>> well, good morning, and thanks for coming out early on a monday morning. and thank you to joel for that lovely introduction. it is a real pleasure and an

honor to open this conference, nato at 75, charting a new course that i'm very much looking for to your questions in the few minutes. for three-quarters of a century nato has been a cornerstone of international peace and security, united nations in a collective commitment to mutual defense, and to our shared values. nato's success story really is remarkable, and it's one that was by no means preordained. the fact that in 2024, 75 years after it was founded, the alliance is bigger, stronger, and more united speaks to the alliances adaptability. it speaks to nato's resilience. but it also speaks to the commitment and the courage of millions of soldiers, , sailors, aviators and operate together

under the nato umbrella. but i think it also speaks to the attractiveness of nato's core values, democracy, individual liberty, and the rule of law. now, i don't have enough time this morning here had to gh all of nato's many achievements over the last seven decades, and there will be sample panel struck that they were folks will be allowed to look at the alliance from different angles, looks like a superb conference and series of discussions, and i congratulate the organizers. but what i do want to do this morning is i want walk us through all that has happened inside the nato alliance over just the last two years, since russian launched its unprovoked war of aggression in ukraine. these last two years have in many ways been transformative, and don't use that word lightly. i don't think there's a better

word to describe what's happening across the nato alliance since the war started. and i think they have showcased time and time again nato's agility and its innovation. so let me walk you through five big changes that we've seen again just in the last two years. years. first, after many, many years of focusing on expeditionary operations or you remember in the 1990s they were often referred to as out of area operations, the alliance has come home and returned to its core mandate of collective defense. and it's taken a series of dramatic steps to enhance its deterrence. before the war even started, nato allies were moving force posture into eastern europe. you will remember that nato just a few months after the war started announced four new multinational battalions on the eastern flank that were paired with the four that were created

in the three baltic states and poland right by doctor rut into crimea in 2014. in the trance and some less to the alliance also rolled out new regional plans that provide clarity to all allies in terms of what's required to protect every inch of nato territory. we are also working on an entirely new command-and-control structure which a suspect general cavoli will talk about in his remarks later today, and we just finished conducting our largest military exercise since the cold war, steadfast defender, with 90,000 nato troops. and that exercise for the first time in a long time enabled us to exercise north american troops moving across the atlantic and into europe to defend nato territory. so that's number one.

dramatic shift or a coming home of sorts to collective defense and enhance deterrence. secondly, burden sharing has increased significantly in recent years. you will remember that in 2014 all allies pledged to spend 2% of their gdp on the own national defense. that pledge was to last ten years. that that brings us to 2024 when we started the pledge ten years ago we had three countries in the alliance spending 2% 2% p on defense, and by last count we don't know where we're going to end up by the end of this calendar year, but right now we have 20 allies that are meeting the 2% pledge. 20 allies. that is a significant increase over a decade. of course we wanted to be all 32, and we're going to keep pushing until we get there, but the movement that we saw over the last two years, particularly by countries like germany that

put an extra 100 billion euros on the table for their own defense after the war started speaks volumes about where we are as a subject of burden sharing. but when we talk about burden sharing, it's not just about 2% of gdp spending on national defense. sharing also takes us to the question of ukraine. and here we are also seeing remarkable level of burden sharing across the alliance. the united states over the last two years has provided roughly $74 billion worth of support to our friends in ukraine. our european allies collectively have provided somewhere around the order of the $110 million worth of support to ukraine. every single member of the alliance is providing assistance to ukraine, economic, humanitarian, and security systems. so burden sharing is something that we've seen and everywhere we have seen tremendous positive

shift just over the last two years. third, nato has added two new members. you will remember right after the war started in the spring of 2022 the was a knock at the door and to make countries that had hundreds of years of non-alignment decided to shift the national policy and request formal nato membership. pot in five years, not in a decade come not in two years but immediately. they wanted to start the process immediately. as you well know finland became an official member last spring, and sweden just joined officially, and now it is taking its seat at the table just a couple of weeks ago. and those two allies already making meaning meaningful contributions to the lights h and every day. number four, nato rolled out a new strategic concept in 2022. this is nothing new. nato rewrite the strategic concept. its core mission statement about once a decade. what was a new about this

particular strategic concept was that in addition to mentioning the two core threats the alliance is facing, russia and terrorism, for the first time in nato's history the strategic concept mentions the prc, challenges associate with the prc, for nato member states, and the importance of deepening our partnerships with our friends in the indo-pacific. now, why is a native doing this? does it have aspirations to become a global alliance and add the members in the indo-pacific? absolutely not. that's not the plan. our indo-pacific partners don't have an interest in joining the alliance, , and the alliance is not looking to go global. but what we see is increased utility in working together with our friends in the indo-pacific on a number of shared security challenges that really have no geographic boundaries.

