreement? in your expert opinion. >> if we had walked away from the doha agreement, we would have been back, in my opinion, now i am offering an opinion, we would have been back fighting the taliban. we would

have been back to where we were before the agreement. that's my opinion. >> so, you in your opening statement of the belief that imposing further conditions on the taliban at that time, as you gestated, would risk a return to war? and you hold to that belief today, is that correct? >> i do. >> and had president biden sought to revise the deal to maintain a small number of troops in afghanistan and indefinitely, did the risk remains that that taliban would resume attacks against them? >> very likely. >> i'm sure mr. ambassador, you agrees, that the highest priori of the united states president should be to protect american lives, correct? >> correct. >> thank you.

and even over other development or national security objectivess or even the welfare of our allies and partners? >> this gets into a complicated discussion. we do put lives at risk in defense of our interest and values, as we did in afghanistan for many years. >> let me ask my last question. mr. ambassador, in your own belief, do you believe that president biden's completion of the u.s. withdrawal from afghanistan in 2021 was necessary to protect american lives? >> certainly, american lives in afghanistan, in terms of american military forces, yes. >> i thank you, mr. ambassador.

i yield back. >> chernow recognizes mr. wilson. >> thank you. ambassador, thank you for your service and it is so inspiring to be with you. we are grateful for what you have done for our country. it is particularly time for us to appreciate the success of the american military. for 20 years and they stopped terrorist attacks in our country. as people look back, we should appreciate the success of the american military. my former national guard unit, the 2/18 infantry of the south carolina national guard led by bob livingston served for one year across afghanistan and they developed a great affection for their afghan brothers. i was there four times seen firsthand the success of what they were doing. i'm grateful my youngest son first lieutenant was an engineer serving with the army guard. it is very personal to me. the

absolute disgust i have with president joe biden, his shameful appeasement surrender and abandonment of the people of afghanistan has led immediately to the death of 13 young americans who -- even though the sniper had mass murdering individual bomber in his sights, which could have saved the 13 lives and could have saved, indeed, hundreds of poor afghan citizens who were murdered, but yet the biting rules of engagement came into play and 13 young americans died. with that, too, it has given encouragement to what we are into now. we did not choose this and that is a war, a dictator with roll of gun invading democracies with rule of law. we saw that on february 24th, 2022 one were criminal putin

invaded ukraine. we saw it october 7th, when hamas, the puppets of a ran invaded israel. we see today with the threats being made against the 24 million people of taiwan by the chinese communist party. o all of this to me goes back to the shameless, shameful decision, which i think is the most catastrophic in the history of the united states in terms of national defense and security and foreign policy, and there is no excuse, however they rewrite history, god bless their hearts. but then, additionally, we should always remember that america was in afghanistan and liberated afghanistan from taliban terrorists because of the terrorist attacks of 9/11. history should not be rewritten . what happened is, osama bin laden was operating out of a cave in afghanistan. for 20 years and did, military l was successful to protect, but sadly, we now, by abandoning afghanistan, the local global

war on terrorism is coming to america. the fbi has identified we are at great risk of attack imminently today in america, that could occur. it's shameful what occurred. additionally, a question i have is that when on august 26, 2021, one president biden excused his appeasement and right in the middle of his speech was sent to his advisers, abandon, leave now. and then he threw in, it was on the teleprompter, i have letters. i sent him and asked that night, i asked for copies of the letters of the advice he received to abandon the people of afghanistan. i should not surprise you but every two months i sent a letter to the white house asking for the letters. there are no letters. they have not been revealed. what advice was given by his advisers on leaving the people

of afghanistan to fall off jets is the abandonment took place. >> i believe our military, under the leadership of the president and chain of command, did an admirable job in a very difficult set of circumstances to get as many people out, someone had 25,000 people were brought out. i associate myself with your praise of our military. the honor of serving with them in afghanistan and in iraq, and they have done an outstanding job for the people of the united states for our security. with regard to what you mentioned, sir, about the letters and advice, i do not have a direct knowledge of what it is that was involved there, but the advice was to bring out

as many people as possible, to reach out to as many americans and those who had worked for us or organizations that work for us, to bring them out. a huge number was brought out. >> thank you for your service. thank you, mr. chairman. >>th chair recognizes mr. sherman. >> about the relevant period, we had two choices, keep a force there, particularly with airpower and be prepared to incur modest casualties, or pull out. the foreign policy establishment wanted to stay. the dissent cables said, stay. the politicians promised the american people we would pull out. not because our casualties were particularly large, but because they were on top of 20 years of war. we were defeated militarily in

achieving our full goals in afghanistan, not by the taliban , but by the phrase, forevermore.e once that phrase was coined, the american people demanded we withdraw. i know there is rusher on the chairman to politicize his committee and achieve the political objectives of his party. but this hearing is going to give politicalization a bad do name because it is the worst issue for the republicans to bring up. ambassador, this agreement, this doha agreement is the worst agreement i could imagine. i don't blame you. because president trump -- you testified in your testimony, by the end of 2018 it was well known president trump's decision was to bring all american forces home from afghanistan. in 2019, on the anniversary of 9/11 he invited them to camp david and just before the

november 2020 election, the president trump stated, we will have the small remaining number of our brave men and women serving in afghanistan home by christmas. the only leverage you had over the taliban is, maybe we will take that foreign policy approach and keep our air force capacity there. you have the president saying, president trump singh, they are all home by christmas, every single one of them. so, this is the worst agreement i can imagine. ambassador, is there anything in the agreement where the taliban commit themselves to allowing 13-year- old girls to go to school? i didn't find anything like that. is in there? >> fthe taliban --. there is nothing in the agreement. the issues dealing with the future of afghanistan was to be negotiated.

>> the agreement itself is to say, why didn't we enforce the agreement? when the taliban treats 12-year- old girls like slaves, when they kill members of the lgbtq community, when they kill anyone who converts from islam to christianity, they are not in violation of this agreement that we are having a hearing to say, why are we enforcing? you can't enforce. we entered into agreement in which they agreed l to do nothing more than talk to the afghan government. they talked. they decided they wanted to kill lgbtq amenity, they wanted to kill what they call apostates, they wanted to enslave half the human race, the female half. so, this agreement wasn't so bad that the chairman attacks president biden for not withdrawing from it. this is an agreement entered into by the man who claims he

is the best negotiator in the world, president trump. i will say that we did achieve one objective and that is afghanistan is uniquely situated to serve as a base for terrorism against america. in fact, there has been more terrorism coming out of afghanistan killing iranians in iran then americans. there is no such thing as a easy withdraw. russia and britain had very messy withdrawals from afghanistan. that was true when every english-speaking afghan i had any acquaintance with was trying to leave, the idea that the average grunt in afghanistan would stay and fight is absurd. i do have one more question. republicans have said that somehow we should have gone all over afghanistan and collected our $85 billion worth of weapons.

reasonably from people who knew they could keep them for their own self-defense or sell them to the taliban. could we have, by force, taken back our weapons everywhere in afghanistan on our way out without casualties? >> thank you thomas are. as you know, the weapons that were left behind were weapons that we thought was safe to leave behind for the government of afghanistan. stomach even though we realized the government was useless, could we have sees them without casualties? >> we are speculating, now. the government, we assume would not fall apart. >> that was more of a rhetorical question. if people have weapons they want to hold onto, you can't take them away if you are not willing to incur some casualties. i yield back. >> chair recognizes mr. perry. >> thank you, mr. chairman. mr. ambassador, in september of 2020, you appeared before the

house oversight committee and testified that the u.s. troop withdrawal would be determined -- i'm going to quote you -- based on conditions on the ground and delivery by the taliban on their commitments. did you or secretary blinken advocate for an extension on the withdraw considering the poor planning behind the final evacuation as it occurred? >> as i said, sir, four months were added to the timetable, moving from 13 to 18. but, as i said again, the decision was made to withdraw at the end of august and not to link it to any conditions that you might have in mind. >> that was your quote, conditions.

