the house and senate floors to congressional hearings, party briefings and committee meetings. c-span gives you a front row seat to how issues are debated and decided with no commentary, no interruptions and completely unfiltered. c-span, your unfiltered view of government. >> up next, the house armed service subcommittee on strategic forces hears testimony on president biden's 2025 missiles program budget request. they have questions on hyper sonic technology and global threats facing the united states.

>> the meeting will come to order. thank you all for being here. thank you for your patience. while we finish the votes series the last few minutes. first of all i'm going to have you that nonsubcommittee members be able to participate in today's meeting. is there any objection? if not, so ordered. so subcommittee nonsubcommittee members will be recognized at the appropriate time for five minutes. welcome to our hearing and thank you witnesses for being here. we have mr. john hill, the deputy assistant secretary of defense for space and missile defense policy. joining him, we have lieutenant

thomas james, deputy general of the u.s. space command. and lieutenant general sean gainey, the commander of u.s. army, space and missile defense command. the subcommittee meet today to review the year's budget request for missile defense capabilities. i have a number of concerns right off the bat here. first, the overall level of funning is inadequate given today's threat environment. the fiscal year 25 budget requests $10.4 billion for the missile defense agency. that is more than $400 million less than last year and almost a billion less than projected in last years. i want to reiterate this point. the fis equal year 25 budget request for the missile defense agency is $960 billion, almost a billion below the level planned for in last year's budget.

puts, these draconian cuts are not limited to just fiscal year 25. the outyear spending projections including in this budget. compared to the spending plan and the budget submitted last year it forecasts cutting over $2.6 billion in missile defense funding between year 25 and 28. to achieve these cuts, this budget would make selve concerning decisions including terminating the production line for sm3 block 1b. eliminated competition by pre-prematurely down selecting on the next generation interceptor and glide phase interceptor programs. i know we'll get into these issues in greater detail but in case of the glide phase interceptor, it is important to know this down selection is

occurring five years earlier than planned and before the preliminary design review is even held. i'm extremely concerned that we will simply not have enough sufficient technical data to make an informed choice between competing concepts for this program. it is the only capability in development specifically designed to combat the growing hypersonic threats we face. it is vitally important to our national security that we get this program right. that is why congressman dated in sections 1666 of last year's defense authorization bill that this budget would do the opposite. overall i'm concerned these decisions simply accept too much risk. and that missile defense appears to have become a bill payer for other capabilities in this

budget. this is difficult to understand given the growth in missile threats, the extremely high demand for missile defense capabilities from combatant commanders and the visible evidence of the value these capabilities bring to the fight on full display as we speak in the sea and in israel and ukraine. i look forward to hearing more from our witnesses about how they budget impacts their programs and their assessment of the risks contained in this budget. with that, i turn to the ranking member for his opening remarks. >> i thank mr. chairman. i'll just begin by echoing many of your concerns. this is obviously a time when missile defense is in use all around the globe including by the united states, in great quantity. this is not a technology that seems to be fading away. my biggest concern is that i just don't understand the rational behind many of these

cuts. now, i have asked a lot of tough questions of leaders like yourself, mr. hill in particular about the purpose of hyper sonics inform in that same vein, we don't understand what the concept is to use hyper sonics that makes it hard to understand the money we're spending on it. likewise as the chairman said, if we doafnt understand the rational behind these cuts it becomes very hard to support them, especially in this environment. i want to welcome both lieutenant general james and lieutenant general collins as this is the first opportunity to testify in front of the subcommittee in your new roles. lieutenant general james, space manned's role is increasing in importance and consequence and given ha space command was recently given responsibility for department level missile defense coordination it is critical that you and we understand the complex strategic role missile defense plays in our national security. you are the first army space space operator to reach the rank

of lieutenants general, so you must be doing something right. fa40's have been a part of the department and this milestone is well overdue. congratulations. lieutenant general collins, your unique background across the spectrum of eventually thetic programs makes you well prepared to be director of the missile defense agency. i am encouraged by our discussion tas it is imperative we understand the policy that they are developing before we blindly build new systems that result in destabilization miscalculations andesque flying nuclear war. as shift to the topic of today's hearing i want to remind the subcommittee that missile defense has a mixed legacy and continues to pose difficult questions about what its purpose is and should be under what conditions it actually makes us safer and how much and what kind