this information, malicious cyber attacks, or emerging and disruptive technology. we view the security challenges increasingly in one theater and not limited to just the atlantic or the pacific. and so nato is moving out while it is focus on the war in ukraine, it is moving out to deepen these important partnerships with our friends in the indo-pacific to share best practices and insight on those shared challenges. finally, nato, while it is been addressing the challenges in ukraine and coping with the russia threat, , has taken a series of unprecedented steps to address a wide range of emerging and future challenges. and i'll give it a couple of examples. we have new initiatives across the alliance in two new domains, cyberspace. you will remember when nato was created we focus on land, sea and air. now increasingly the alliance is moving out to focus on security threats that exist in cyberspace

and in space proper. nato also recently announced a c1 1 billion euro innovation fund to protect our collective technological edge it nato is in the process of building something called the defense innovation accelerator for the north atlantic which has a handy name of diana, to solve critical defense challenges both with the private sector and with academic institutions. we have expanded our work across the new alliance on climate security but also resilient. we have identified a key areas such as our telecommunication networks, our health systems or continuity of government that must remain resilient in the face of any potential attack. and last summer we just announced something called the defense production action plan to ensure that nato has the industrial capacity and the capabilities that it needs to

support its defense plants. so taken together, what does all of this mean for this alliance? the enhance deterrence, the new resourcing we're seeing, the new members that are still trying to join this alliance, the deeper partnerships with our friends in the indo-pacific, and all of the new initiatives that we are rolling out to cope with future challenges. well, it tells us that at 75 this alliance remains relevant. it remains resilient, and the remains ready for the future. and that's why we look forward to hosting this year's anniversary summit right here in washington, d.c. july 9 through the 11th where we will no doubt celebrate 75 years of historic achievements, are strong transatlantic bonds and nato's vital importance in defending against future threats. now an addition to the celebrations we of course will be spending a lot of time at the summit focused on ukraine.

i can't predict, none of us can, with any certainty what the world will look like come july, but here's what we do know. all 32 heads of state will be traveling to washington, d.c. in july to showcase their unwavering unity, their unwavering resolve in helping ukraine when. we will send a strong signal to president putin that he can't wait us out. we are not distracted, that we are not looking away, and we remain focused on ukraine's immediate and future security needs. and we will take concrete steps at the summit to move ukraine closer to the alliance and build a bridge to nato membership. and, of course, in addition to ukraine the allies will be making a series of new announcements on many of the subjects i just mentioned. we are rolling out new initiatives as it relates to cyber come to resilience, to climate security, and yes

defense production act will. so let me close just with this. sometimes i encounter folks that wonder whether nato's 75 years, whether or not that some sort of liability. and i the very short answer on those types of questions. nato's 75 years of experience, that is not a liability. that is an asset. 75 years of working towards consensus with our closest allies day after day on nato's core mandate and our future mandates has made unity our greatest strength. yes, working with 31 other allies day in and day out as have its challenges. it's not always easy to get 32 nations to agree around the table. but when allies put their full weight behind an issue or a position or a new initiative, there is no question that it has both regional and global

implications. i think madeleine albright, former professor here of course and a first female secretary of state said it best when she said we know that when democracies, with the democracies of europe and america are divided, crevices are created to which forces of evil and aggression may emerge. but when we stand together, there's no force on earth more powerful than our solidarity on behalf of freedom. and that's it right there. it's our solidarity, the solidarity that makes nato stronger and is made nato one of the most successful alliances in history, and one that is made the alliance ready for tomorrow's challenges. thank you very much. i look forward to your questions. [applause] >> well, thank you, ambassador smith. thank you, everyone to beer.

i'm davidson, "new york times," and just so that you understand the order of the next few minutes. ambassador and are going to talk for about half an hour, and then we're going to go out to questions for everybody. there are a couple of microphones lined up, or at least i see here, where you can stand for your questions. so thank you for this. thanks for coming. >> thank you. >> great to see you again, in a previous life we had offices next to each other. >> indeed. >> but it was hard to imagine then that you would be ambassador to nato. i'm still doing the same thing i was doing. so let me start with your comments about what it is that we've learned in the last two years, because it is been an extremely moment for nato. i think you summarized it well,

that there were years, decades really where they were doing expeditionary out of area operations. a lot of debate within nato, is this really what we were created for? there was some debate, , do we need nato anymore? there were my favorite conversations that i dug up when i was working on new cold wars. the book you would reference before, the intro discussions mostly in the bush administration about the integral -- what he could bring rush into nato and the russian nato council gave them at office inside the nato headquarters. i think that's gone. >> it is gone. it is gone. >> yeah. so that take you to the question of what we have learned, what we were surprised by and what we've learned. so you gave us some of the great strengths that have come together. there are three things that