i think americans have in mind that it would be a condition based withdrawal which would make sense. you provide some kind of -- when i say you, our adversary, so to speak -- you provide some level of compliance with the agreement that we can see, and then we will give you a little. that is not what occurred. i am just wondering if you can name a single concession made by the taliban during the time period between the april 14th announcement by president biden of total withdrawal and the fall of afghanistan. what concessions? >> when concession was that they acquiesce to the condition of four months that we demanded. four months was demanded of additional time. they could have rejected it and gone back to fighting. they didn't. they acquiesced.

the agreed not to enter kabul when we asked. they agreed to a government that would include members of the republican side, the government side. >> those agreements as you notem , were hollow because they took more and more and more of the government under their control, which was not in the doha agreement, which was not what was considered -- which was not agreed to. and they did invaded kabul. >> they did because -- the agreed not to and then --. >> they lied to us. it wasn't based on conditions on the ground and i'm wondering, did you convey these concerns to president biden during the continuing negotiations about the blatant violations. there were blatant, but the whole world saw that as they

were occurring. >> certainly, i'm not here to defend the behavior of the taliban. >> none of us are. >> but i believe that assisting on additional conditions --. a >> we are not asking for additional conditions, just the condition they agreed to. i'm trying to determine, knowing that, you knew that, the world saw that, the president saw that. i'm assuming, maybe i shouldn't be, i'm assuming you advised him of that. the secretary advised him of that he proceeded anyway. >> he proceeded to withdraw forces because he believed, if he persisted, it would be back to a fight, and he didn't want to do that. >> out of curiosity and the remaining time, who chose that

20 anniversary of 9/11 as the final evacuation day? >> i actually do not know that. >> did you ever question that? maybe it is not as important and impactful to you for the rest of americans, but that's pretty significant. >> i agree with that. an adjustment was made to the end of august, as the final date of withdraw. >> but it was september 11th. >> you know as well as i do. >> you don't know who made the decision? >> the president obviously made the decision but i don't know who advised them on choosing that date. >> the president is the commander and chief regardless of who advised him. it was said that the president wanted to withdraw and you reminded us because it was to protect american lives. and to lessen the loss of american lives. you would also conceive that the time coming into that

during the previous administration, there had been no loss of american lives. once the decision was made, and the plan executed, there was a horrific loss of american lives. >> the loss of life that didn't occur under president trump --. >> we will never know what didn't occur. we know what did occur. the previous administrations plan come into it during that period of time, a long period a of time, there were no loss of american service members lives. >> because of the agreement. >> no, not because of the agreements. the taliban wasn't following or abiding by the agreement. the president let the taliban know that if they killed a name american lives it was going to be over for them. >> chair recognizes mr. keating. >> first off, as a gold star

family member myself, i want to recognize and thank the families that are here and i want to be sure we thank first and foremost and get our eternal gratitude to their service and sacrifice. the purpose of undertaking the overall investigation of afghanistan was to look to 20+ years and try and find out lessons learned. things that we could do differently. the goal is, and i think i share it and i think that families share it, to prevent future lives from being lost. can we learn something over this period of time that will serve other families? that's my goal over 20 years looking at this. and i can't really sit here at this moment in time talking about saving future american lives without indicating

something else that is happening right here in this house right now. it is not acting on aid to ukraine. what is that relevant to this? when we can fund ukrainians defending themselves against an illegal war from russia that is direct present danger to united states and our allies, and we can confront this threat with n funding ukraine. by doing that, confront russia, deter other threats, threats that could be in china and taiwan, and keep young american men and women from being deployed under article five. if ukraine falls, putin has made it clear, he is going into the baltic states, which are nato states. in the theme of trying to save huge american lives, i hope the speaker has the courage to allow democracy that so many people fought for, a chance to have a vote on this.

when it comes to ukraine, mr. ambassador, i do not get to choose who is here. i did not get to choose the title saying that the biden administration failed. i prefer to look at this over 20 years, but i would quote, given the comments of some of my colleagues a quote from u.s. ambassador john bass who said, our main policy efforts -- he was the ambassador under resident trump -- our main policy efforts not only didn't reinforce each other, they contradicted each other. these contradictory signals were amplified by president trump's periodic statements supporting rapid force reductions, taken together, they undermined afghans confidence in a u.s. security commitment and in their own armed service and government, something you alluded to.

the lack of confidence that spelled itself out with the afghan government and military. i guess i will leave with this and hope that we can undertake as a committee our emphasis on a what went wrong, what we can learn. learn from our military. learn from our diplomats. there was plenty that went wrong and they had dire consequences in many instances. in terms of limiting this hearing to how the biden administration failed, i will end with one quote. that occurred on june 26, 2021. it was at a political campaign rally afterwards by the former president. i started this process. all the troops are coming home. they couldn't stop this process. unquote. let's not have this hearing

center on who is the last person holding the ball when the music ended, but rather, sincerely looking at what we can do to prevent other tragedies, what we can learn from this and how we can save young american men and women from being in harm's way when they don't have to be. they have the courage to be there when they have to be. the decisions that are made are not theirs. i will never forget when i first became -- when i went to members serving in a war zone and i asked him what he thought about the war. he said, my job is to serve. that question is yours to f answer, respectfully. that's why we are here that's why we are trying to learn. that's why we are trying to save more american lives in the future. i yield back. >> gentlemen eels.

chair recognizes ms. wagner. >> i thank the chairman and ambassador for being here and for his service. today more than two years afterl the biden administration's shameful, tragic, and utterly misguided flight from afghanistan has been clear that the president was determined to abandon the country at any cost , and with no conditions. the cost, lost military assets and readability as a friend and ally and global leader, and most of all, in precious american lives, was incalculable. again, and again, the administration proved it was willing to simply cede afghanistan to the taliban, irrespective of the taliban's clear intent to ignore all commitments and agreements. the responsibility, the app symbol debacle in afghanistan rests on this administrations shoulders.

and there must be accountability. there has been no accountability for the administration's total failure to protect u.s. troops and citizens. ambassador khalilzad, did countries in nato argue against a full u.s. troop withdrawal? >> they did. as subject to political agreement that i mentioned to the chairman. >> how did russia and china respond to the taliban takeover? >> i don't know for sure, but it seems to me that they would have preferred a political settlement, they stated at least, they would have preferred a political settlement. i was always suspicious of their motivations. sometimes

they would want a political settlement, but they knew it there was no easy path to a political settlement. they also would have liked to have kept us in afghanistan in a difficult situation, doing what they wanted us to do, in part, which is to get terrorists that were focused on them eliminated by us, and paying a price without winning. so, we had to be careful in terms of russia and chinese activities. i could talk some more if we went and it different setting about their policies, but this is what i can say in the setting. >> i appreciate that. it is concerning to me that nato was against a full troop withdrawal. afghanistan is now ranked worst

177 countries in terms of the status of women, according to the research. did you believe the taliban would respect women's rights and allow girls to go to school? >> i did not trust them. they did make statements on record, video statements that they would allow girls to go to school, all the way to not only college but two phd. this is on the record. >> but they did not do it. and you didn't trust them. >> right. >> why didn't u.s. negotiators press the taliban to extend the withdrawal beyond august 31 to facilitate the evacuation? >> that was the president's decision not to get ask for four months, as i mentioned before, but that was his decision not to ask for additional extension. >> president biden's? >> yes.

