multiply indicted-- the last few minutes. first of all, before we do anything else, i'm going to ask unanimous consent that nonsubcommittee members be allowed to participate in the hearing. after all subcommittee members have had an opportunity to ask questions, is there any objection? if not, so ordered. so subcommittee-- non-subcommittee members will be recognized at the appropriate time for five minutes. welcome to our hearing and thank you, witnesses, for being

here. we have mr. john hill, the deputy assistant secretary of defense for space and missile defense policy. joining him lieutenant general thomas james, the deputy commander of the u.s. space command. lieutenant general heath kohler, of the missile defense agency and sean gainey, commander of u.s. army space and missiles command. and meeting to review the fiscal year, and i have concerns, the overall level of funding is inadequate given the threat environment. the fiscal year 25 budget asks 10.4 billion dollars for the missile defense agency. that's more than $400 million less than last year. and almost a billion dollars below the level projected for fiscal year 25 and last year's. i want to reiterate this point, the fiscal year 25 budget

request for the missile defense agency $960 million, almost a billion dollars below the level planned for in last year's budget. further, these draconian cuts are not limited to just fiscal year 25. the outyear projections in the budget continued reductions in missile defense spending, compared to the spending plan in the budget submitted last year, this budget forecast cutting over 2.6 billion in missile defense funding between fiscal year 25 and fiscal year 28. to achieve these cuts, this budget would make several concerning decisions, including terminating the production line for sm block 1-b interceptor, and down to single contractors on both the next generation of interceptor and glide phase interceptor program.

i know we'll get into the issues in greater detail, but in the case of the glide face interceptor, i think it's important to note that this down selection is occurring five years earlier than planned and before the preliminary design review is even held. i'm extremely concerned that we will simply not have enough sufficient technical data to make an informed choice between competing concepts for this program. the glide phase interceptor is the only capability in development specifically designed to combat the growing hypersonic threats we face. it is vitally important to our national security that we get this program right. we should be investing in a robust program that delivers an effective capability to our war fighters on a schedule that meets the threat. that is why congressman dated in authorization bill that this budget would do the opposite. overall i'm concerned that

these decisions simply accept too much risk and that missile defense appears to have become a bill payer for other capabilities in this budget. this is difficult to understand given the growth in missile threats, the extremely high demand for missile defense capabilities from combatant commanders and the visible evidence of the value these capabilities bring to the fight on full display as we speak in the red sea. and in israel and ukraine. i look forward to hearing more from our witnesses about how this budget impacts their programs and their assessment of the risks contained in this budget. with that i turn to the ranking member for his opening remarks. >> thank you, mr. chairman. and i'll just begin by echoing many of your concerns. this is obviously a time when missile defense is in use all around the globe, including by the united states, in great

quantity. this is not a technology that seems to be fading away and i think my biggest concern is that i just don't understand the rational behind many of these cuts. now, i've asked a lot of tough questions of leaders like yourself, mr. hill in particular, about the purpose of hyper sonics. it's in that same vein, we don't understand what exactly the operational concept is to use hypersonics, that makes it hard to understand the money we're spending on it. likewise, as the chairman said if we don't understand why, don't understand the rationale behind the cuts, it becomes hard to support them especially in this environment. i want to welcome both lieutenant general james and collins as it's the first opportunity to testify in front of congress in your new roles. and in space command increasing in importance and consequence and space command was given

responsibility for department level missile coordination, it's critical that you and we understand the complex role that missile defense plays in our national security. you're the first army space operator to reach the rank of lieutenant general so you must be doing something right. fa40's have been exemplars in the department and this milestone is well overdue. so congratulations. lieutenant general collins, you're unique background across the spectrum of strategic programs, space, nuclear weapons and missile defense makes you well-prepared to be the director of the missile defense agency. and our initial discussions that it's imperative that we understand the larger policy implications of what mdaa is developing before we blindly build new systems that could inadvertently lead to proliferation, or in the worse ask case, destabilization, miscalculation to nuclear war. as i shift to the topic of the hearing. i want to remind the

subcommittee, there's a mixed legacy and difficult questions what its purpose is and should be, under what conditions it actually makes us safer and how much and what kind we need. that's why the questions, including what the chairman started with are so important. as i laid out last year, there are five basic scenarios or levels at which we consider using or not using missile defense. i'm use ago graphic depicting these levels which i will use to frame the rest of my remarks. the highest level of misdefense, longstanding policy across every administration that we are not and will not pursue missile defense for a nuclear attack, despite the attempt to change u.s. policy during last year's cycle to specifically do so, going down this road would be destabilizing, prohibitively expensive. until we can rid the world of all nuclear wednesday which believe is ultimately necessary for the survival of humanity itself. we can neither unilaterally

disarm nor unilaterally render useless our arsenal. if we were to try to render our missiles incapable through increased missile defenses they would do what they're already gone, develop new, more complex missiles to defeat the systems. and it sounds like a crazy concept when you first read about it, but it's fundamentally kept us safe. the fourth level of missile defense is the area where there's the most debate where we can argue our advancement in missile defense in the last two decades since pulling out the treaty has against aspiring nuclear powers like north korea and iran. we must continually evaluate when we view them as more of a strategic level threat and therefore, rely on a policy of nuclear deterrents instead of simply trying to outnumber

icbm's with interceptors which the program intends to do. missile expansion, the question, how do russia and china respond? i argue they'll certainly see that growth directly affecting the credibility of their nuclear forces which may have dire consequences. i hope in today's discussion, mr. hill, you can help us understand how to continue to weigh those questions in that balance. as they look at the budget request and the missile defense policy and posture of the united states, we must ensure the strategic ability of america and the world for decades to come. now, level three is a nuance that i think is important to distinguish from a rogue nation, besides the system to deal with it is different, but continue to have some capability to defend against a small and accidental launch should be maintained. at level two, the tactical level, the incredible support ukraine has received from allies and partners from air and missile defense enabled them to fight against near

nonstop russian attacks in the last few years. if they can't get past that languishing supplemental, this is the area where ukraine will suffer the most and have direct impacts on their ability to maintain their sovereign country and territory. in the red sea we're seeing what many thought was not possible. national coordinated missile defense and obviously use ago lot of missiles, which is one of the questions we have about reducing the budget. while u.s. navy ships have been at the center of defending missiles, and the missile threats, they have been working across the multinational task force. the french, u.k., navies have intercepted targets in the red sea. we need to move towards non-connect, which flips the cost curve the missile defense, something the chairman and i have have been pursuing aggressively, no one can with the impact.