strike me that took nato by surprise and wanted to run them, run through them. because it will give us a sense of how they reacted. in the opening days of the war, or in the run-up to the war i should say, a lot of european leaders, even the weekend before the war at the munich security conference, were telling me, were telling you, were telling secretary blinken the russians are just bluffing, they are not really going to do this. the economic interests are so great in providing gas and oil they would never take this risk. he's just trying to get a negotiated solution. what lessons have emerged from the fact that while the united states provided the intelligence and the europeans believe the intelligence, it didn't believe our assessment? >> yeah, you're right. this was an interesting time for

me because i was confirmed in november of 2021, and that was right in the thick of i think it was early fall 2021 when we had taken, the biden administration had taken this decision to share an unprecedented amount of intelligence with our closest allies let them know what we thought was a clear indication that they were not just bluffing, this wasn't just posturing. they were preparing to go to war. and so i landed in brussels in late that november, late 2021, and i frankly didn't quite know what to expect. i guess my assumption going in was that the united states putting this information on the table, the debates which shift and that we would all then seen from the same song sheet. but, in fact, what happened is

exactly what you're describing. there were many allies around the table that were saying come on, we hear what you're saying, we appreciate the fact that you have shared this level of intelligence with us many times, not just in one instance, but we were keeping the -- >> making public because they were calling -- >> that's right. no, and we were making it public, absolutely. was it just our closest allies. but then one of my most vivid memories is when the phone rang february 22 at 3 a.m., a kind of felt come will talk about the 3 a.m. phone call in the united states. literally rang around that time, and we went in for the north atlantic council meeting. before the meeting got started one of my colleagues from eastern europe raised his hand, and before we're going to launch in this series, we were activating nato's graduate response but i think the nato

response force, flurry of activity, he said i just need to say, put his head up, looked at table and instead i couldn't believe you. i, i -- >> secretary blinken has said similar. >> sorry, but what that did, so the fact that tragically russia decided to go forward with this war, there were several diplomatic efforts you will remember the trips to geneva. there was the nato-russia council at nato headquarters on january 12 around the table at the north atlantic council. so we had made efforts to encourage them to take another path. they did not. the war starts. there was a shift inside the alliance in that there was suddenly a different approach and attitude towards u.s. intelligence after that moment. it had created a situation where the u.s. had built up a considerable amount of

credibility because we had shared the intelligence, called it up, and tragically it come to pass, that from that moment forward as u.s. continue to share intelligence about russians plans, what their strategy, what was happening on the ground and what we envision with the next step, then you can see the allies attention and focus on what was being presented to u.s. briefers. so there was a significant shift from one day to the next across the island. >> do you think, in other words, do think now the intel between the u.s. and the other nato members, the agreement on assessment has fundamentally change? >> i think it has fundamentally changed, and the changes that we saw two years ago are still ever present today inside the nato alliance, in terms with the seriousness with which allies look at and consider use

intelligence. >> there were two other areas that jumped out at me from my reporting on this three. one in the oldest tech and one in the news. europe had pretty much stopped making conventional ammunition of artillery shells at the time. using fired. and the ukrainians, while the u.s. and microsoft, amazon world services and others that if i was job of moving the ukrainian government to the cloud, there have been no planning for how they're going to communicate. elon musk stepped in and solve this one, but that was not part of the plan. so i'm wondering if you could just sort of bring us up-to-date on both the ammunition side and the communications side burner side. >> yeah. -- cyber side. >> sorry, just had some caffeine you. so two things.

first and foremost on what was happening in europe before the war and postwar. one of the hardest lessons i think of the war in ukraine for the nato allies is a deeper appreciation and understanding of the brittleness of the transatlantic defense industrial base, and some of the shortages that we were seeing because of an aging and kind of shrinking workforce across that defense industrial base. and so what we thought were nato standards that would enable us all to have the stocks necessary to cope with any potential contingency, i think ukraine opened her eyes to reality that first and foremost we need to have a lot more on hand, but also that we need to open up those production lines that we had shattered many, many years ago, and we think about

hollywood, we are still the of doing this, not fill the shortages that now exist across the alliance because of the critical insistence that is been provided to our friends in ukraine -- assistance. that defense production piece is front and center for us as a catalytic project. we have seen some remarkable steps forward and just to make short years but my goodness with a lot more work to do ahead of us. let me just cite one amazing example, the checks. the checks used to produce about 10,155 per year. they are now two years later producing 100,155 100,1. that is one example. there's many more what they've e in germany over the last year or so has also been impressive. we got a lot to increase reduction in the united states, especially on ammunition but, frankly, across many systems. but on ukraine the ukraine piece of it, there's a very

interesting set of different lessons that we learned from them and we're learning in real time, and that is this war with russia that the canadians are in the middle of defending their territory has brought emerging tech into it sometimes feels, i'm no general milley has a great quote that in your book, that it feels, it's trench warfare. it feels like not like world war ii, there's an omen of that with the tanks went back and forth, but the trench warfare really brings us back to world war i. and yet the ukrainians are paying you technology and drowns. they are using apps, swipe right for more ammunition. i mean, it's unbelievable what the greens have done in terms of attaching new technologies to basically soviet legacy equipment. so on that side of things, yes, they are feeling now the pinch