>> taliban issued threats to attack u.s. troops if they stayed longer than the august 31 deadline. ambassador, did you consider this to be the actions of a responsible partner of peace? >> that consideration that additional extension was asked for, it wasn't ask, but additional extension was asked for, perhaps it could lead to this restart of the fight, and that's why perhaps the decision was made not to ask for more time. >> they threatened our hou.s. troops if they stayed one day longer than august 31. what was your assessment throughout 2021 of whether the taliban was meeting the conditions of the doha agreement and how about in april of 2021? >> it's always on my personal judgment to the taliban to do what they have agreed to do, we

have to respond with our commitments in a way that incentivizes them to do what they have committed, meaning we wouldn't do what we have committed to unless they do what they have committed to doing. that was my point of view, and that was my advice. >> my time has ended here and i yield back. >> chair recognizes mr. castro. >> thank you, chairman. thank you, ambassador for your is the money today. in your prepared testimony you said, by the end of 2018, as is well known, the president's decision was to bring home american forces from afghanistan. we have also heard testimony in multiple closed-door transcribed interviews with senior state department officials to this effect. in other words, the withdrawal of all u.s. troops from afghanistan began in february 2020tw as part of the agreement

you negotiated between the united states and tell event. can you provide examples of how president trump's decision to withdraw all u.s. troops was apparent and, well known, beginning in 2018? >> the president tweeted to that effect multiple times. i would give a reference to secretary pompeo's book, in which he documents the president's determination. when i had my meetings with the president, he always made that clear, that was the objective. >> let me ask you, it's fair to say the u.s. withdrawal from afghanistan began as a result t of the february 2020 doha agreement? under president trump? >> indeed. >> do you believe that sentiment to withdraw all troops was known or suspected

by the taliban when you were negotiating with them? what informs this belief? >> the public statements, sometimes the taliban would say that i was not following in my negotiations, the letter or spirit of what was being said publicly by saying we would only withdraw if certain conditions are met. why sometimes statements would be made that provided, created the impression as if we would withdraw regardless. >> you feel like that was undermining him at the time, your negotiating? >> not for others to judge, but the challenges i described. >> so, and how did that fact, how did that situation, the conflicting statements and so forth, the fact that the taliban had a sense, at least or suspected that there would

be a total withdrawal, how did that affect her ability to negotiate the doha deal? >> it was not helpful. also, however, i try to educate them, not to take public statements made for a variety of reasons as the definitive final word because circumstances could change that we needed a good agreement we needed a good agreement, as good as possible given the statements being made. without having such an agreement they might hear a statement very different. >> from the president, the secretary of state or some high- ranking u.s. official? >> nd. >> you negotiated this deal.

was there ever any doubt that it committed the united states to draw down its military leave from the country? basically to go to zero? >> that was clearly in the agreement. the idea of perhaps leaving some forces behind was there. not an agreement we raised with the talibs. it became an understanding. i have to be careful how i articulate this. if there is an agreement between the government of afghanistan and the taliban and there is a new unity government, the issue of a residual u.s. presence would be decided by that government's. >> in light of these facts to which you have testified, would

it be reasonable to say the draw began in 2020? >> right. >> that it wasn't the sole decision of one u.s. president in 2021? >> i agree. >> the trump administration initiated the withdrawal by negotiating and ultimately concluding the doha deal in february 2020, with an explicit aim to withdraw all american troops in af14 months. the trump administration's implementation of the deal set in motion the formal u.s. withdrawal from afghanistan? >> agreed. i would advise if we would think about withdrawal and in the way the final phase of the withdrawal happened, that is the distinction we should keep in mind. >> thank you. >> the chair recognizes mr. mast. >> thank you. i will start by touching on the

last statement that you just said. there is the withdrawal and the weight it is conducted. you can say that about any sporting event, athletic event, anything you are planning to do in the future. you might plan to have a super bowl, but there is the way the game is played. that is what ultimately counts, what do tyou do when you get onto the ground, as they say, where the metal meets the meat. i want to ask a few questions about that. i want to ask a few questions about the conditions for the biden administration. did the biden administration execute or operate on a plan that there are no conditions, there is no line, no threshold or anything that was going to bid them from being out of afghanistan on the day they wanted? >> let me understand what you

are asking. certainly the desire to complete it will drop by the end of august was that any state beyond that risks the restart of the war, which was the driving factor, as i understood it. >> i'm not going to try to put words in your mouth. was there anything that was going to stop them from leaving on the day they wanted to leave? >> that would be speculating, of course. i would restate avoiding the restarting of the war was the most important factor shaping decisions. >> i wonder if it would or would not be speculating, because as you have spoken about and as you have been mi question about -- questioned about and as you have offered up previously, you make your recommendations to the

administration. you said, listen, there is tha continuation of expectable adherence with the conditions of the doha agreements. that is a recommendation and i believe that was her recommendation. make the taliban uphold crthose provisions. there is grab the doha agreement as though it never existed and create your own conditions, president biden. tell the taliban this is what you want. there is forget about the conditions of the doha agreement and one-way or the other you are leaving when you want to leave. >> right. >> he chose, my understanding is, forget the conditions. we are leaving when we want to leave. we are leaving on the date we demand. we are not leaving any other date. is that correct? >> the additional four months was the only factor that

changed the timetable. otherwise, you are right. >> we know he chose september 11 to begin with. i'm going to ask one more question. do you know who pays the price ultimately for bad foreign- policy? >> all of us. especially the armed forces. >> that is exactly right. how many people pay the price for his bad foreign-policy? we knew they >> of course isis attacked. we knew they were out to attack. we demanded steps by the time the band to prevent the attack. general mckinney on the record has said despite the fact he is

are hostile to what the taliban, they did everything we asked. it was an isis attack that killed 13 brave americans and the alabama u.s. cooperation to prevent that did not succeed. >> thank you for your time. the gentleman yields in the chair recognizes mr. titus. >> thank you mr. chairman, mr. ambassador, on june 26, 2021 a person at a rally said this. i started the process. all the troops are coming back home. they couldn't stop the process. 21 years is enough, don't you think? 21 years, he couldn't stop the process. >> i suspect that is president trump. >> that is correct. doesn't that suggest he was acknowledging the process he

started cannot be stopped without some consequences? >> i cannot speculate, but it is my judgment president biden, if he wanted to, he could have. >> you just said a minute ago to mrs. wagner when she was asking about the taliban's commitment to education of women virtually that we have to live up to our obligation in order to make them live up to theirs. what if we had not withdrawn those troops? what if we had not lived up to our obligation? wouldn't that have had consequences that were not desirable? hadn't they already stopped attacking u.s. troops before this and if we had left troops they are, we had not met our obligation who knows what they would have done. >> you are absolutely right. >> we can speculate whatever

they would've done probably would not have been good, because the chairman said i can't trust the talent man or we cannot trust the talent man. you said i do not trust the talent man. why did we enter into an agreement with the talent man with no accountability measures, no way to hold them to their commitments? >> we enter agreements, we are talking international politics with people we do not trust. we did it during arms control with the soviets. remember, president reagan said trust but verify. the way to incentivize the other side we have an agreement is you won't do with they want from you unless they do what they have agreed to doing for us. that is the way it works, do you have your information system to monitor are they living up to the agreement or not? the and you bring that information into the negotiation and implementation.

>> did you have any way to monitor what they were doing? >> absolutely. we did have information. we in fact it reports, my office did with the department of defense on, for example, what were they doing in terms of terrorism. what they agreed to do or not to do and then what they were doing and we were sending those reports out. >> you mentioned terrorism, we made the deal they were no longer going to be a base or support for terrorism, yet didn't we find the al qaeda leader there in -- with a drone? obviously they were not living up to that obligation. >> violations happen. i agree that was a flagrant violation. we took action. >> how did you miss that if you

are monitoring? >> we obviously does make this happen after the withdrawal. the monitoring system worked. we found them and then we took action that the taliban said we should not have. we had made it clear that we would do what was necessary to protect the american people and we took the action that the president did an eye upon that action. >> what else have they done that we got through any kind of monitoring? >> we are watching their counterterrorism commitment. i am sure you can see reports. from what i see on the outside, and this is my opinion, it appears we believe they are largely adhering to those

commitments. >> not to the education of women apparently. if we would've left some troops like some people have suggested, do you not think that would've had consequences for what they would have done aside from the doha agreement if we had violated our part and left some troops there, do you think they would've said okay? >> the judgment was, and you obviously rely on a lot of people, intelligence coming to a judgment was we will be back to fighting if we did that. if we unilaterally said we are not withdrawing all forces, although we agreed we would and that we may be back fighting and as i said, president biden decided to withdraw all forces. >> do you agree with that? >> i supported the idea of not going back toward, but one