simply defecting the threats, we have work to do. however, this past year has marked many successes in the main awareness. in february, mdaa hypersonics were launched and budget supports the ongoing testing through 2027. the space development agency also launched their wide field of use centers which will be a key components of the next generation of missile warning and architecture replacing the legacy big juicy satellites currently on order. as we evaluate the fy25 request for missile defense program i will continue to ask the following questions, how will expanding missile defense today impact strategic ability tomorrow. we're already in an arms race, will it make our world more safe. does each investment stabilize or destabilize our strategic national security? these are the questions we must have ourselves on this subcommittee not just with an eye to this year's budget and ndaa, but in determining how our decisions will impact the world we leave for our children.

thanks, mr. chairman. i yield back. >> okay, thank you, we'll now move to opening statements from our witnesses. i would note that your prepared statements will be made part of the record, but you'll each have five minutes to make some opening remarks. mr. hill, let's begin with you. >> thank you, chairman, ranking member, and distinguished members. subcommittee for the opportunity to testify today. thank as well for including my full statement in the record. in brief, my written statement surveys threat developments in a deteriorating security environment. it stresses the unmistakable centrality of missiles of all types, including uncrewed aerial systems or uas in modern warfare and underscores the disexpensability of missile defeat capabilities to deterring aggression and defending our homeland, our forces deployed around the world and our allies and partners. it highlights how those allies and partners can have come to similar conclusions and

increasing that i remember own investments and working with us to meet these challenges together. the administration's defense budget request for fiscal year 2025 includes 28.4 billion dollars for missile defense and missile defeat programs. i want to acknowledge at the out set of hearing, the strong support this subcommittee has consistently shown for missile defense and missile defeat efforts for many years. and i stand ready to work with you, to pass defense authorization legislation for fiscal year 2025 the 64th consecutive year and with all of congress to pass on time defense appropriations legislation for fiscal year 2025. today i must also emphasize, perhaps more than anything else, the critical urgency of passing the national security supplemental request which congress has now had for nearly six months. that request includes desperately needed funding. funding to support ukraine in

defending its democratic sovereignty and its very existence against russia's illegal and ruthless invasion and relentless barrages of missiles and attacks. and funding israel in funding itself against the continued missile uas and rocket attacks by hamas and other groups aligned with iran. funding to provide critical humanitarian assistance in ukraine, israel and gaza where innocent civilians are dying every day. funding to support our indo-pacific partners in deterring aggression by the people's republic of china. funding to replenish our own military supplies of munitions and material that we've had to draw down to meet the urgent needs of allies and partners and funding to invest in the capacity of the american industrial base with these munitions systems and including missile defense systems violent

vital. there's simply no time for delay. the time to act is now, i cannot overemphasize said as the general said the other day, i cannot overemphasize of congress coming together in common purpose and acting with urgency to pass the national security supplemental request. ...

and the operators of the system all key partners in this mission. as you mentioned, chairman, where requesting $10.4 billion to develop and deploy homing missile defenses and improve regional missile defenses against increasingly diverse and dangerous missile threats. our . our prioritization of decisions will maximize missile-defense system capability capacity and writing this. we continue to work closely with our combatant commanders and services to prepare them to fight for the fight of today and tomorrow. to defend our homeland for ballistic missile attack the ground-based midcourse defense or gb system remains our nation's soul protection from limited attacks with a primary focus being the advancing norsk better north greene frederick ongoing ground-based interceptor service life extension program will continue to improve the gpi reliability about mitigate risk until the nextgen interceptor is fielded by the end of 2028.

after 20 years we stand ready as shown in december of 2023 when we successfully executed and intercept flight test using the two, three state selectable ground-based interceptor into backstage mode, first victim is pretty increasing to mobile space. we planted a poisonous capability to the by the end of this year. the nga's program remains on track. both contractors and successfully execute bulimic design reviews and mtas preparing it in your future to complete a best value determination and select a single company to continue nga's developer testing protection and fielding. soon the plan to add the long-range discrimination radar to the operational capability baseline by december of this year. lrd are delivered to the government last month will enhance tracking discrimination and hit assessment against long-range missile threats. the space force are in the

process of formally declaring lrdr ready for detection later this month. for regional defense we can to design improvements to the aegis ballistic missile defense capability and procure the standard missile three block missiles. fy 2025 we will also test and deliver greater upgrades and support the navy in future space domain awareness demonstrations. we will continue u.s. terminal high altitude area defense or thaad interceptor procurement fielding a training support along with reliability and cybersecurity improvements. in collaboration with the u.s. army we fielded thaad 4.0 capability to batters in korea and on guam and in the process of fielding 4.0 to the alban thaad batteries by the end of 2025. thaad 4.0 integrates patriot capabilities with thaad to increase hatred defended his engagement opportunities. we will begin design work to improve the thaad system to take

on ever advancing regional threats. the department continued velvet of a 360° layered missile defense capability for guam. we after construction of the joint command center six radar site and launch site will begin in fiscal year 2025. by the end of this year we'll execute a flight experiment with the block to wait against a medium-range ballistic missile target controlled with the initial aegis guam system using the first transportable unit. looking forward we continue to pursue into nccic of those to defeat the sears challenge posed by hypersonic maneuvering threats. today our sea bass and treble defenses is protect assets at sea and forces ashore from hypersonic threat reporting with the need to anticipate delivering follow-on intimate three capabilities in fiscal year 2025. the interceptor program will enable layer defense against

hypersonic life threats. by the end of fy '24 incarnation with our future international partner japan in the able select single interceptor designed to complete development. we looking to develop mature capability and support the plan cooperative development of that glide phase interceptor with japan. on the detection and tracking as mentioned by ranking member moment we launched the hypersonic and ballistic tracking space sensor prototype satellite in february to demonstrate fire control solutions generally against hypersonic maneuvering threats. following successful demonstration, the responsibility for fielding fire control to the post will be transferred to space force. i'm honored by this opportunity and look forward to your questions. thank you. lieutenant general gainey. >> chairman lamborn, ranking member moulton, and distinguished members of this subcommittee. i'm honored to testify before you and represent this