and the shortfalls that exist in europe and in the united states, but they've also continue to innovate throughout the war and use technology to their advantage. and that's why nato just recently created, the celtic of j tack which is going to allow us to work with the ukrainians and extract lessons learned -- j tack -- on how derek fighting the russians, what modern to combat with the russians look like, no one knows than offense in ukraine right now. and how it is pieces of a sci-fi movie and it also has pieces of world war i conventional warfare. >> it's interesting you say that and the fact i was going to ask you, you had it right about the general milley quote. he's colorful and i will cut out lipid of the colorful piece, because as he always says he speaks, army is his first language. but he said trench warfare for

while we thought this would be a cyber war. and we thought it was looking like an old-fashioned world war ii tank war. and then there are days when i thought they were fighting world war i. >> exactly. >> the fact of the matter is, i mean i said this in my words, not his, it is part 1941 -- 1914 mac 1914, part 1941 and part 2024. >> completely. that's exactly it. >> is nato now, does it it have its head around that alteration that you are doing something that mixes? >> absolutely. first and foremost we are obviously working to extract those lessons learned and what it means for the alliance. we're increasing production. we if not increasingly about how nato standards need to continue to drive and send signals to defense industry. you know, if nato says, for example, let me pick a random

number, nato mandates that all members must have, let's say 30 days of ammunition, , and then suddenly says not 30 days, six months, a year, three months, whatever it is, , and dramaticay increases what the nato standard is that while allies have to meet, it obviously been since the right signal the industry that hey, this has a future and that merits reopening these old alliance. because the answer you get from defense industry so often now when we pound on the doors and say, please reduce more and faster, both for our own stocks and four friends in ukraine, they often say well, you need it right now. will you need it next year? and we seen this movie before where nato allies think they need a certain capability and then they back off it or they pivot to something else or planning dictates a different set of requirements. and so we're tied to take a

long, hard look at what those nato standards are, particularly as we refill our stocks based on the assistance we provided, but then to send the right signal that this will be a lasting project for the alliance. the way we see it, this would be, the defense production piece of it will be, , over the next decade we are going to be working on not only ensuring that we have the stocks necessary to counter any potential threat but to backfill and continue to get the ukrainians what they need. >> so this is expensive. >> indeed. >> what would you were describing her i know you we celebrity the 2% marker for 20 of the 32 countries. but the 2% marker was set ten years ago. >> correct. >> and i spent as you a couple months in berlin, and spent some time with the german defense officials about their plans to

do exactly what you just described. and while the plans are impressive, you can't do it for the 72 billion euros in europe they spend on defense. hard for me to say this with any accuracy, but i have my doubts and you can do it for twice what they're spending. and yet the political conversation in europe, including in germany, has not caught up with the cost of doing what you just described. >> yes. there is good news and bad news. >> good news is ready 2%. bad news is 2% will not do it in more. >> if you go back and look at the language from the vilnius summit last summer. what do we say about 2%? we said that it is a floor not a ceiling. and we said that because increasingly we will look at what's going to be required for the future, we increasingly believed that additional

resources above and beyond every country hitting 2% are going to be needed. and sector austen has been clear about that. no doubt general cavoli will mention it again later today. and what are we seeing in europe? we are seeing countries now stretched a 3%. with a number of countries that are already at 2.5. not just the baltic states by the way. romania, some of her friends in the nordic countries. i mean, a whole, a whole array of countries, are looking at 3%, at the polls are talking about 4%. now obviously with the polls because the writer on the edge of what's happening in ukraine, they feel this war in ways others maybe don't feel it. so acutely. but it is a conversation that is occurring across the alliance day in, day out about whether or not even when we all hit 2%, whether or not that would be sufficient. because you are right to point out that not only to do the back

to work that we have to do but to prepare for all contingencies, including in some of those new areas that i have mentioned, it's going to require resources. >> so the bill in congress right now, the 64 billion, if you get it, much of the emanation as i read that built this is going to backfill in things with or be given them. it would actually result in more ammo going immediately to the ukrainians. >> it's both. it's both. and that's what we have to get the supplemental done. it is absolutely critical we get this through congress. the ukrainians need the support desperately. they need to have u.s. continue to leadership. they need these resources. we want to make sure that they don't go into the summer rationing their ammunition or facing any unnecessary shortfalls. we want to put them in the best position possible to face spit their already rationing. >> they are rationing. there are shortages currently. but they are grappling with an

ivory much hope, we all hope that that supplemental will get through no later than the end of this month. >> so let's talk for a moment of a something to praise end of your discussion, which is the delicate dance about how you talk about admitting nato eventually, admitting ukraine eventually into nato. no secret there's big divisions within the nato alliance on this. this. the eastern europeans are pretty clear and were clear in vilnius the one thing in basically now. president and chancellor scholz were basically the two leaders who were most vocal on the question that you cannot advance i country while it is in the midst of war. and it sounds from what i'm hearing like to want to take a word used in vilnius, which is vague about when ukraine would get admitted.