would have reopen negotiations. that is something different. >> i think the american people didn't want us to go back to war. >> the chair recognizes mr. davidson. >> thank you, mr. ambassador. thank you for your service to our country. i appreciate your testimony. hopefully it helps us to learn what we can from afghanistan and apply it not just to provide accountability and truth for the record, for action in the future. i spent my life from 18-30 in the army. i was in the 75th ranger regiment. one of the core missions was noncombatant evacuation operations. in none of those training

scenarios, i never did it live, we trained for it, but in afghanistan that was the mission. in no training scenario that i am aware of did we have a plan to ever take the military out first and then hope that somehow the civilians would get out. have you ever heard of such a doctrine anywhere? >> i applaud you for your service. i had the brave honor of service with our men and women in afghanistan. they inspire me and i very much associate myself with what you said. i think the problem was in my judgment and i've said it before is we plan for a single scenario in that scenario was that the government and its troops would survive our withdrawal. for some time thereafter that

is what informed the sequencing. >> do you believe that the state department actually believed they would trust the lives of american citizens to the talent man? they were not there themselves. they were ready to get out of town. they thought we could get ourselves out, we could get the military out, and we will just trust the talent man to finish the job. that was the plan? >> it was to work with the government of afghanistan and the troops that we had trained and equipped to deal with the withdrawal and then for a period after. the plan was to maintain some forces after the withdrawal was completed at cobol -- kabul

airport and to protect the embassy. i believe that assumption, and i keep repeating that. several of your colleagues are mentioning lessons learned. we do not plan as one lesson that i have learned for a single scenario. we have to plan for alternative scenarios. >> regardless of how many alternatives we had that seemed like a particularly bad plan. with the benefit of hindsight i think everyone can agree it was a bad plan. >> in retrospect it was problematic. i explained what the assumption was. >> in 2004-year-old an op-ed title afghanistan milestone, which i would like to submit for the record. it covered the country's approval of a new constitution. i want to read aloud some

sentences that euro. afghanistan has sent a compelling message to the rest of the world that by investing in that country's development the united states is investing in success. americans can take pride in the world that we played in leaving the multilateral effort to support afghan democratization. president bush's decision to increase a that will likely total more than $2 billion in 2004 will accelerate reconstruction of the countries national army, police force, schools and medical system. you finish by writing our work in afghanistan is not yet done. it will take several years of sustained commitment and significant resources by the united states and international community before the country can stand on its own feet. given the stakes we must remain committed for as long as it takes. i've heard that phrase before. do you think we were successful? >> without objection it is entered into the record.

>> thank you, chairman. what can we learn about nationbuilding? it seems foolish to me and i'll admit foolish at the time. >> i supported president bush's vision for transforming afghanistan. the government vision was the problems of that region -- >> the goals are always nice. it always sounds so good. the execution is problematic. frankly the same phrase, as long as it takes, as much as it takes, is the only public plan the biden administration has laid out for ukraine. other than that i don't see any tie to ukraine. i yield back. >> thank you, mr. chairman. ambassador, thank you so much for your testimony today. before i begin i want us all to take a moment to remember the 13 u.s. service members who

lost their lives on august 26, 2021, while conducting the evacuation. i know that every member of the is community joins me in paying tribute to their families as well as of the families of all service members who put their lives on the line over the course of our country's longest war. we will continue to honor them and never forget their sacrifices. on august 26, 2021 i spent most of the day on the phone with a constituent, a mother whose son had very abruptly been sent to afghanistan to assist in the evacuation. he was stationed at the airport and he -- she did not hear from him the entire day. you can imagine the stress and the anxiety that she had as we got the news service members have been lost. i will never forget that.

it is our obligation when we sin men and women in uniform into harms way. and we continually ensure they have the support they need and that the mission they are being asked to conduct is in our national interest and achievable. that their partners on the ground are willing to make the same sacrifices our troops are making every day. my question i think is simple, but it is probably a complicated answer and deals with the fundamental underlying reality here. why over the course of 20 years in afghanistan did administrations of both parties failed to correctly assess the level of dedication and cohesion of the afghan forces and its political leadership? >> an excellent question. there lessons to be learned. we have to focus sharply on that.

we spent a lot of resources, and a lot of effort. the forces were of varying qualities. they sacrificed a lot, some 60,000-70,000 afghan soldiers and policemen died. what happened to them, our assessment was they would do a lot better after our withdrawal. >> understood. the real question is how do we fail so badly? i know there was a division in the intelligence community with the cia on one side and the pentagon on the other on the effectiveness of training afghan forces. i am not asking you to will and to classified information, but can you speak broadly to these diverging perspectives and what interests they may have been driven by?

>> one is perhaps the way we build needs to be in question. many people argue teaching the afghans how to fight should not have been a difficult task. the way we organized them perhaps to fight, the recruitment, the sustainment, organization, maybe they were not appropriate for the circumstances. second would be to what extent politics and the divisions in the country affected the force? i was very concerned. i spent a lot of time in 2020 because two candidates announce themselves as president. here was a possible scenario in

which some forces were going to go with one candidate, the forces we invested so much in. some would've gone with the other. already you would've had the war with the caliban and then you would've had another inside of the republic side. there are lessons to be learned. >> i'm just going to stop you. i have a very deep concern from vietnam to afghanistan into a rock and who knows in the current situation in the world we keep seeing politicization of intelligence to fit a predesigned agenda. what seems to be a cherry picking of intelligence and data that administrations may use to tell the story they want to tell and not necessarily the reality. that is what i want to see us get away from. with that i thank you very much. i yield back.

>> the chair recognizes mrs. kemp. >> thank you for today's hearing. i want to thank you, ambassador, for making yourself available and coming before our committee. since the disastrous withdrawal from afghanistan under the biden administration all heartfelt progress and basic freedoms and rights for afghan women have vanished. women made incredible games in the classroom, played an active role in the government and free press, and participated in the workforce side by side with male coworkers. when the taylor van cise power one of their first actions was to ban girls from attending secondary school. they eliminated the afghan commission to eliminate violence against women, band women from working at ngos and started restricting women's access to public areas. decades of work on women and

girls went down the drain in a matter of weeks. as a woman this is deeply personal to me. it has been raised several times today that you presented the administration with several power-sharing proposals that would give the caliban partial or majority control of the afghan government's. what did these peace plan say about women's rights and participation in the afghan government? >> we did give one plan to accelerate the negotiations, since we wanted to see the optimal outcome. the better option would have been an agreement before the withdrawal was completed. in those draft proposals afghanistan's adherence to international standards on human rights and respect for the rights of all afghan

citizens, man, women and children were all specified. we share with them the need to assist. >> did you think the caliban would be willing to share the power of the afghan government with women? >> well, we have them say to us and they said that publicly and on video then women could be ministers, that women could be active in all parts of life. what has happened since has been a violation of those statements that are on the record. not to me, but to the whole

world they said that. >> their words and actions did not match. the taliban was often cited as stated to the united states might have the watches, we have the time. was the taliban waiting the united states government out so that it could overthrow the government after our departure? >> i would be speculating, but certainly they waited us out in the sense that based on what happened, based on changes in the world and successes that we had on counterterrorism as i have described, we decided it is time to come home. there are things that we could've done differently in retrospect. those studies will be done in terms of the caliban. >> ambassador, did you consider that as a possibility if a power-sharing agreement was implemented? >> i did suddenly consider it as a possibility.