incredible one team organization of 2300 soldiers and civilians spanning 13 time zones and 19 locations worldwide. these professionals tirelessly provide space, high altitude and missile defense forces and advanced capabilities to the army and joint war fighter. i'm honored to represent them and i thank you for your unwavering support for this team and their families. in january i took command of u.s. army space and missile defense command in joint functional component command for integrated air missile-defense also known as -- also acting at the scene commander for both fort greeley alaskan u.s. army garrison. additionally, i also served as the army's lead enterprise integrator for air in missile-defense, and my organization provides operational level missile-defense expertise and integrates transregional missile-defense functions across the joint and combined war fighting force. as the army's and

missile-defense enterprise integrator, today i will use this role to leverage and highlight the army and missile-defense remain the the m is most heavily deployed force with the highest demand signal amongst the combat of commands every year. this temple continues provide a significant strain on our formations and families, and we must continue to address their needs. as you know the urgency for multi-domain transregional combat affects continues to increase exponentially. our adverse air and missile defense related threats rapidly expanded in recent years in quantity, writing and sophistication. rapidly expanding their space r&d instigating cyber attacks and test complex missile systems. we see this today in ukraine and looming on the horizon in the pacific. it's never been more imperative that we and our allies and partners enhance our missile-defense and space

capability to impose costs on her adversaries, denying them the benefits of using these weapons and injuring the safeguarding of our nation. as our adversaries increase their emphasis on space and missile capabilities, the u.s. army grows in kind. in december the secretary and staff of the army and sergeant major of the army signed army space and the voting multi-debating -- the army's role in integrating space capabilities at the joint and coalition operations while also interdicting the space capabilities of adversaries. it is also increasingly apparent that integrating our space operations and missile-defense operations is a critical importance to our national security. our integration is essential to effectively contribute to strategic deterrence and respond in crisis. we've worked for yesterdays military must evolve. today we must integrate space and missile defense at the very onset of a prototyping concept

development and application. and we do it all in this, in concert with the army, joint and coalition partners one voice to get around the globe. our allies and partners are critical for layered and tiered operations to tigray disrupt and defeat adversaries, to share burdens can integrate technology and protect our mutual homeland. but all these operational consideration fail in comparison to the will determination and to trust the amazing men and women that operate and sustain these advanced systems. these soldiers and the films make life altering sacrifices to serve across the globe dash or their families. thank you for your efforts in supporting them with timely budget, caring for them and their families and building trust with the american people now and in the years to come. caring for our soldiers and their families is paramount to win in any environment around the globe. thank you for your support supporting such an incredible

mission ready tigre look for to addressing your questions. thank you. >> thank you. lieutenant general james,. >> could my, chairman lamborn, ranking member moulton and distinguished members of this subcommittee. it is an honor to be today representing general lighting at the nearly 18,000 soldiers, sailors marines airmen guardians do you do civilians and contractors of the united states space command. our expertly trained and mission focus work force them into most valuable asset. as you've heard from a distinguished colleagues here on the panel, our strategic competitors offensive missile systems arson typically increasing and capability and skill. they will challenge her ability to conduct operations at protect and defend u.s. and allies vital interest. our competitors are rapidly evolving, diversifying and proliferating their technology. hypersonic cruise missiles will complicate our missile-defense missions.

in april 2023 unified command plan assigned united states space command with responsibility for transregional missile-defense planning and operational support that decision was the culmination of a company to study with numerous document and the 2020 missile-defense review. this was a natural fit given our unified command plan responsibilities such as space operations and global sensor manager, as a missile-defense mission continues to converge with the space missions. part of the transition of transracial missile-defense planning included alignment of the joint functional component command for in a good missile-defense under u.s. space command, commanded by my good friend lieutenant general sean gainey. we ensure the content execution of responsibilities during the transition with the information degradation. we have integrated into our command structures and processes in our exploit was different optimize our execution of critical missions.

as the global sensor manager usspacecom is responsible for planning, managing and overseeing the operations of all of awareness, missile-defense and missile warning sensors. our terrestrial sensors are a critical enabler to the combatant command a national level military command centers both perform missile warning missile-defense and space domain awareness mission simultaneously. our space-based sensor provide the first alert of the missile launched from anywhere on the planet. they provide this to our national leaders, the national military command system, combatant commands and select international partners. usspacecom employs a joint combine apart at approach to our operations which expands our access to sensors and their information. this includes our combined space operations centers commercial integration cell and our national space defense centers join commercial operation cell, commiserate with the department recently published commercial space strategy.

the jcl also includes 14 allied partners that fully integrate it into our domain operations. it is vital that we keep pace with the emerging threats and technologies while ensuring our center architects remains optimize and modernize. while we pursue integrating new capabilities we must still aggressively leverage and integrates all legacy centers in support of her critical missile warning and missile-defense functions today. as part of a conference of missile-defense strategy. continued funding for research and developing for the next generation of space space and rest of sensor systems is critical. to keep pace with competitors and the potential adversaries that we face today. these capabilities must be resilient and we must be able to defend and reconstitute them to achieve space across the main mission assurance for the joint force. in closing, the 2020 missile-defense review space it is a strategic imperative of the united states to continue investment and innovation in the

development of full spectrum missile defeat to maintain deterrence and offer protection while heading against uncertainty. consistent with the missile-defense review of the department must explore and enact the full range of capabilities to counter advanced adversarial offensive missiles and hybrid threats across the spectrum of conflict. u.s. space command with fellow combatant commands services,, alis and interagency and commercial partners stands ready to perform a unified command plan responsibilities to maintain and expand our competitive advantage. usspacecom appreciates congresses continued support as we ensure the delivery of space-based capabilities and achieve our foundational more responsibility to protect the joint force, the nation and our allies to all levels of competition and conflict. i have submit a written statement for the record. thank you and i look forward to your question. >> thank you. we will now go to questions from the panel. from the committee.