and move or a similar wording forward for the 75th anniversary. president zelensky came in pretty hot to the vilnius meeting, read his tweets as all of you were. thomas how your managing this. >> well, look, in vilnius we get a lot. we came together. it wasn't easy. it had some challenges. allies have different perspectives on this as you noted. but we did come together and we did a couple of things. first and foremost we said to the ukrainians, there's no question about membership. you will become a member of this alliance. your future place is in nato, and will continue to work to get there. we also make clear that there are a number of reforms that they need to undertake to be granted full-fledged membership, and that's a challenge that all

aspirants have faced. and they're making good progress. progress. and if equity said secretary blinken in brussels last week and we were able to get a a rt from the ukrainians on all that they're doing on their governance and security reforms. and it's an impressive list it for a country in the middle of the war to continue to make progress, for example, on anticorruption is extremely admirable. so we have applauded this episode want to encourage them to keep going. but we also in addition to basic saying to them, look, nato will agree to full-fledged membership for ukraine when conditions are met and when allies agreed, and that holds for this summers sumr speeders and the war ends. >> right. >> or as you set out a stopping point. >> exactly. but what we did do is we created a new nato ukraine council where ukraine comes in and sits as an equal around the table and is able to share first-hand impressions of insights from the war. we can hear what the requirements are but we can also

talk about of right of other subjects. we that meetings of the navy ukraine council on the tax on critical infrastructure. we've talked to them about cyber attacks and looked for ways to provide additional assistance. but we did another important thing last year, and that was to lift map. the membership action plan that many new members have gone through which can be a bit of a lengthy process. we removed that entirely and that said you will not have a membership action plan. you will proceed towards a session with the time is right. so your question is, well, what are you going to do this summer on top of what you already did last summer if membership is on the table? and there we will have concrete deliverable for ukraine. i can't get into the full details on that at this juncture, but we are on a way to get them on what we're calling a bridge to membership by deepening nato's work with the ukrainians on questions of

interoperability, on modernization, providing additional resources to our friends in ukraine, and institutionalizing some of the bilateral support that has been provided. >> you mentioned cyber. before the war broke out summer just before the war broke out, nato agreed that a major cyber attack on a mentally cosseted something that could trigger. tell us all a bit about what you've seen the russians doing come both how they're using cyber inside ukraine where at moments the cyber attacks and the kinetic attacks seem to type together, of which are seen outside of you can where i think we have probably expected a more active russian attack surface in the nato nations. we have seen some, but not dramatically-the background noise. >> well, i guess the way i would

describe that is it has in essence been a steady state. the russians, this is one of the favorite tools of the variety of hybrid tactics on which they regularly rely. malicious cyber attacks is a play that we've seen them rely on time and time again obviously to have an impact inside ukraine on the battlefield with the ukrainian public to create political strategic dilemmas for president zelensky, to drive this information. they also use this information on a regular basis as well. ..

>> those two actors increasingly learn from each other and rely on that cyber instrument to divide the nato alliance from within, to divide europe from the united states. >> talking about-- >> well, info wars and also cyber attacks on our structures, on secure systems, on what the ukrainians are doing on the battlefield. what is nato doing about it? nato started first and foremost protecting its own frame works, that was number one. and cyber domain which happened in 2016, as you noted. from there, last year, we built a virtual cyber response capability under which an ally that is under attack can knock on nato's door and say what's available here in terms of i need forensic's help. i need help patching a system. i've got part of my government that's off line. what can nato provide me on the

fly and there we have this virtual response, almost like a chinese venue, a whole array of options that you can hand to an ally and say this is available for you today. >> have you enacted this and made use of it so far? >> well, yes. i don't want to get into details about that, but, yeah, we've put it to good use and now, at this summit, what we're also going to be focused on. we're going to have four or five new cyber deliverables at the washington summit. we're working at building capacity across the alliance. as you know better than anyone, we have nato members that are best in class when it comes to preventing, deterring, detecting cyber attacks and we have allies that are catching up. so we want to bring the capacity of all allies up to the same level when it comes to counter defense. >> of your nato members, the

u.s. and britain have pretty extensive offensive cyber capability written about over many years. do you envision nato having an offensive capability as well? >> we're not talking about that as a structure. >> okay. >> let's turn a little, you've raised the chinese cooperation with the russians in cyber, but obviously, it's much broader than that. i would say one of the surprises of this era is that the partnership without limits, and turns out president xi and president putin is one of the dynamics of super power conflict now and it's also what nixon and kissinger spent decades or years, anyway, trying to avoid, opening the nature one. two years into this, because that was announced at the olympics in-- or just before the olympics.