of it we need. that's why these questions including what the chairman started with are so important. as laid out last year there, five basic scenarios or levels which we consider using or not using missile defense. a graphic i will use to frame the rest of my remarks. the highest level has been long standing policy across nearly administration that we are not and will not pursue missile defense to defeat a nuke attack. going down this road would be incredibly destabilizing, technically challenging and prohibitively expensive. until we can safely rid the world of all nuclear weapons which i believe is ultimately necessary for the survival of humanity itself. we can neither unilaterally disarm or render useless the arsenalling. if we were to try renner them

incapable, they would develop new more complex missile to defeat those systems. it sounds like crazy concept when you first read about it but it has kept us safe. the fourth level of this defense is area where there is the most debate. the missile defense over the past two decades since pulling out of the treaty has provided a greater security blanket over aspiring powers like north korea and iran. they have expanded their nuclear arsenals, we must continually valts when we view them as more of a strategic level threat and rely on policy of deterrents. if we decide to continue to outpace their bullistic missile eck pans, the question is how do russia and china respond? i have argued that they will see that dwroat as directly

affecting the credibility of their own nuclear forces which may have dire unintended consequences. anna: today's discussion you can help us understand how the department continues to weigh those guess that balance. as this subcommittee evaluates this year's budget request and the continued missile defense policy and posture of the united states we m.s. understand these implications for ensuring the strategic eighth ability of america and the world for decades to come. aside from the system required to deal with it is very different but continues to have capability against a small but accidental launch should be maintained. the tactical level, the support ukraine has received has enabled them to fight back against near non-stop russian missile attacks for the past three years. this body cannot get its act together to pass the supplemental. this is the area in which

ukraine will suffer the most. in the red sea, we are seeing what many thought was not possible. multinational coordinated effective missile defense. obviously this is using a lot of missiles which is one of the questions we have about reducing the budget. while u.s. navy ships have been at the center of defending deployed forces from a wide range of bullistic missile threats they have been working across a multinational task force. the french, german and u.k. navies have all intercepted in the red sea. something the chairman and i have been pursuing aggressively and no one can deny the incredible impact today's incredible defense systems are having in the middle east. finally at the foundation level, simply detecting these threats, we still have much work too to do. this past year has mark many successes. in february, the tracking space center prototypes wered and the

budget supports their ongoing to testing through 2027. the space development agency launched their wyle wide field of centers replacing the legacy big juicy satellites currently on orbit. as we evaluate this regres missile defense programs i'll i will don't ask the questions. how will it impact strategic ability tomorrow? we are already in an arms race. will it make our world for safe and does each investment stabilize or destabilize our strategic national security? these are the questions we must ask ourselves on the subcommittee not just with this year's budget and the ndaa but in term determine howling our decisions will impact the world we leave our children. thanks, mr. chairman. i yield back. >> thank you. we will move to the opening statements from our witnesses. your statements will be made

part of the record but you'll each have five minutes to make some opening remarks. mr. hill, let's begin with you. >> thank you. thank you distinguished members of the subcommittee for the opportunity to testify today. thank you as well for including my full statement in the record. in brief, my written statement surveys developments in a deteriorating security environment. it stresses the unmistakable centrality of missiles of all types including u.a.s. in modern warfare and underscores missile defense and missile defeat capabilities to deterring aggression and defending our hole land and our forces deployed around the world and our allies and partners and highlights how those allies and partners have come to similar conclusions on increasing their own investments and working with us to meet these challenges together. missiles' defense budget request for philadelphia year 2025

includes $2.8 billion for missile defense and missile defeat program. the strong support this subcommittee has shown for missile defense and missile defeat efforts for many years and i stand ready to work with you to pass defense authorization legislation for fiscal year 2025, the 64th consecutive year and with all of congress to pass on time defense appropriations legislation for fiscal year 2025. today, i must also emphasize perhaps more than anything else, the critical urgency of passing the national security supplemental request which congress has now had for nearly six months. that request includes desperately needed fund, funding to support ukraine and defending its democratic sovereignty and n its very existence against russia's illegal and ruthless