general collins come as a talk that my opening statement i'm very concerned about the glide phase interceptor. last year the program plan to continue development and to maintain competition between two industry teams for at least another five years. a preliminary design review, pvr, was planned for 2029 with the potential down select decision following pdr frickin' of the program planning to select a single contractor this year without the development activity to prevent new technologies and with a lot less information. first, a general question. competition in the program reduces risk, drives innovation and helps ensure the government is getting good value. when you say that in general that is a fair statement? >> mr. chairman, as a career acquisition officer, competition within an acquisition strategy does bite down risk heaps both

teams sharp throughout the acquisition and it's a best practice within the department, yes, sir. >> thank you. how concerned are you then than making a down select decision this early in the program will increase risk? >> sir, that is a job we will be attacking greatly now with the decision that will be coming later this fiscal year. there are other mechanisms to manage competition and risk within a program lower than the prime level. we will be looking forward to keeping the program on pace and based on section 1666 look for opportunities to bring hypersonic capability to the fight much sooner. with the gbi program as established today, working with our soon international partner japan will continue to look for opportunities to buy down that risk judiciously their potential with competition at a lower

level at the component or subsystem level. >> okay. let's dive a little more into that. what concrete steps, you've already alluded to some, can we take to mitigate this risk or to give ourselves options if technology development doesn't go as planned? >> much of this, as part of, as part of the decision to come with down selecting, we are intimates upgrading acquisition strategy and finalizing the decision criteria for making this decision. part of that will be finalizing and taking a look at how to establish the program and going forward, depending on the selection and the risk associate with that particular crime, we will enough to take a look at with the prime the steps that would be taken. each prime has a different set of risks based on their designs in that we tested specifically identifying based on the decision which one would drive

what decisions and actions we would take going forward. >> well, i still am concerned. i know that you will do your best to play the hand of cards that you have been dealt, but able to an concerned about this. i just think we are taking on much risk that we otherwise would be able to mitigate through continuing the competition more into the future. this leads to my next set of questions about the program schedule. you would think if the program had advanced sufficiently and technology is mature enough for the government to select a single prime contractor five years earlier than originally planned, that we would be in a position to accelerate the schedule. but it looks like the opposite is happening. in last years hearing your predecessor admiral hill and i discussed the program schedule

and now delivering a capability in 2034 was not adequate. he agreed and said, quote, out in the mid-30s is almost irrelevant. we are not meeting the threat, unquote. but this year's budget would add additional delay and now does not anticipate deploying a capability into 2035. do you share add molehills view that this makes it irrelevant -- admiral hill's view that this makes it irrelevant to go into the future? >> sir, i deathly agree with waiting 11 used to bring hypersonic lipase capability to the war fighter, is too long. and looking into options within the gbi program and other options that could bring an interim capability sooner. we do have a requirement to come back with those options to you and we're working through that in a report, will be provided by

september that goes through those different option spaces both within the gbi program and broader across the missile-defense enterprise to try to get any capability we can out of the weapon systems we have and also into the future with the gbi program. >> what can you tell us in the setting for the record that you would do specifically. you already alluded to the intention to try to accelerate some things, but what are concrete steps that you going to be able to take or plan to take? >> yes, sir. right off the bat, one is we begins with both of our primes the riff on the gbi program today to identify opportunities that they see within their industry space and the broader enterprises to come up with acceleration options that we could be taking within the program, within the gbi program. otherwise i'm also looking

across that of the weapon systems that we have in place today to understand what, if any, residual capability they may have and/or what potential developments, smaller developers could we take within those of the weapon systems that could bring some type of residual capability or interim capability to the fight. >> thank you. i work in my questions there but i will just quickly summarize my concerns. this budget as proposed cuts in funding, delays the schedule and adds risk to the acquisition approach. i understand it will save some dollars and is cheaper but i'm just not sure it will even lead to success in the long run much less address the threats in the meantime. without a turn to the ranking member for any questions he might have. >> thank you, mr. chairman. i certainly share some of the same concerns. lieutenant collins, the f-35 and north group summon stenotic symbols of programs effectively

and zero competition and are grossly over budget, and grossly behind schedule. you have extensive acquisition experience. can you cite example of a broken the benefited from down selecting and reducing competition early? we has such a reduction fielded better technology faster and reduced cost? >> ranking member moulton, thank you for that question. >> well, i think the silence speaks volumes. let's move on. mr. hill, the department indicated cancellation of the sm three block one was done in part to purchase more sm three block to a. will set aside the are no additional two ways in this budget request and focus on the policy issues i continue to raise. is it accurate to say block 1b b is solely a regional missile-defense asset? >> sm three block 1b is a regional missile-defense.

it is medium-range sprays also act as a sm three block two has been proven to intercept an icbm range of threats, the type of threat designed to be handled by the ground-based midcourse defense system? >> i believe it's been shown to be able to intercept at that beginning edge, but the operational concept for it as a regional defense missile that is bolted for medium-range speeders i'm asking that if the builders. >> i believe as a test there that was done. >> a very long way of saying yes. so my question is, was there a policy evaluation done on how or adversaries to include china-russian north korea would respond to a further increase of sm-3 block 2a which a capability can strategic missile in lieu of the 1b variant which does not? >> yeah, that was done before my time doing this but i think the

implications of the sm-3 2a which are being deployed in fleet of different places around the world is not something that should logically cause china or russia to have any concerns from a strategic stability perspective. >> if you could provide a report to the committee it would be helpful. you said there was some analysis done. >> no, the decision, the decision on the test was before i was doing the missile-defense business. i was talking about the history that was done at there. >> the point is what matters are for strategic stability is that just what we think is perfectly logical of what our enemies think. we have to consider these concerns when we're making these budgetary decisions. sm-3 block 2as have important role but the quantities we're covered by are about one-third

of what was intended for the 1b. if we suddenly reversed that an triple our 2a, we could and bolder adversaries do further proliferate advance the technology tech told you with a numbing make a regional defense posture weaker at the time were regional missile-defense is of prime importance but also impacts strategic stability at their strategic level. i get the sense this decision was not thought through on operational is is. general collins from your perspective is a future navy fleet equipment or merely sm-6 interceptors and some sm-3 2a interceptors with the direction you see the threat going? >> sir, ranking member moulton, good question. what i would take is i i woule concerned with the capacity capabilities that are in the fleet and our ability to support with enough 2as going forward moving the capacity from that production line today.