>> that's right. >> prior to the invasion in 2022, how do you assess the level of chinese and russian cooperation? and i guess i'll throw the iranians in as well because obviously they've been providing a lot of battlefield help, drone help, to the russians. >> yes. and let's not forget dprk as well. i mean, the amount of assistance that the dprk has provided to their friends in russia has also had a major impact. >> talking artillery, missiles. i think it has had an impact, why don't we leave it there and certainly something that the allies increasingly talk about, but this brings us back to the theme that i mentioned earlier. why does nato invest so much, or why is nato investing so

much in the partnerships with japan, australia, new zealand, what russia is doing in this moment. we can talk about the prc, not direct lethal support, but indication they're providing some sort of material source through dual use components and we talk about that through the alliance and with our indoe pacific partners as you noted the iranian piece as well where they've provided a whole array of very effective lethal drones to their friends. >> the u.s. has been doing a lot to try to -- and to try to interrupt that supply chain for the drones. sanctions of many kind and so forth. how effective is that being? do you think there's been any impact on the iranian ability to produce? i know they're now trying to produce iranian factories in russia. >> yeah, we do believe there

has been an impact. it's an ongoing project for the transatlantic partners. the sanctions piece obviously isn't handled by the -- i'm sure they could tell you why the last two years have been incredibly transformative for the u.s.-eu leadership because of what happened in ukraine. the amount of work that we've done with the european union on sanctions on support for our friends in ukraine has also been just absolutely remarkable, but back to your question about the prc and russia, we do find ourselves across the alliance increasingly grappling with the question of how do we draw attention, each of us, bilaterally in our relationship with the prc to call them out on this material support, to apply pressure not to provide that kind of support and make

sure that they understand the consequences if they continue down this path and i think it's been a very effective area of work for all the transatlantic partners. we're seeing many countries across europe be much more forth coming in calling out the chinese for this no limits partnership with russia, but also, for their political support to what russia is doing in ukraine and that material support that i just mentioned. >> the core of the nato security guarantees since nato's creation 75 years ago, has basically been the american nuclear deterrent. and yet, we have seen in the past two years a revival of nuclear threats that are worrisome. i describe in the book the scare in october of 2022 when you and your colleagues were quite concerned, in fact, some

of your colleagues said 50-50 chance that russia would detonate a battlefield nuclear weapon in ukraine. first, tell us a little about how that experience may have been transforming for the nato members. were they as fully aware as the u.s. was of the nature of this threat? and then, let's talk a little about how it may be changing the way that nato is thinking about nuclear strategy. >> well, yeah, a couple of things on that. first, when we rewrote the concept in 2022, you see when you read the document, nuclear deterrence remains the backbone of nato's deterrent policy, no question. our wording is very, very clear as long as nato exists, that's not going anywhere and i think the language on that is crystal clear, but i think you're right

to point out with the war in ukraine and all of its nuclear saber rattling that we've seen on the part of president putin, we now have gotten into kind of almost a review of what nuclear deterrence involves. what it means, we're working day in, day out to move our nuclear iq. just the whole theory of deterrence, i would say, came back to the forefront, and we're back where nato started 75 years ago. obviously, we take what putin says seriously and the u.s. was able to share more with our allies to help them understand what we were seeing, but honestly, it's what putin has been saying that's gotten everyone's attention. he's been very public about this and medvedev has been outspoken on ukraine. and not as much recently.

in the early stages of the war we talked about the potential use of tactical nuclear weapons and so you can imagine what the reaction was around the alliance. we were deeply concerned. at the same time, i think the u.s. made it very clear, publicly, but also privately with our closest allies that we didn't see any clear indication that the russians were actually preparing to use nuclear weapons. not then, not now. and so, we take this nuclear cyber rattling seriously. we continue to monitor the situation. we're in close contact with aum of our allies up and down the eastern flank, obviously, gravely concerned about this prospect, but we have also one, reassured our allies about what we were seeing, whether or not anything-- we were seeing any signs of weapons being moved closer to the border, but also just the need to continually warn the

russians that there would be serious-- i think jake sullivan said catastrophic consequences should russia opt to do so. >> well, that october, 2022 incident that president biden compared to the fundraiser in nuclear and want to hear him as his most candid was a pretty serious moment. they did not move nuclear weapons, they did hear commanders discussing possibility and that made a big difference. a last question for you as we think out about the summit that is coming forward. there are the assurances that you can put on paper. there are the capabilities that you can build and you've described to us how you're doing that, but the political

atmosphere makes a big difference to allies' conviction that the u.s. would be there should they need to invoke article five. you've heard what one candidate said publicly about what he would do if somebody hadn't made, you know, paid up. i assume he meant, but it's hard to know the 2%, but separate and apart from candidate trump's, you know, arguments, there is in europe today in part because of our own hesitance in passing the ukraine bill and all that, a questioning about whether or not the political body of the united states is as committed to nato as it was before. the republican party has several prominent members who have expressed their doubts, both about aid to ukraine and