both sides are saying they wanted that. the question was the terms. the president of afghanistan did not want to leave office. he wanted the caliban to join them. they said no, there has to be a new government's formed with a head that is acceptable to both sides. the negotiations were difficult. we knew it was going to take time. >> are you saying president biden unconditional withdrawal legitimize the taliban's plan of action? >> changes the balance in favor of the taliban, but i believe the bigger mistake or the bigger factor that shaped the outcome was poor performance of government, of the afghan

government's. running away while saying they would never do that, the disintegration of the armed forces were the vigor factors in my judgment in terms of what ultimately happened. >> there is no doubt, we saw. >> thank you, mr. chairman, and thank you to our witness for being here today. mr. ambassador, i have to be honest with you, like many americans i was shocked when i read the february 2020 trump- tran16 agreement. how few conditions there were for the caliban to meet. no protection for women and girls or the afghan people who had helped us and worked side- by-side with our forces. basically the former president agreed to a precipitous withdrawal of all troops, all coalition partners and all civilian personnel by may 1 two

release 5000 prisoners to work with the u.n., to lift sanctions against the caliban, to seek economic cooperation for the reconstruction of afghanistan, and to refrain from the threat or use of force against afghanistan or intervene in its domestic affairs. in exchange, the taliban agreed to release up to 1000 prisoners. they vaguely committed to enter enter afghan negotiations and agreed not to allow members to attack our personnel on the way out. i did not see any agreement to stop attacks against afghans. i did not see any agreement to prevent them from taking afghan territory. i certainly did not see any

protection of afghan women and girls. i did not see any guarantees afghanistan would prosecute anyone who commits atrocities against women or girls. i did not see any requirement that the caliban take steps to keep women and girls in schools. i did not see any requirement that the caliban take steps to uphold any rights of the afghan people. apparently the protection of women and girls was not important to president trump. given the terrible reality that we see today in afghanistan including for afghan women and girls in retrospect, what should have been done differently to secure protections for vulnerable minority populations and in reticular women and girls in afghanistan? >> the key issue for you and

our other leaders is whether achieving the goals that you outline on women should have been a precondition for withdrawal, which means that the u.s. forces would have given the responsibility to achieve those rights, that we should have stayed in afghanistan until the caliban agreed. >> to protect women and girls? >> right. >> were you ever instructed on behalf of president trump to secure those agreements? >> and the judgment was to pursue those objectives with other means other than the use of armed forces. there are lots of violations of human rights around the world. it is not the responsibility of u.s. forces. the mac we are talking half the population of the country.

was it ever articulated that one of the goals of withdrawal was to make sure afghan women and girls were going to be protected? was that ever articulated? >> it was articulated that will be pursued and during which we have a written agreement that states we would work with the government which supported human rights, the legitimate government to pursue those using diplomacy, using future relations. >> so you are not going to negotiate that with the caliban. you were going to help behind- the-scenes the afghan government that collapsed. you are going to encourage them to support women and girls? >> the assumption was the government would not collapse. that it had more numbers, more weapons, more international standing, or money. >> did you ever believe that

the caliban was truly interested in negotiating with the afghan government? >> i saw them negotiate with the afghan government. negotiations started in september. >> was that before you gave up all the leverage by signing the agreement and by frankly donald trump tweeting in advance what he was going to do in withdrawing our troops? >> there were disagreements obviously inside that administration and outside with the way the president decided to go. it was the right way. the decision was made and as you know the president makes the decisions, others expressed their opinions. the decision was made not to link withdrawal. >> on the protection of afghan women and girls. my time has expired. i yield back. >> the chair recognizes mr. barrett. >> thank you, mr. chairman.

thank you, mr. ambassador, for being here today. i appreciate the work that you have done. the question that i have deals with the many reports of cyber agreements between the u.s. and the caliban during the doha. for instance after signing the deal secretary of state mike pompeo claim that the caliban would destroy al qaeda. other reports indicated that caliban would enter negotiations with the afghan government. neither of these things really happened. did you believe the caliban would destroy al qaeda or what is your position? >> the agreement says specifically, and you talked about the side agreement, the are classified. there are two. one deals with terrorism. i cannot go into that in this setting. hopefully you have read it. it was not to allow al qaeda

specifically, the terrorist, any terrorist that would threaten the security of the united states and our allies. that was the agreement. the case was a grave violation of that agreement. as i said before i am not in government. you should ask the intelligence community what the judgment is on their adherence. i believe based on what i read that we believe they are largely in compliance on the counterterrorism. with regard to government negotiations, negotiations did start. the agreement necessitated the start of inner afghan negotiations. we assumed it would take time.

we desired if it could be concluded before we left, but we did not want to make it conditional on withdrawal. one side or the other would have not wanted to include something and keep us there. the government for example could happen interested in keeping us there. the government did not want us to withdraw, they liked the situation with the big american presence and support. as to the assessment of who was more serious about negotiations, i could speculate or i can give you my opinion, but the key point is we didn't want the withdrawal of forces. a decision was made to leave conditioned on decisions by

afghans toward each other because we did not know what their calculations would be and whether those calculations would assist with the timetable of withdrawal that the president had in mind. >> thank you. one more question, since you were involved in this so deeply. was the biden administration made aware of the side agreements? >> absolutely.'s >> my last question deals with giving you the opportunity to refresh us about your involvement in communications in those final days before the fall? >> i was very much at the center of the storm. i was in doha those final days. i would participate obviously with the president and others in meetings. i was essentially the channel

to get the caliban to do what we wanted during those two weeks. we wanted to do a road closure because we thought isis-k was going to use that road or from the hill nearby they might shoot a rocket at the airport. this month there might be a terrorist to direct them to block the road, to go up the hill, go to the mosque and then i would deal with the people's movement. one thing i learned, sir, is how our society has gotten mixed with the afghan society. i would get calls from all over the united states say this person used to drive my car and he wants to get to the airport. he is stuck in this place in kabul. please arrange for him to get

to the airport. and then i would be in multiple contacts daily with our military at the airport. i put our deputy at the airport also. the military will call me. we want to see x dollars. they are not responding to our messages. can you talk to the big leaders to allow this to happen? it was a lot going on and not to mention members of congress calling and asking for things. >> thank you, i've run out of time. >> i gave you too much information, i think. >> mr. chairman, if you would indulge me for a second or so. i can't help but share my experience about soldiers, men or women who put the uniform on. we have one of those young 13

right from my district. i cannot help but recognize the contribution that our people in uniform make around this world. >> absolutely. >> thank you, sir. we appreciate your contribution as well in vietnam. the chair now recognizes mr. stanley. >> thank you very much for those comments about our women and men serving the country. thank you, ranking member meeks, for holding this meeting. i would like to focus on our allies. those who risk their safety and their family safety to support the united states mission in afghanistan. for 2 and half years our afghan allies have been trapped in a frightening legal limbo. trapped because congress has again and again failed to pass the afghan adjustment act and make good on our promises. we even had an opportunity to pass part of it in the senate order deal just last week, a deal that extreme republicans

killed. the female tactical platoon part of the special operations command, these brave women went through rigorous screening and training by the united states military. they participated in hundreds of direct action combat missions against the taliban alongside u.s. special forces including green berets, navy s.e.a.l.s and army rangers. 42 ftps, many of whom are part of the persecuted ethnic minority were evacuated after kabul fell. the taliban knows who they are. they know who the families are that they were forced to leave behind. a constituent of mine, an army captain who served in 2016-2020 spent part of her deployment serving alongside the ftps. she told me threatening letters from the caliban were sent to

these women, warning they will be dealt with so that they will serve as an example. she also said there is no doubt these women would have been and tortured before death if they had not been evacuated by u.s. counterparts. another active duty service member wrote to me the female tactical platoon hold some of the bravest women i have ever met. i am an american soldier. these women thought by my side for nearly 10 years, targeting the enemies of the united states in afghanistan. i trusted them with my life daily, and they entrusted me with theirs. when afghanistan failed in august 2021 they did not want to lay down their arms and flee, they were force. as the taliban encircle kabul they began to target the members of the female tactical tune and their families. their loved ones remain in

danger, their mothers, fathers, sisters and brothers were forced to stay behind since they are considered immediate family. until this day i receive messages from family members desperately needing help. they need our help. that is army active duty service member. in the words of an ftb herself who was kind enough to share her story with my office. i cannot give you my name for fear of reprisals against my family in afghanistan. i served in the afghan special forces female tactical platoon for 5 years. i speak five languages, spent a year and have training before being assigned to a platoon. i would love to serve in the u.s. army. i left behind my father, mother, three sisters and brothers were now subject to harassment and kidnapping at the hands of the caliban because of my service with u.s. forces. my sisters are in hiding for fear the caliban will disappear them as that happened to other ftp family members, even though