>> well, we obviously share those concerns. general collins come has in the a complete analysis of the impacts on this decision on its ability to support and sustain the current inventory of what meet the needs of allies and support the navy's requirements? have that analysis been completed? >> we've not completed that analysis. we have been waiting for the 24 appropriation to understand the amount of money were going to get within the sm 31 be lying to support the negotiation for an additional lot of 1b. that work is going on currently today to understand the impact the both the 1b fight a lot as well as the future of the 2a line. all of that to inform what type of would be required within the 1b line to support the lifecycle of 1b. >> to quickly summarize as a chairman did, we both share a concern about the lack of

competition. that seems to be echoed by your silence. we both share a concern about simply the magazine capacity that we have if we are reducing the number of regional assets we have at a time when we're using them quite regularly here and i have additional concerns about what this all means for strategic stability that it just sounds like have not been analyzed or even considered carefully. we have a lot of questions and i think that's important. just one final question. there have been a lot of discussions from the subcommittee about the potential need for a third conus interceptor site. hasn't jroc validated in a requirement for a third site? >> no, sir, there's no requirement. >> if it were to validate such a requirement is a location those look at almost injured to go still would you believe that third site should be located? as the last study explicitly indicated that in the eighth we need to we look at the analysis

prior to moving forward with any sort of program once you had a requirement. >> that's correct. we would take a look at if a requirement for east coast site was identified as requirement and validated as mentioned when the final report came up we could take a look at the current threat to current performance at the system, the current state of affairs to assess and evaluate what that optimal site would be. >> so just to summarize come as a renegade don't need a third site. if you were to need a third that you would just go with what was selected ten years ago can you do another analysis. mr. hill i would add i hope we would permit questions about strategic ability look at the implications of a third site on the views of our adversaries. >> that's correct. focus on a third site will be the things we are already investing rather than a third site. >> great. thank you, mr. . thank you, mr. chairman. i yield back. >> thank you. mr. desjarlais. >> general collins come hypersonics are a complete d our prior conception of the

global missile threat landscape with our ability to evade our legacy detection systems. we are not in position were rippling catchable in our building to detect and defeat these novel capabilities. can you update our committee on how you are addressing the issue of detection first with the capabilities like hypersonic and ballistic tracking space sensor satellites? and how are you collaborate with sba's on these and other efforts pertaining to hypersonic missile defense? >> thank you for the question. hypersonic missile defense is certainly a key focus of the missile defense agency and protecting our war fighters as we move forward. the hypersonic ballistic tracking space sensor i mentioned a opening statement and you just mentioned, that is a prototype set the satellites didn't demonstrate our ability and the technology to from space detect, track, close a loop against the hypersonic threat come to take a hypersonic threat and track it throughout its

entire launch come from launch to intercept. that is a key aspect of our future ability to detect and eventual intercept hypersonic weapons anywhere on the planet in the future. to get there we have worked very closely with the space development agency. they would be the operational transition agent for us to take it and included within the future proliferated war fighting space architecture. we have been working very closely with them. also the space war fighter, war fighting analysis center, the slack part of the space for. >> we been fighting with them to ensure that our long-term fire control requirements are included within the forest design of any future space architecture. and so with those relationships within space force we are ready when we complete the demonstration later this year to transition into the proliferated war fighting space architecture tracking layer to pick up on the

hypersonic requirements. >> on the clyde face interceptor, where are we at? >> yes, sir. we have two primes awarded another transaction authority agreements, and both are proceeding post system requirement review and working to finalize designs as well as tech maturation for each of their designs. there's a good amount of maturation of the design and integration of the system that we worked on. >> okay. is an acceleration research and hypersonic defense options necessary and is it technologically feasible? >> sir, , we believe hypersonic defense is feasible. we have today a terminal case ability capability to intercept hypersonic threats within the sm-6 sea bass terminal capability within the aegis weapons system. so we are already fielded

capability to intercept hypersonics in the terminal phase. glide phase interceptor we've identified the technology areas that need to be matured within the program to do glide phase intercept farther away from the intended target. we are in the midst according to all those technologies to be able to feel this capability. so yes, we believe that technology exists with some maturation to come but we do believe hypersonic flight phase intercept keep of those is feasible. >> mr. hill what is the department also help u.s. will address there. hypersonic threats to the homeland? >> as general collins describe investing capabilities. as congress directed. we created come we designated the secretary of the air force for leading the cruise missile defense of the homeland project and, of course, glide phase interceptors, cruise missiles, so we will defend them against that, recognizing that in many

cases this is something that an adversary is using and developing not in the context of a nuclear strike but in the context of potential defeating our ability to respond. we want to demonstrate that we have the ability to follow up on the commitment we made and that means we will defend critical infrastructure in the united states. >> thank you. yield back. >> thank you. mr. norcross. >> thank you, chairman, ranking member for today's hearing and certainly the witnesses. we've had a number of discussions on this committee that talked about the ability to produce the weapons we need, the interceptors. quite frankly the entire industrial base. mr. hill, today you talk about the investment in that industrial base. so just for the sake of an argument let's say we have the

technical expertise to design and build up we might be able to build a prototype. when you look across the u.s. industrial base, and the workforce, are you comfortable with where we are in terms of being able to produce the numbers that we're talking about? >> i think, frankly i'm concerned that we have taken a bit of a holiday and that we're playing some catch up here. i am concerned that we have an adversary in russia that is war footing in ukraine. we and our allies in europe only to look more carefully at the investments and improve our abilities to replenish when we draw down munitions and other key systems. >> so you talked about the investment in the industrial base. what specific it would you .2 that in this budget is actually

going to mitigate some of those concerns? >> i think that our focus particular on munitions area and expanding capacity and some of that is function of when you are buying in larger quantities, when you're buying, using the authority the committee has given us to multitier procurement. now you're creating an environment in which you were not just rely on the kevin sproge but companies are also willing to put their money into expanding their capacity. >> so what are we doing to address that exactly? what signals are we signaling? i'm very personally with me ammunition what were doing over there. when you start talking about investing our workforce, what does that mean? you can send the signal but and lets the contract follows it, it's a hollow signal. >> right. the contract following it would be the question of resource

allocations in finite budgets. this is the question we've been discussing earlier today about how many are we acquiring. >> well, i'm not trying to pin your data actually i am going to pin you down because were doing this to address exactly what we're talking about. again, we make the decision and all the complexities and deal with that and he would say we need it yesterday. i need that is historically what we do. if you look at some of the numbers we are requesting an particularly mr. moulton what he was saying, even if you change your mind they cannot ramp up in time. so when we start looking towards investing in that industrial base we have to send the signals that are true to industry. we have to build it ahead of time because the longest lead item is not a peace material. it is a human, and that is why i continue to bring this up meeting after meeting but with that i will yield back to the