some about nato. they may be just voicing noise out here and i suspect the majority of the party still has its old views. this must be a problem that both drives you crazy and you can't do anything about. [laughter] >> because all you can work is on the capability side not the political will side. >> well, that's not entirely true. i think it's on all of us, those of us that work on nato issues to continue to make the case and last year i traveled throughout my home state, the state of michigan to have conversations with the governor, with a variety of student groups. i went to both university of michigan, michigan state. i was able to do talk radio, do a lot of outreach to try and answer those questions about why do we still have the nato alliance and why should we keep supporting ukraine. and i'm heading off to ohio tomorrow to do the same thing. so some of it's out of my

control and i was sure were you going to ask this question, but here is what i say when i get this question frequently. so there's two concerns about the united states that you hear on the other side of the atlantic. one is, are you going to get the supplemental done or is u.s. support for ukraine over? is it now on us? will europeans have to take over and provide the remaining assistance to ukraine? and two, can we count on seven more decades of u.s. presidents of all political stripes standing up and committing and supporting the nato alliance? and i think my answer on both fronts is pretty optimistic. one, i think that we have visitors coming through from congress almost every week, delegations that are made up of republicans and democrats travelling together and all i here from them time and time again is we're going to get the supplemental done and we need to continue funneling support.

there's a broad base of support in the house, in the senate, it's bipartisan to continue supporting ukraine. there are members in the house, we all know, that are skeptical, don't want to see the supplemental go through, but by and large when that vote comes to the floor, we're confident that we're going to get it. >> to get it to the floor. >> have to get it to the floor. that's the challenge. two, on broad u.s. support for the alliance, i'll say public opinion data, actually the most recent poll that came out showed that u.s. support for the nato alliance is up. it seems that folks increasingly understand why this alliance serves u.s. interests and why it serves our allies interest and that bumper stickers that we say a lot, stronger together. isn't just the bumper sticker, it's the truth. coping with ukraine is something that we need to do with 50 other countries around the world in terms of providing valuable security assistance. coping with instability elsewhere in the world requires

us to work with our closest allies and partners, it's not just ukraine. i think that fundamentally americans understand the value of alliances and the importance of the nato alliance in particular. but also, i'll say, when i travel around the united states and encounter americans in places far away from washington d.c., i think, again, there is this kind of bipartisan support that it's-- nato is not a partisan issue. it always, i suppose, has the risk of going in that direction like any foreign policy subject, but from where i sit right now, whether i'm travelling across the united states or engaging with delegations in congress, or doing press interviews with talk radio outlets, i mean, i think nato enjoys a privileged place in american foreign policy that by and large, the majority of americans understand why it was created

and why it's still relevant 70 years later and that's what we're going to be trying to do at the summit this summer. >> all right, if people would like to line up and, i think what we're going to do is probably take two questions at a time, since our time is short. the ambassador revealed-- and of course, the depth of her diplomatic skills that she went to both michigan and michigan state doing this. >> outreach, speeches. i didn't study at both. >> no, i understand that. >> now it's nice-- . even just attending the two for a day tells you if your skilled here. why don't we take the first two questions here. >> thank you. so, jason davidson from the university of mary washington and the atlantic council. last week the secretary-general confirmed that at the washington summit the aliens will put forward its first southern flank strategy.

now, some people would look at that and say, well the alliance has a really big problem on the eastern flank, why is it messing around on the southern flank. so could you say a little about why the alliance and why the united states should care about the southern flank of the alliance and what specifically you would like to see in the southern flank strategy at the washington summit? >> great. and let's take the one behind you? >> i find it an interesting discussion and on sanctions. i was wondering when you came to the point of the sanctions effectiveness. so actually when you would talk about sanction effectiveness, it comes to my mind and we do research, also, how effective sanctions are about evasion. because russia is evading sanctions with the use of many, many countries, especially from the former soviet block, central asia and china, you know. and what is the philosophy that

you have. how is addressed at the nato level and the u.s. government level? i'm from center of political and global strategies. >> great. so, let me start with the south. it was a good question. you know, we have kind of a phrase that we use around the nato alliance that we have a 360 degree approach, which means that the alliance is not exclusively focused on the north atlantic or its southern flank or its eastern flank, that we simultaneously try to take on all of those areas, and those new regional plans that i mentioned in my remarks actually divides the-- all nato territory into three different regions and there is a region, general kavoli can say more on this, nato south, how to address any potential

forms of instability or attack on nato's southern flank. but there is a question on the table and that is while the alliance is focused on the war in ukraine, what more can the alliance be doing to address some of the potential challenges or threats that emanate from the south. and there, there's a whole array of things to talk about and it won't surprise you to hear that our southern member states from portugal and spain to greece and turkey, italy, a whole array of countries want to see the alliance fortify its initiatives in this area. late last year we appointed a group of experts, a small group of policy makers and academics with deep experience in handling some of those southern challenges. and they just recently came to the nato alliance and presented us with over 100 different ideas of what the alliance could do to move out and