they are only my sisters they will exact revenge on anyone they can find related to me by blood. i fear for my family's life every day. i share their worst to underscore the deadly consequences if this congress continues to stall on the afghan adjustment act. every day this congress fails to act is a betrayal of our allies and of our american values. ambassador, your thoughts on the afghan adjustment act? >> i appreciate what you said, congressman. i am not familiar with this fact. therefore i am not in a position to offer an opinion. >> i appreciate your diplomatic answer to that. for your information, as you would expect, this would allow the female practical tunes and others who served alongside the u.s. military who are

temporarily having temporary status be given permanent status in the united states. >> i know that many afghans served with distinction and sacrifice a great deal. in regard to the specifics i have not looked at the legislation. >> you are an outstanding diplomat, thank you. >> the chair recognizes mr. shealth. >> thank you, mr. chairman. this is one of the more concerning hearings that i have ever been in. and little bit of background, i do not have your experience in the region, but over a 20 year period i have five assignments were dealt directly with the region starting in 1984, most of my assignments as a military planner. i was stationed or

headquartered in bagland. i was in iud later for the iraqi freedom operation. i have heard nothing and i have read nothing in preparation for this hearing that it is filled with naivety. now you were given the position of having done much of this under both president trump and president biden. i am not questioning your motives, sir, but we have to focus on the fact that the withdrawal was a strategic blunder of monumental proportions. monumental, putin started moving troops within two months after that strategic blunder. as the 20 year forever wars, our military, this nation's

military is not meant for nationbuilding. it is meant to go and break things and impose our national will, our national interest on our adversaries. that is the use of the united states military. i want to focus on that one strategic blunder. we talked about the doha agreement, the actual title of the doha agreement, i think, it is the agreement for bringing peace to afghanistan between the islamic emirate of afghanistan, not recognized by the united states as a state, and known as the caliban in the united states of america. that is the formal title of what we call the doha agreement. the caliban, it is naove to think that alabama was ever going to live up to anything. my 20 years or over a span of

20 years dealing with the region and this entire process that we've heard today is extremely naove. sir, i find you at the middle of it. i firmly disagree with your statement that the restart of the war being a most important factor in the withdrawal. i absolutely disagree with your characterization of that. my question to you, sir, you said earlier that caliban was largely in compliance with their counterterrorism agreements. can you justify that statement for us? >> first, on the last statement i said i am not in the government. i do not read the intelligence now. based on what i read and what the intelligence community puts out, an unclassified product, it appears to me they are largely in compliance, based on what i read of their reports.

you should not take my word for it. you should call experts who are monitoring the situation very closely in our government. we have a significant body of expertise that monitors. >> let me help you there, the u.n. sanctions monitoring team released a report last month, in january, that says about the relationship between the caliban and al qaeda remains close. the matter maintains a holding pattern in afghan under caliban patronage. we need to understand, and let me ask you a yes or no question. >> may i comment on what you just said? >> no. what is the status of the caliban today? we don't recognize them as a government. we understand they are in physical control of afghanistan. what is the official u.s.

position on the caliban? >> again you should ask the u.s. officials. my understanding is we transact with them. we meet with them when we have concerns on particular issues. we interact with them. we do not have a presence as you know in afghanistan. we do not recognize the caliban government. we have not implemented the doha agreement, because of our unhappiness will what they are doing and not doing. those are questions and issues for the current officials on what they are doing or not. i am telling you what i read. >> if i may, germany just became the third largest economy in the world. if we are talking ukrainian funding the eu needs to step forward. our gdp is 27 trillion. the eu together is 20 trillion,

rushes 2.5 trillion. we need to push europe as a whole to be funding the ukrainian war. thank you, sir. >> the chair recognizes mrs. dean. >> thank you for being here for your years of service and expertise. it is very valuable to us on this committee and to american citizens. i do want to recognize the families in the room, some of whom i've had the opportunity to meet, gold star families. i want to recognize the service of our military members. for 20 years of sacrifice and service, the brave gains that were made and the horrific losses that were suffered. with heartbreak i recognize you and with humility i recognize you and your service. i also of course remember the 13 service members killed and

navigate, a tragic set of events, and the scores of others injured that day. i wanted to try to examine three areas as quickly as i can. the impact of actions. when you are asked earlier you said you put the responsibility of what happened in the afghan withdrawal on the afghan government. i would like you to tell us more about that. for example, going back to the final days of the withdrawal, you said in your testimony the agreement you negotiated between the caliban and the afghan government fell apart when president ghani surprisingly fled the country, which caused the leaderless military and police to instantly disintegrate. what did the impact of that integration have on the situation outside the gates at kabul airpor

and on the noncombatant evacuation? >> thank you for what you've said. the impact was instantaneous. the rush to the airport, the airport crisis, if you like, with great because of what happened. the security leaders rather than standing in place carrying out their duties defending their city, defending the government, they rushed to the airport to be evacuated. then there were obviously challenges about securing the parameters of the airport. >> was surprising apparently across-the-board brother to you or to the administration.

>> to our various communities that watch these things. if he was afraid, the president, for his life. there was an agreement that a lot of the immediate subordinates that with the announcement that caliban would not come into kabul. there was a sense of calm in the palace. he didn't reach out to say can you do one, two, three, to secure the palace if he was afraid. i don't know what we would've done. we had no indication from him that he was going to leave the field and go to the uae. >> a stunning abandonment. the second area of troop drawdown, we saw the trump administration first her down to 8600 in the first 100 days and 4500 by september 2020.

can you explain what happened that created the final drawdown in the last days of the trump administration down to 2500? >> the president had sent the troops will be home by christmas. whether a total withdrawal would happen -- >> what did you think of president trump in his final days in office, setting it up with the new administration having 2500 members on the ground? >> ultimately the back-and- forth that took place resulted in a decision to not completely withdraw by christmas, but to leave the final decision to the new administration. >> i want to end on something you entered on in your testimony, that you saw perhaps the scenes and the values being planted. can you give us some possibility of all of the work

of so many folks on the ground in afghanistan as well as our military? what are some of the seeds that you think could possibly spring a better future for afghanistan? >> most young afghanistan is in their 20s and 30s experience america, the encounter that we had in afghanistan. the schools, the universities, women being educated and cell phones with internet, i think they are struggling for their rights. some have left the field. others are standing for their values. the future remains uncertain. the struggle goes on. the objective the president

pushed and others have for a democratic and modern afghanistan, i think the objections remain valid. it is not going to come but with american engagement over a much longer period of time. >> i thank you for allowing the answer and thank you, ambassador. >> the chair recognizes mr. cain. >> thank you, mr. chairman. and thank you to our witness. ambassador, you have a very long and a very distinguished career in the united states government and have often appear before this committee. i want to thank you for your extraordinary service to the people of this country and the people around the world. unfortunately the taliban is once again the ruling power in afghanistan. from president biden's go to their order in 2021 meant to

coincide with the 20th anniversary of september 11, 2021, despite leaders in the u.s. military previously urging to the attention of some troops to support afghans, but what conversations did the administration have on the intentions of u.s. contractors in afghanistan? >> if i understood the question, what impact did it have on the contractors? did i understand? well, they became uncertain and ultimately mostly decided to leave, because they were concerned about the security environment and insurance related issues. although the plan was based on the assumption the government would survive, the systems that they had, the military system will continue to be service.

we had to rush around and try to find outside the country potential places where those systems could be service. airc. without the support the afghan security forces would not be able to successfully combat the television. it must have been planned out that without this support, afghan security forces would not be able to combat the taliban. ambassador, could you also speak to the government plan that advanced by the biden state department in early 2021? >> there was discussion when the new administration came to accelerate negotiations. because as i said even in the previous administration, the desire was to get a political agreement as soon as possible, although realistically it was

assumed it would be complicated and take time. two features of the proposals by the biden team was one, to internationalize the effort to get the u.n. to appoint someone to help with negotiations and second was to advance a power- sharing plan for afghanistan. not that would be the one but to get a discussion going. the government of afghanistan dismissed it, more or less, saying there were many ideas and plans. yes, there was a proposal put forward and given to the taliban and afghan government. >> how did the russian government respond, ambassador? >> the russians clearly had a

two track policy. one was they want us to leave and they want us to leave. on the other hand, they wanted us to also stay and do the very work of dealing and going after groups that would target them and to see us stuck there and pay a price without succeeding, so -- but i -- the public statements at least as i recall a long time ago in the immediate aftermath, they would have preferred an agreement first, a political agreement first but i'm sure they were happy to see us leave and depart. >> could you explain your assessment and deeper regard, please? >> well, for the longer-term,

they didn't want u.s. forces on the border of the former soviet territory and they thought our presence in regard to central asia offered opportunities and advantages, but on the other hand, like iran, they wanted to make it as difficult for us to tie us down. leverage, if you like, by remaining vulnerable and stuck there. not a win, but not the kind of leave. not to have permanent bases there to -- also while we were there to make us suffer. >> thank you. >> the chair recognizes mr. walt.