chairman. thank you. >> thank you. mr. bacon. >> thank you, mr. chairman. thank you, gentlemen for being here. could you help you understand why the budget overall budget numbers have gone down significantly for civil defense in the upcoming budget versus what we did last year? that's what it appears to me. is it because of budget caps or maybe there's other priorities? trying to understand that. >> sure, i'll start. definitely the fiscal responsibility act did set the scene. read work within that ceiling. we had must pay bills, payroll increases come healthcare programs, a lot of of the ths are going in the defense department. then you find, you are having to make some choices. my readiness today for the things i'm working on, investment for the future, not easy choices. >> i think it's something of the armed service committee to maybe review seemed like missile defense is there we do not want

to be cuddy. i know the budget is going up a little bit but i was surprised to see the amount of the cut going on for missile defense. it's concerning when you see the basis ticker like iraq and being repeatedly hit from iran. what can we be doing better to protect our forward bases from this are what are we not doing? i know this could be a theater commanders question but you have great insight. >> congressman, thank you. i'll take that question. in my current role and previous roles specifically as the army's providing a preponderance of missile defense and counter uas defense for those bases forward. again, continuing to add funding for the forward war fighter to deploy capabilities can you heard general carella advocate for additional funding is requested for additional counter uas to the building across all of our basis for big regift

capability there now. that is proven successful. we're putting in technology directed energy and also other type of kinetic systems and continuing funding of those systems allow us to put in volume additional capability. >> thank you. excellent to see the amount of targeting iran is doing at our basis and a ruckus is a? be doing anything we that. in the last ndaa we put some measures in for kurdistan. how will that look do you think i would not be a hard challenge to accomplish? >> there was a provision that helped the kurds get missile defense in the last ndaa. scribes are, i heard kurdistan. >> kurdistan, sorry. >> that's just my hearing. actually support the kurds in

balancing that relationship, relations in region is also part of that question. to add to something as well we've also said in the red sea context obviously struck back at some of the sites where some of these iran aligned militia groups operate, the houthis most notably. and that is an essential complement to the force protection, that missile defense provides. >> thank you. one less question for general gainey if i may. we've been reading reports of fatigue and burnett because of high tempo for your servicemen and women. what we do to help mitigate that? >> the army has taken a holistic look and as you heard me earlier highlight the significant strain on the force but what it will tell you is i am amazed at how the soldiers continue to respond

by continue to maintain a positive attitude and high reenlistment rate moving forward. as the army looks to get after how do we improve the quality of life and improve the up-tempo costar modernization efforts and continuing funding for modernization efforts because patriot system is a most deployed to system because it is our workforce system. as we modernize with integrated battleground system is the core point inside that modernization can we will then integrate several different capability provides the range of capabilities across several threats so you no longer have to do . just say patriot battery. you can to put different components and the army's of growth of that capability in the last will also add additional capacity so that will help moving forward. >> we appreciate the men and women who serve in your command and that matter for all of your commands and missile defense is such an important mission and

its in high demand everywhere,, so we're grateful to you and your people. >> perfect timing. now go to mr. vasquez. >> thank you, chairman. thank you to direct member. thank you to our witness of being here today. this morning i have the project representing new mexico's second disc of the birthplace of america's space and missile program. white sands continues be the department defense bring a research and testing facility for our nation those important weapons programs, we also continue to face struggles maintaining modern technology and facilities. during my visit to white sands this january leadership should repeat the long-range radars which are supposed to provide critical tracking capabilities for weapons testing have been in service and had not been upgraded since the 1960s. posing significant challenges to keeping them operational and in line with modern technology. beyond this maintenance challenges i've understood these radar challenges and the

failures during tests have been come increasingly frequent occurring as often as five times per month and with tracking inaccuracies that are all my hundreds to thousands of yards. not being able to accurately track weapons during testing bottle it poses a safety risk to the folks that are working there but also to surrounding communities that threatens our readiness to national security. that's completely unacceptable. we should do everything in our power to ensure white sands has the necessary equipment to safely and accurately track weapons test so we are providing our war fighters with the best tools and information possible to accomplish their mission. lieutenant general gainey, are conditions like these acceptable to you and how do standards pose a threat to our national security? >> thank you for the question. white sands missile range remains an integral part as you know to our testing and job, the army air and missile defense program. sc new mission commander, i also

have strategic testing at the sites were also maintain an infrastructure incenses be able to get after that. i believe continuing funding and improve its of all those capabilities are critical to continuing to ensure that we have the best capability as we test our critical systems moving forward. >> thank you so much. in mexico as you know lieutenant general with a long legacy of not just missile testing but a lot of research and government that has contributed to the strength of this nation's nasa security and also have a legacy of impacts on local trends khmers and testing activities which is one of the reason i'm fighting and others in congress are fighting to reauthorize. we want to make sure this technology are updated and we don't make the same mistakes of the past at the same time protecting national security. mr. hill, given the importance of white sands testing capabilities, what is stopping the department from obtaining these critical testing systems?

>> congressman, i'm not familiar with the specific decisions on those, but i can survey take the question. in the general sense, obviously the previous discussions about the overall topline and making trade-offs on resources i'm sure it is part of the calculation that's happening. >> thank you mr. hill. i appreciate you paying attention to this issue in future budget request it be on the missile testing and evaluation at white sands we are also home to the largest manufacturer of space great solar cells that a key component to providing power to our satellites. producers in my district power significant portion of our nation's ashen security satellites directly contributing to the strength of our missile warning fleet in space. mr. hill for components like solar cells that are critical for missile defense and warning infrastructure, what does it mean to the department of a reliable, domestic supply chain and how can congress help

support robust production capabilities like those in my state? >> i think reliable domestic reduction change was important they are across a number of fields. one of the things we have done we most recently issued our commercial space integration strategy, recognizing how much innovation is being driven by the commercial site of space. and understand that we in the defense department need to shift from trying to contort them into meeting all requirements to being flexible about our requirements so we can leverage what they are doing. that would be an example of creating an environment in which more innovation happens inside domestic production capacity. >> i appreciate that, mr. hill and we certainly are at the forefront of that commercial, commercialization both in research and develop face but also now in assembly and manufacturing when it comes to all these different components that are going into these modern systems and appreciate your continued attention and investment in new mexico's second district.