strengthen its deterrents and effects and the way it protects the southern flank. now, nato is in the middle of debating those over 100 recommendations and there are a lot of good ideas there. there are small things and bigger, ambitious initiatives. between now and july, they'll settle on a handful of initiatives that enable us to deliver on something for the south. and as i noted, also, earlier, there's two chief threats that we're facing inside the nato alliance, russia and terrorism and so we want to ensure that nato continues to do good work in both of those spaces, fortifying its deterrents to encounter those threats. i don't want to get into where the u.s. position is on those 100 plus recommendations and i really can't get into the details of that because we are literally right in the middle

of debating all of those good recommendations, but you're right to note that the alliance will have something more to say about its southern flank and the reason i think that's important, i think why the secretary-general thinks it's important is to showcase to any would-be adversary or actor that we are prepared for all contingencies. this is the alliance that can walk and chew gum at the same time. as i said, nato is addressing what's happening in ukraine, but simultaneously moving out on an array of new initiatives. on the sanctions question, i mean, again, nato doesn't take on sanctions per se, this is not part of our chief work inside the alliance, so, i'm hesitant to get into it. i will say that we believe that the unprecedented sanctions that both europe and the united

states have imposed since the start of the war, has had an impact. there are instances where we see evasion and we continue to work with our closest partners in europe through the g7 and u.s. relationship and other bilateral rips to get at the heart of that to prevent it from happening and remains a key feature of what we work on with our transatlantic partner, but we believe the sanctions that have been put on the table since the war started have left the russians with 400 billion dollars less than they would have normally to put towards this military operation, and the fact that the russians are now turning to countries like the dprk or iran or the prc for capabilities and technologist says a lot about what the west has been able to do to shut off the flow of potential

components that could help them pursue this war. >> by the way, this, we're hearing upwards of half of it. >> there are instances where we see a significant level of what they provided actually, not, not working, no. >> two more here and then i think that maybe brings us to the end. make the questions short and crisp, we're running down on time a little bit. >> hi, i'm a graduate here. my question is to do with defense procurement. the edict last month to increase the role, and one of the issues that european member states, while they are nato standards they each apply layer their national requirements onto those procurements, so, 13 different national varients, which respects supply chains, nato logistics, ability to mobilize and fight together.

i was wondering how nato is approaching not just expanding the defense industrial bails and procurement, but also seeking to better align capabilities to sort of stepping on each other's feet. >> okay. and one more question there. >> all right. my name is greg morris, i'm a historian with the department of state. the question is, the u.s. withdrawal from afghanistan in 2022. what impact did it have with u.s. relations with other nato allies and was there an impact here regarding intelligence sharing in the months leadup to the start of the war in ukraine regarding u.s. intelligence sharing with allies? thank you. >> so on that question, you'll remember that i mentioned that i was confirmed in late november of 2021. so i actually was here at the

state department serving as a senior advisor to secretary blinken throughout most of 2021. i was not inside the nato alliance at the time during the withdrawal from afghanistan and i feel like i'm probably not the best person positioned to talk about that. on the question of fragmenttation across europe's industrial base and the associated challenges that we're seeing as a result of underinvestment over many decades, i mean, this is a challenge that nato is going to have to work on very closely with the european union and we were pleased to see the european union recently roll out a european defense industrial strategy. it's a very interesting piece of work that clearly, very clearly articulates the

challenges that europe faces for the foreseeable future when it comes to building up its defense industrial base and getting at duplication, some of the challenges, the fragmenttation, that were mentioned by the individual that asked the question. we do, however, want to ensure that as of european union thinks about taking on a variety of new initiatives to build out defense production and build capacity, that it relies on nato's standards. the last thing we want to see is for the european union to establish its own set of standards. we would then have situations where countries are looking at their own national standards and requirements, they're looking at what nato is deliver mandated through nato membership and a new aspect with it, for the european union

potentially putting a different set of standards. the european union is reassuring us they would rely on the standards and we want to keep it that way and encourage our friends in the european union at least in the short-term as they look and address the shortfalls that we address at the top that it continues to look at noneu member states for ways to backfill. now, i understand why the european union wants to focus on eu members and building up their defense industrial base in europe, but we have to work together. we have to find ways to aggregate demand. we have to look at multinational solutions that will help us produce faster and get more for ourselves and into the hands of our friends in ukraine. >> well, thank you. i've got a list of more questions, but we are running out of time. so, we will have to save them for the run-up to the nato summit or something like that.

but i thank you for spending all of this time both in your prepared remarks and your very candid answers here and i hope that we've given the-- a good startoff for what looks like a really promising and interesting day. >> thank you very much, david and thanks to all of you for coming out this morning. thanks to georgetown university and i hope the rest of the day goes well. thank you. [applause]