>> thank you, mr. chair. good to see you, ambassador. many years of this painful episode in our history but i would say to our goldstar families that are here and every veteran that sacrificed, we kept america safe for over two decades and we can't lose sight of that. we did not have another 9/11. we did not have additional attacks on our homeland, despite many issues in this war that we should absolutely learn from, so we have heard continuously both in the media, from colleagues on the other side of the aisle, and from the president, president biden, that he was stuck with the agreement. you know, his hands were tied. the trump administration tied his hands. he had no choice. i want to put out, mr.

chairman, one thing for the record here, this is a short list of the policies that the biden administration walked away from on day one, everything from the construction of the border wall, our membership in the world health organization, the biden administration completely walked away from trump's maximum pressure campaign. he ne tried to get us back into the disastrous iran nuclear deal, and did remain in mexico, canceled the pipeline, billions of investment. i could go on. all of these were reversed on the first month, yet we are supposed to believe that somehow he was handcuffed to the steel. -- this deal. mr. ambassador, let's go back to january of 2021. president trump is still in office. his advisors go in, tell him, mr. president, the taliban

haven't lived up to the half- dozen conditions in the deal, minus one, partially not attacking troops. but in terms of entering negotiations with the afghan government, the taliban ended live up to their deal. what did president trump do, mr. ambassador, as a result of that advice? he had a stated goal of getting all u.s. troops out, right? now he is told he didn't live up to the deal. what did president trump do? >> well, it's speculation, of course. >> it is not speculation that by january 19th, 2021, we had bogner airbase, didn't we? is that the only airbase in the world sandwiched between china, russia, iran, and is a key platform for counterterrorism?

>> we did. >> did we have 2500 special operators and u.s. intelligence professionals? >> we did. >> that we have between 5 and 7000 nato troops? >> we did. >> it we have over 10,000 contractors keeping the air force flying? all of the assets, plus the most important thing, the message to the afghan people? let's fast-forward just a few months later. did president biden reject your advice for conditionality moving forward? >> we decided not to make a withdrawal of the final 2500 conditional on a political agreement or down to terrorism force behind. >> he essentially said -- not essentially, he did say to the world that we are out. unconditional. we are out, regardless of the

consequences. correct? >> because he thought if he said it, we would likely go back to war with the taliban. >> but this is the misnomer, the false choice here we could take an approach like we did in columbia for 40 years where he had trainers, assets, support, but we didn't put american troops in harm's way. there was a lot of middle ground between unconditional, full withdrawal and going back, correct? >> true. >> those options weren't considered. i will ask you this. we've had the senior leader of al qaeda, a guest of the taliban . we've had reports of eight al qaeda training camps in afghanistan. we have reports from the u.n. of tens of thousands of fighters, foreign fighters flowing in to afghanistan. plus the ongoing threat of isis. is it the american homeland

today safer than it was three years ago? >> well, i would -- respectfully , i'd ask you to ask the intelligence community, ours, to look at the data to the u.n. reports. i wouldn't rely, in other words, on the u.n. report. >> chairman, if i could indulge you before we end here, does al qaeda and isis still have the intent to attack the united states and the west, if given the opportunity to do so? >> well, no doubt. but i also want to point -- >> that is a yes? for the record, that is a yes? >> yes, but i'd also like to say, congressman, the intelligence community -- committee from what i read --

and of course, we can't discuss classified material here, but i believe in the next year or two, al qaeda does not have the ability to attack the united states. i am paraphrasing. from afghanistan, the likelihood would be -- >> the commander of central command a year ago testified that isis will have reconstituted their capability to attack the west within six months and that was a year ago from afghanistan, mr. ambassador . >> yes, but i noticed the intelligence committee since then in the last few months have highlighted successes by the taliban against isis. i would respectfully suggest that before coming to a judgment on those, that you -- >> the iranian -- i'm on the intelligence committee. relying on terrorists like al qaeda to take out terrorists is a fools errand and very

dangerous. thank you, mr. chairman. >> mr. chairman, ambassador khalilzad, thank you for coming back before our committee . in 2021, that was the last time you before this committee, before the withdrawal, i asked you if president donnie and chairman abdallah had any predictions about the outcome of a planned u.s. withdrawal in afghanistan. having met both men when i visited your response was, "they have no choice but to prepare to defend themselves. we have made a commitment to help them defend themselves if they go the route of a military solution." ambassador khalilzad, did the united states stick to our commitment to help the afghan government when the taliban took a military solution in afghanistan? >> well, we did.

i believe in the following way if i understand you which is that we continued to provide them with military support, including attacks against when attacked, but once the government disintegrated, of course we could not help them. >> as mr. waltz demonstrated, we did not stick to our commitments and there was not a fulfillment of the conditions based withdrawal. it was an unconditional withdrawal, so from that standpoint, i don't think united states stopped our commitment to help the afghan government when the taliban was clearly making progress throughout the country. do i -- do i interpret your testimony in response to mr.

waltz correctly, that president biden did not adhere to a conditions based withdrawal as contemplated by the doha agreement? >> no. the doha agreement -- one, there would be no attacks on the u.s. withdrawing forces, that we could come to the assistance of the afghan government, that there would be inter-afghan negotiations, and there would be no allowing of terrorists. but whether to make withdrawal conditional on a cease-fire that the two afghan sides don't fight each other and a political agreement, those were not explicit issues. >> this was clearly an abandonment of the conditions based agreement.

>> which conditions? >> i hear you. was an unconditional retreat the way i see it. in 2021 before the withdrawal, i asked you whether it would be a strategic mistake to abandon bog room and you basically referred me to the defense department on that question. ambassador, the withdrawal from afghanistan gave up u.s. control of the only u.s. airbase in the country that shares a land border with china. could you give us a readout of the status, who's in control of it now, and have you seen any chinese interest in that base? >> of course, you are right, we gave up bagram but as far as what's happening there now, you

should ask the community to brief you. i wouldn't be surprised if the chinese were interested in it but i have no data or fact to give you. >> have you seen any increase in chinese involvement since the united states left? >> there are indications, clearly, from what i've read in the media of chinese interest in afghanistan and activities, yes. >> ambassador, it is often portrayed the withdrawal was a security decision for the long- term safety of american soldiers. while i do not believe the united states should have had a forever presence in afghanistan for bagram, the way we withdrew was an unmitigated disaster . do you believe the united states is more or less safe with the taliban in charge? >> i believe that the withdrawal was because of the costs and a perception that it was costing too much and we

needed to adjust. but certainly in terms of terrorism, it would have -- being there would have given us certain advantages. being in afghanistan, rather than not being in afghanistan, but -- >> my time has expired but with isis, al qaeda fighters thriving in afghanistan, the taliban in charge clearly the united states is not in a safer posture. with that, my time has expired. mr. chairman, thank you for the hearing. >> thank you so much, mr. chairman and ambassador khalilzad , pleasure to see you. i wanted to understand a portion of your opening testimony. you said, "the first phase of the withdrawal lasted 135 days in which u.s. forces were reduced to 8600." by the time trump left office, forces have

been reduced to 2500, so fill in the gaps a little bit on what happened between the levels of 8600 to 2500. that reduction to 8600, which you said occurred initially ordered by president trump, is that the case? >> that is the case. >> and it was an explicit condition of the doha deal the united states is on the hook to do that level of withdrawal after the signing of the agreement in 2020? >> the only one that was specified in terms of a phase was phase one to 8600. it didn't get into subsequent phases except the final withdrawal of the remaining forces would be by may 1st or so and 14 months, in other e words but there were no other phases like 2500. that was not specified in the agreement. >> okay, and it occurred per the terms of the deal within 135 days?