invasion including relentless barrages of missiles an uas attacks. funding to support israel against the rocket attacks by hamas and other groups aligned with iran. funding to provide critical humanitarian assistance in ukraine, israel and gaza where innocent civilians are dying every day. funding to prevent deterring e aggression by the people's rep of china and funding for our own splice and how do you know i guesses and material we have had to draw down meet the needs of allice an partners and funding for the american industrial base and workforce that is producing these how do you know i guesses and weapons systems including weapons -- munitions and weapons defense systems. chairman, distinguished members of this subcommittee very simply, there is no time for

delay. the time to act is now. i cannot overemphasize, i cannot overemphasize the critical importance of congress coming together in common purpose and passing the national security supplemental e quest. thank you again for convening this crucially important timely hearing. thank you for your attention and thank you each and every one of you for what you do for your nation >> thank you, lieutenant general. >> thank you distinguish members of the committee. i appreciate your continued strong support for missile defense and look forward to the questions today. i would like to start out by thanking the men and women behind the development missile defense system that i represent today. our mda family and the operators of the system, all key partners in this no failed mission. as you mentioned, chairman, we

are requesting $10.4 billion to deploy missile defenses and improve missile defenses inc. -- with diverse and dangerous missile threats. our priority -- prioritization from accept lines -- make -- maximize capability and readiness. we continue to work closely with our services to help prepare them to fight for the fight of today and tomorrow. to homeland from ballistic nessel attacks, it remains our nations sole protection from limited attacks with the primary focus being the advancing north korean threat. the ongoing ground-based interceptor gpi service life extension program will continue to improve the gbi reliability and will help mitigate risks until the next generation interceptor is fielded by the end of 2028. after 20 years it stands ready and is shown in december of 2023 when we successfully executed a intercept flight test using the

two three stage selectable ground-based interceptor in two state mode first. demonstrating increased engagement battles. we plan to deploy the capability to the entire fleet by the end of this year. the mgi program remains on track. both contractors have successfully executed polemic during designer views or pdr's and mda's preparing in the near future to complete a best value determination and select a single company to continue mgi development, testing production and fielding. soon we plan to add the long-range discrimination radar to the operation capability baselined by the december of this year. it delivered to the government last month will enhance tracking discrimination and hit assessment against long-range missile threats. this base force and nda are in the process of formally declaring lrd are ready for space object detection later this month. for regional defense they design

improvements to the ballistic missile defense capability and procures the standard missile three glock to a missiles. the fy 2025, we will test and deliver spy one radar upgrades and support the future demonstrations. we will continue u.s. terminal high altitude aerial defense interceptor procurement, fielding and training support along with reliability of cybersecurity. in collaboration with the u.s. army, we have fielded the 4.0 capability to batteries in korea and dark while men are in the process of fielding it to the all remaining bad batteries by the end of 2025. it integrates patriot capabilities with them to create patriot engagement opportunities. we will begin design work to improve the system to take on ever advancing regional threats. the department continues development of a three hundred succeeded relay or of missile defense capability for guam. nda construction on the joint

command center in tipi why six radar study will begin in fiscal year 2025. by the end of this year we will execute a flight experiment with the sm3 glock to a against the medium-range ballistic missile target controlled with the initial guam system using the first tipi why six unit. looking forward, they continue to pursue into end capabilities for the challenge posed by hypersonic threats. today, our terminal defense protect and enforces the short from hypersonic threats. working with the navy we anticipate capabilities in fiscal year 2025. the interceptor program or weapons system will enable defense against hypersonic light threats. by the end of fy 2024, in coordination with our future international partner japan, nda

will elect a design to complete development. we will continue to develop the mature gbi capability and support development of that interceptor with japan. on detection and tracking part as mentioned by the ranking member, we launched the hypersonic end ballistic tracking space center or the prototype satellites in february to demonstrate fire control solutions against hypersonic maneuvering threats. following successful demonstration, the responsibility for fielding it like fire control capabilities will be transferred to space force. i am honored by this opportunity and look forward to your questions. like thank you, lieutenant general. >> chairman, ranking member and distinguish members of this subcommittee, i am honored to testify before you and represent this incredible one team organization of 2000 300 soldiers and civilians spanning 13 time zones and 19 locations worldwide. these professionals provide