thank you so much. i give expert thank you, chairman lamborn and ranking member moulton, and thank each of you for being here today. general, it's great having each of you in my office last week or it was interesting to learn that not only is it the rock is a but also apparently the city of love since this is where you met your wife, general james, and i also found out that general gainey parents met at redstone arsenal, so is interesting to that. redstone arsenal is making a name for itself. i've said it before and i'll say it again, we got some great things coming out of huntsville. general collins just a few vco general guillot with northcom reconfirmed to this committee that the next-generation interceptors critical for defending the homeland. last spring your predecessor testified to the benefits of keeping multiple contractors on the ngi program through critical

design review. but since late last year we have learned that this is no longer the plan. this really concerns me and many others. looking back to 2019 when the redesign vehicle program was canceled, we had all our eggs in one basket. there wasn't a backup plan. and because we didn't have a backup plan we had to extend the life of our interceptors and start an entirely new program. this cost taxpayers a lot of money. it cost this capability and the cost is of time. when there's a ticking clock over in the indo-pacific and throughout the world. what change? wise ndaa now making an earlier plan down select decision before critical design review next year? >> congressman, thanks for the question on in g.i. it is absolutely our foundation for homeland defense into the

future and we have continued to focus the agency very much on ngi and its incorporation in, dollars in 2028. two things of note. one we talked about is certainly the fiscal realities in the decisions that needed to be made across the missile defense portfolio has been far-reaching. but second, we have also been keeping the ngi program on track both primes have completed a preliminary design review. both have completed full qualification of all their parts for the radiation environment. and many of the subcomponents have been taken to the critical design review stage of design. all that brought together, we, the agency believe we have a full in-depth understanding of the designs from the two primes. we fully understand and the

transition to production plans and the risks that are still involved with both primes, and believe that the level of risk is well below the department standard of making a decision such as this. so we believe we have the technical depth and knowledge and understanding of risk as we move forward to make that decision. >> i know some very smart people have done great work to keep our current interceptors in the game longer but we cannot keep life extending the fleet, is that right? >> that is correct. >> i know the compass and ngi succeeding is a big part of that to the incredible work being done at redstone arsenal with both industry teams in huntsville, alabama, but the consequences of something going wrong with ngi are much higher now than it was back in 2019. would that would that be a correct statement? >> yes, sir, they're still

additional risk ahead of us on the program and we will continue to stay very focus away that risk is. sorry. we'll continue to focus on where that risk is and focus on mitigating the risk as best as possible. >> i totally agree. there are much higher this time because just as you said we can't fall back on doing another life extension of the current system. we have already used our get out of jail free card with the rkv. i worry that biden administration is wanting to dismantle the significant industrial capacity that has been built up over decades. ndaa budget plans are taking a detrimental hit due to some shortsighted decisions here. is there a a report or study t ndaa has contacted the down selecting before critical design review over sticking with the original acquisition strategy?

>> no, sir, we do not have any report or assessment on that. >> thank you. so we are budget constrained,, the primary or initial reason for the change in strategy, or is it because the team, the teams have progressed better than expected? >> i would say it's a combination of both, both teams have regressed very, very well but the was a catalyst that was driven by the fiscal decision as a. >> i think each of you for being here. i yield back. >> thank you. mr. carbajal. >> thank you, mr. chairman. hearing all the nexus that show to his district and not paradise which of my district makes me start question your judgment, i must say. we know our adversary possessed hypersonic capabilities. defendant against an defeating this threat is proving to be challenging both technically and physically. general collins, , how are

advanced manufacturing technologies such as additive manufacturing being utilized to reduce costs and acquisition timelines for future hypersonic defense programs? >> thank you, congressman for the question. and fully agree with your notes on the difficulty in developing an industry base to accelerate our hypersonic offense of in defense of we move forward. and in my previous job with an air force might hypersonic weapons we had the same challenges in developing industry base to produce critical technologies we require for hypersonic weapons. at the missile defense agency we are very focus on bringing any of the new advanced manufacturing capabilities and technologies to bear to help one reduce costs of building hypersonic weapons in the future as well helping to scale and increase base of capacity of lines going forward. we are very much looking into

advanced manufacturing additive manufacturers you mentioned that we have a group within our division that is closer look at and investing in small business maturation capabilities of additive manufacturing and particular capability that are required within a hypersonic weapon, , when a particular his carbon carbon additive manufacturing which is key to the front edge dermal protection system of our hypersonic weapons. a key technology and a limiting factor within our ability to scale the industry base. we're very much investing across the traditional and nontraditional basis to ensure we have manufacturing capability for hypersonic weapons. >> thank you. general collins earlier the missile defense agency launched two hypersonic and ballistic tracking space satellites. ndaa received additional funds in fiscal year '24 defense appropriation bill to do calibration testing and training on threat represented hypersonic

target. can you please describe the status of the satellites and out ndaa is going dash in the a's going to execute the 25 million recalibration provided in fiscal year '24 under this? >> yes congressman, absolutely. it was a major activity. on valentine's day of issue we launched -- >> that's my anniversary by the what. >> that's a great day. the satellites are still progressing through launching early orbit testing. we have a very slow methodical process whereby we turn on the satellites can we turn on the payload. over the last month we have had first what we call the first time we turn on the payloads and actually looked within and look at the data to calibrate. that calibration continues. we started to do a number of cooperative activities where there may be a launch or test that somebody else is executing and we've been using those as capabilities as opportunities to calibrate that payload. later this summer we will be

executing our first htb hypersonic test bed one launched in june. that is a lot specifically designed for our satellites to look at hypersonic threat and track it through its time of flight. there will be another htb two test later in the summer. those of the two main wickets were looking at to calibrate and certify the fire control solution and technology that we have. back to the owner conversation another opportunity where getting is a space develop an agency that will launch on the same booster. there in playing with her to satellites so were going to be able to utilize some testing of the life capability in concert with our htb s technology as well. a key capability as a look forward to a future missile warning missile defense and missile defense space architecture. thank you. >> general james, a value add of hbts as is that it will provide

five controlled quality data to track and intercept hypersonic threats or can you speak to the importance the board's of fire control quality data county boards of using threat represented hypersonic targets to calibrate and train against how space command plans to do that cross future your defense programs? >> yes congressman, i sure can. thanks for the question. i have a few things to say so thanks for the question. [laughing] absolutely, as space, continues to flush out it's missile defense mission and continue to press on that and we see those natural links between what you've heard of the colic say about the convergence of the space in the missile defense mission. how we use our space assets and develop those to get at the technology changes we see 2. the hyper velocity for the cruise missile threats that we see, we're going to accuse space-based systems, we we'rg