>> phase one, yes. we felt the military advice -- we could do the mission with the 8600 so the risk was not 60 going to be higher in any significant degree in terms of carrying out the mission of the 8600. >> understood. and so, did -- you said that was phase one, so there were no stipulations of further truth? none of them? do you recall any troop reduction directed by president trump in september -- >> there was -- i believe i will need to check but my recollection is it went to another phase of 4500, then to 2500. >> and was that at the discussion of president trump? >> military offering options

and the president deciding. >> okay, and did you understand the drawdown in 2020 -- was that to be tied to any taliban progress on meeting its own commitments? >> well, in that regard, yes, i would say. their commitments, especially on the counterterrorism part -- the relationship between the counterterrorism and withdrawal were very tight. the commitment on the afghan reconciliation was not as tight. it was linked, but not as tight. it was definitely tight on the start of afghan negotiations but not on success and an agreement being in place before complete departure. >> okay, and do you recall a tweet by president trump in october of 2020 pledging to have

the small remaining number of our brave men and women serving in afghanistan home by christmas? do you remember that tweet? >> well, there was the idea that was floated -- i don't remember the specific tweet to get everyone home by christmas. >> but if you saw that, that would be something that wouldn't surprise you? >> that would not surprise me, no. >> according to the terms of the doha agreement, the united states would not fully withdrawal all troops until may of 2021. did that seem realistic, given the actions of the taliban? >> well, that was not called for in the agreement. the agreement had until may and it had conditionality, which is that our commitment dependent on

them delivering their commitments. >> will removing all of those troops have impacted your leverage to secure afghan peace talks? >> well, you. removing troops was the biggest leverage. therefore if we did not have the troops and the leverage during that period, the troops would not have been there. >> and do you recall another discretionary troop reduction by president trump down to 2500 in january of 2021 just before the administration took office? >> i am not aware of that, of any decision in january to get 25 troops out. before the change in administration, i am not aware of that. >> okay, well i see that my time has expired.

>> thank you, mr. chairman. getting the troops home for christmas makes this particularly appropriate. in the back, there are two goldstar families. their loved ones didn't get home for christmas. they didn't get home for christmas because of a hasty withdrawal, because of a decision to withdraw from the military base and keep, as it turned out, a completely non- defendable or non-defended embassy, so i want to go through a bit of a timeline because you have two administrations and to a great extent were there for all of them. when mike pompeo left office, one of the agreements was a 50- 50 sharing coming out of that negotiation between the taliban and the lawfully elected government. is and that true? >> percentages were not d

mentioned but they were negotiations for a new government between -- >> which shared a government? >> yes. >> the shared authority started off gently as 50-50 and as the taliban continued to aggressively take bigger parts of the country, because we had withdrawn and the afghan government was not able to hold them back in that summer offensive, as i understand, it went to 60-40 in favor of the taliban, 70-30, then ultimately 100-0. is that correct? >> i don't know about the percentages. there was nothing formally -- >> was the taliban and demanding more authority as they took more land? >> no doubt as the balance shifted, the requirement and what one heard was an increase,

but i have to say again that on the 15th of august, they made a proposal for a shared government . >> okay, well you previously testified to this 50-50, 70-30 and these are your own statements, so i just wanted to -- we will give it to you from the transcribed interview. >> othey have asked the change in position, but i don't recall with the numbers. >> let's be fair with the facts. there was an end of hostilities negotiation in many ways similar to other ends of that. we agreed to leave because they agreed not to fight. during perhaps the trump administration, but certainly during the biden administration, the taliban was

aggressively fighting. they were, in fact, taking territory, violating the spirit of the cease-fire, the spirit of the agreement. and yet, we continued our withdrawal as if they were not, in fact, taking by force control of the country. isn't that correct? >> the agreement was, congressman, afor them to not attack withdrawn forces. if they attacked the afghans, to come to the defense of the w afghan forces. >> but we didn't come to that. let's be clear. what you are saying is we agreed we would not be killed as we withdrew, but left the caveat we would not allow the taliban to defeat the afghan military and we had the right to come to their defense. >> rate, which we did. >> we didn't do it sufficient as to stop them, did we? e >> in the end, you are right but

what surprised us was the poor performance of the afghans, particularly post-president biden's announcement and in the summer, the april announcement that the balance began to shift. >> i just want to ask a simple question, a final question. when conditions changed and our ability to stop the taliban from taking the country by force and putting children, particularly girls, back into essentially slavery, when that began to change, president biden did not react by sending troops back in or anything else and it is your testimony he did so because sending troops back in -- in other words, and forcing them keeping their agreement -- what have potentially cost american lives and he wasn't willing to do so, the 13 americans died and

countless americans and people who helped americans became trapped in afghanistan because he wouldn't send troops back in when in fact the taliban was violating not just the spirit but the facts what they had agreed to, not taking the country by force? isn't that true? >> well, the government disintegrated. >> the government disintegrated. all they had left was an and circled kabul? >> further in time -- >> i would like to go back to around january 20th of 2021. between january 20th, 2021, what was, in fact, the government disintegrated, or over the next eight months as they were finding themselves unable to hold the territories and negotiate, they began to disintegrate, disintegrating finally when they were entrapped and all that was left

was an airport to leave by? >> you are right that during the eight month disintegration increased and finally in kabul what happened happened, but i think that the balance shifted surprisingly. our assessment was different than what happened. >> i appreciate the surprise, but mr. chairman, i think the testimony speaks for itself. it was during the eight months in which the taliban aggressively took land that they began to deteriorate a government because we did not reengage with troops sufficient. maybe that was a good decision but i don't think it was. i think it was the decision that made inevitable the people of afghanistan living in slavery and 13 americans losing their lives and with that, mr. chairman, i yield back. >> mr. mills, is that correct? okay. well, let me just that want to

thank you, sir, for being here today. again, voluntarily. i appreciate your honesty and transparency. you were in a very difficult assignment, which i always told you. >> thank you. >> back in the day -- you know, it is helpful to the committee to get all of the facts before us and i want to thank you for your service to the nation as well. there may be additional questions. we would ask you to submit them in writing. all members have five days to submit questions. make sure any material is within the record and this committee stands adjourned. [background noises] [inaudible conversations]

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[inaudible conversations] [inaudible conversations] >> c-span has been offering

unfiltered congressional coverage for years. here is a highlight. >> racial profiling has to stop , mr. speaker. just because someone wears a hoodie does not make them a hoodlum. the bible teaches us, mr. speaker -- >> the member will suspend. the member will suspend. >> these words. he has shown you a man -- all mercy and humbly was your god and in the new testament, luke 4: 4: 18-20, the spirit is upon the and he has anointed me -- he sent me to proclaim freedom

for the prisoners. >> c-span, powered by cable. do you solemnly swear that in the testimony you are about to give will be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you god? >> saturday, watch congress investigates as we explore major investigations into our countries history by the house and senate. each week authors and historians will tell the stories, see historic footage from those periods and we will examine the impact of congressional hearings. this week the 1950s mccarthy era hearings. the senate committee explore whether communists had infiltrated the state department , army, and other federal l l l agencies. the investigation resulted in

republican senator joseph mccarthy for his actions. watch congress investigates saturday at 7:00 p.m. eastern on c-span2. >> c-span is your unfiltered view of government. we are funded by these television companies and more , including comcast. >> oh, you think this is just a community center? . it is way more than that. >> comcast is partnering with 1000 community centers so students from low income families can get the tools they need to be ready for anything. comcast supports c-span along with his other television providers giving you a front row seat to democracy. the director of the federal bureau of prisons joined the justice department's inspector general to testify on the rise of nonmedical related deaths in the federal prison system. they talk about the need for policy reforms for solitary confinement and mental health and substance abuse treatments, and more

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