space, high-altitude and missile defense forces and advanced capabilities to the army and joint war fighter. i am honored to represent them and i thank you for your unwavering support for this team and their families. in january, i took command of the u.s. army space and missile defense command and joint functional component command for integrated air and missile. also acting as the senior commander for both for really allows god and u.s. army garrison. additionally, i also serve as the army's lead enterprise integrator for air and missile defense add my organization provides operational level missile defense expertise and integrates trends regional functions across the joint and combined fighting force. as the army's air and missile defense enterprise integrator. today i will use this role to leverage and highlight the army air and missile defense remains the army's most heavily deployed

force with the highest signal amongst the commands every year. this continues to provide a significant strain on our formations and our families and we must continue to address their needs. as you know, the urgency for multi-domain trends regional combat affects continues to increase exponentially. our air and missile defense related threats have rapidly expanded in recent years in quantity, variety and sophistication. lastly expanding the space r&d, instigating cyber attacks and test complex missile systems. we see this today in ukraine and living on the horizon in the pacific. it has never been more imperative that we and our allies and partners enhance our missile defense and space give abilities to impose costs our adversaries denying them the benefits of using these weapons and ensuring the safeguard of our nation. as our adversaries increase their emphasis on space and

missile capabilities, the u.s. army grows in kind. in december, the secretary and chief of staff of the army and the sergeant major of the army signed the army space division supporting multi-domain operations, specifying the army's role in integrating space capabilities and coalition operations also interdicting the space capabilities of adversaries. it is also increasingly apparent that integrating our space operations and missile defense operations is a critical importance to our national security. our integration is essential to effectively contribute to strategic deterrence and responding crisis. what worked for yesterday's military must evolve. today we must integrate space and missile defense at the very onset of our prototyping concept develop an application and we do it all in concert with our army joy and coalition partners one voice together around the globe.

our allies and partners are critical for layered and tears up -- tiered operations to defeat adversaries. integrating technology and protect our mutual homelands. but all these operational considerations pale in comparison to the will, determination and the trust the amazing men and women that operate and sustain these advanced systems. these soldiers and their families make life altering sacrifices to serve across the globe. thank you for your efforts in supporting them with timely budgets, caring for them and their family, and building trust with the american people now and in the years to come. caring for our soldiers and their family is paramount to win any environment around the globe. thank you for your support, supporting such an incredible mission, i look forward to addressing your questions. thank you. >> lieutenant general james barry >> good morning chairman, ranking member and distinguished

members of the subcommittee. it is an honor to be here today representing the general in the nearly 18,000 soldiers, sailors, marines, airmen, guardians, civilians and contractors of the united states space command. our expertly trained workforce remains our most valuable asset. as you have heard from our distinguished colleagues here on the panel, our strategic competitors, offense of missile systems are significantly increasing in capability and scale. it will challenge our ability to conduct operations in protect and defend u.s. and our allies. our competitors are rapidly devolving, diversifying and proliferating their advanced missiles and technologies. hypersonic vehicles and cruise missiles pose diverse threats that will complicate our missile defense missions. in april 2023, the unified command plan assigned the united states space command with the responsibility for trends regional defense planning and operational support.

that decision was the culmination of a conference of studying alignment with numerous policy documents and with the 2022 missile defense review. this was a natural fit given our unified command plan responsibilities, such as space operations and global management as the missile offense mission continues to converge with the space mission. part of the transition to support missions including alignment of the proponent command for integrated missile defense under u.s. space command commanded by my good friend, lieutenant sean gainey. they ensure the continued execution of the responsibilities during the transition without any mission degradation. the united states space command have integrated that command structures and processes to further optimize the execution of critical missions. as the global sensor manager, u.s. space is responsible for planning, managing and overseeing the operations of all space awareness.