to have to provide that level of targeting quality information. and so that's exactly the things that were working on as we continue to develop the net centric command-and-control system and the information systems as we continue to press without you'll see that in our list as important factor when you do continue to press on to increase our ability to command and control and pass that information from a close his sensor to best shooter to be able to make those connections. there's a lot of work that's happening more than just an usspacecom over time into all that with army's convergence and we will tighten exercises and then we will fire, we exercise all of those to continue to build our expertise and that. absolutely critical because sensors are not going to allow us to track and target the

threats we see come in the past but it would have to space-based, and all the things general collins just talked about from sba and work with space force and other capabilities, absolutely important here and integrating commercial and integrating the allies. that is every bit usspacecom has been tons of work with over the years and evolve naturally into how we're going to afford with missile defense. >> thank you. thank you, mr. chairman for the additional time. >> it was really more for lieutenant general james. [laughing] >> thank you. >> mr. nelson. >> thank you, mr. chairman. indeed, i hope you will see that incredibly this is bipartisan with the leadership of our chairman and ranking member and even including congressman carbajal. but truly, we want you to succeed and i have a personal interest. i served 31 years in the army

guard at our reserves and really appreciate military service and i'm grateful my oldest son served in iraq, field artillery. my second son was a doctor out of track, he was in the navy i still claim him serving in baghdad. my third son, signal in sinai and my youngest i year afghanistan as an engineer. so all credit to my wife roxanne for actually training these guys. by the bottom line is we want you to succeed an equally it's more important than ever, mr. secretary general, one conflict we did not choose an to me it's a conflict, a war between dictators with the rule of gun for invading democracies with rule of law. ..

doctor for criminal putin is so human about assorted the apartment complex. particular sleep first responders and personal law enforcement, that's when the attack occurs it was talking to think of the tactics to human to think been to try to this responders continued on around

in his civilians monitor report any sense priority your, everything in violation of war and then 50 attacks over and over again asked collating january 28 with 3 members of the army reserves georgia hezbollah killing three of our personal and wounding 40 others so

incredible the challenges best. the level of employment no surprise the curve deployment effort leadership we have would like to vacuum and department and how addressing this?

i will speak first. most modernized effort moving from patriot center force essentially do anything partners is army now working at integrative autographs and rehab the system right now. it integrates several components, it takes lower tier sensor advancing other sensors whether there airborne and

absent shooters given the operator, several centers to provide several factors in the lower tier and marketability in the current system with optimizing post centers part of a great if you look at this from a joint perspective, that's where we look at you bring these together in a larger construct about something as we work toward, how do you take the integrative battle command system with systems the missile defense agency was together? we are looking at an enduring solution that integrates these

systems and beverages them together. too lower to medium range, conduct counter you i have, the army has invested in that area we have added several short range air defense and provide capability looking at technology like directed energy that we have deployed out there testing that capability. also high-powered microwave to formation. the appropriate interceptor on the appropriate target that is

how it will allow us to move forward. >> thank you. >> if there's ever a committee faced with the problem, it's this one. i've never had a committee that has had so many acronyms to understand what each of these are. it is a challenge but i will try to take this in a different direction. we will forever be playing defense trying to catch up with offense. we can use nfl experience we are

hearing here today. much of this discussion today, we note not environment there is great risk. what happened over the last 20 years significant shift in this entire arena. archie 2,022,000 abm three antiballistic missile. it would do well to understand the details of the language, we usually think it only applies to intercontinental ballistic's but

it went beyond that. united states withdrew from that. for the treaty to justify continued buildup of ballistic missile systems. in recent days last few years the very same withdrawal from the abm treaty system is fair to

argue that treaty has led to the current nuclear arms race. how we are going to defend using the gmd and my concern is we are in a never ending cycle of offense followed by defense cap resumes to be successful against the known offense yet one more round. as much time as we are spending on this committee, defense, we ought to look at how to break the cycle of an arms race and

nuclear piece to it and it becomes even more significant in members on this committee, understand in detail what this race is all about, the risks. my question to you, for us policymakers and you and your team to spend time thinking about how to stop the cycle from of offense, defense and back-and-forth all of which greater risk. talk to hear your thoughts.

>> very key. clearly there was a time, an era when we had someone to work with on the other side of the negotiating table. that era in the cold war we did negotiate agreements successfully. that is a key piece to our situation and now you have three and can you deal with them as a credible negotiating partner right now? is to say you always need to think about that is what you have to work with to maintain. can you come up with to a confidence level with somebody on the other side of the table?

>> five more seconds. everyone of the arms-control that went into effect during the cold war occurred almost immediately after the most difficult moments but amount of time. for me, i'm going to spend as much time talking about this as i do about offense and defense. >> i'd like to correct the record early in the hearing, the ranking members that the department of defense's ipo the holman nearly ten years ago, that is incorrect. despite the fact that that is

correct, you are aware the date is 2019, correct? >> yes, ma'am. >> so ten years ago is incorrect? >> yes, ma'am. >> you also are aware last year general milley and vice federal health testified in front of the clinic is strategically worthwhile, correct? >> yes, ma'am. >> you are also aware multiple nda a's language designated has been included, you are aware of that? but the record reflect ranking member voted that not once but multiple times as well as appropriations. in the fy 14 appropriations act, we work to secure 10 million in the design funds to begin

construction activity for third was of the fence. my question to you, as the director, can you confirm to me as dictated by congress begin the planning and design of the dark missile defense? >> that is that purpose. >> what you using it for? >> initial planning and development and design for the intersect site. >> with with the language that.

>> you understand in the nda i for multiple years this has been a draw process so you are saying 10 million was not for the planning and design? >> in support interceptor site at any location determined in line with the 2019 for the department to find out fort drum and when the requirement was that, there would have to be a reassessment. >> you know you said when we met in my office you understand it would go to the design and planning as testified by the nda. >> when a decision if the decision is made to pursue fort

drum site $10 million would be one 100% in line with being able to push that. >> what you do understand been designated as well as by dod back i am aware. >> okay great. with that, i will go back. >> i concludes the public portion of his hearing. we have folks that will be called roughly 1140 possibly broken degree 71 until folks are called and then we will return the subcommittee so we will be in recess and meet upstairs.