missile defense and warning sensors. our terrestrial centers are critical enablers that combat command and national level military command centers. missile warning and missile defense have awareness mission simultaneously. space provides alert for the launch from anywhere on the planet. they provide this to our national leaders, the national military command system, combating commands and select international partners. u.s. space, employees have a partnered or purged our operations that expands operations to sensors and operations. this includes our combined space operation commercial integration cell, international space defense centers, commensurate with the department a published space strategy. it also includes 14 allied partners that are fully integrated into our space and may operations. . it is vital that we keep pace

with the emerging threats and technologies while ensuring our architecture remains optimized and modernized. while we pursue integrating new capabilities, we must fill aggressively leverage and integrate our legacy centers in support of our missile warning and functions today. it's part of a comprehensive missile defeat strategy. continued funding for research and development for the next generation of space station in terrestrial sensors is critical. to keep pace with the competitors in the potential adversaries that we face today. these capabilities must be resilient and we must be able to defend in space to maintain missile assurance for the joint force. the 2022 missile defense review states, it is a strategic imperative the united states to continue investments and innovation in the development of full-spectrum missile defeat capabilities to maintain deterrence and offer protection while heading against uncertainty. consistent with the missile

defense review that it must enact a full range of capabilities to counter advanced missiles and hyper threats across the spectrum of conflict. u.s. space command services, allies and inter-agencies and commercial partners stands ready to perform our unified command responsibilities to maintain and expand our competitive advantage. u.s.-based, appreciate's congress continued support as we ensure the delivery of space-based capabilities and achieve our foundational moral responsibility to protect the joint force, the nations, and our allies through all levels of competition and conflict. i have submitted my statement for the record. thank you and i look forward to your questions. >> thank you. we will now go to questions from the panel. -- from the committee. general, as i talked about in my opening statement, i'm concerned about the interceptor. last year the program planned to

continue development and to maintain competition between two industry teams for at least another five years. a preliminary design review was planned for 2029 with the potential downselect petition following pdr. now the program is planning to select a single contractor this year without the development activity to prove out new technologies and with a lot less information. first, competition in a program reduces risk, drives innovation and helps ensure the government is getting a good value. wouldn't you say that is a fair statement? >> mr. chairman, as a career acquisition officer, competition within an acquisition strategy does bite down risk heaps both teams sharp throughout the acquisition and it's a best practice within the department, yes, sir. >> thank you.

how concerned are you then than making a down select decision this early in the program will increase risk? >> sir, that is a job we will be attacking greatly now with the decision that will be coming later this fiscal year. there are other mechanisms to manage competition and risk within a program lower than the prime level. we will be looking forward to keeping the program on pace and based on section 1666 look for opportunities to bring hypersonic capability to the fight much sooner. with the gbi program as established today, working with our soon international partner japan will continue to look for opportunities to buy down that risk judiciously their potential with competition at a lower level at the component or subsystem level. >> okay. let's dive a little more into

that. what concrete steps, you've already alluded to some, can we take to mitigate this risk or to give ourselves options if technology development doesn't go as planned? >> much of this, as part of, as part of the decision to come with down selecting, we are intimates upgrading acquisition strategy and finalizing the decision criteria for making this decision. part of that will be finalizing and taking a look at how to establish the program and going forward, depending on the selection and the risk associate with that particular crime, we will enough to take a look at with the prime the steps that would be taken. each prime has a different set of risks based on their designs in that we tested specifically identifying based on the decision which one would drive what decisions and actions we would take going forward. >> well, i still am concerned.

i know that you will do your best to play the hand of cards that you have been dealt, but able to an concerned about this. i just think we are taking on much risk that we otherwise would be able to mitigate through continuing the competition more into the future. this leads to my next set of questions about the program schedule. you would think if the program had advanced sufficiently and technology is mature enough for the government to select a single prime contractor five years earlier than originally planned, that we would be in a position to accelerate the schedule. but it looks like the opposite is happening. in last years hearing your predecessor admiral hill and i discussed the program schedule and now delivering a capability in 2034 was not adequate. he agreed and said, quote, out

in the mid-30s is almost irrelevant. we are not meeting the threat, unquote. but this year's budget would add additional delay and now does not anticipate deploying a capability into 2035. do you share add molehills view that this makes it irrelevant -- admiral hill's view that this makes it irrelevant to go into the future? >> sir, i deathly agree with waiting 11 used to bring hypersonic lipase capability to the war fighter, is too long. and looking into options within the gbi program and other options that could bring an interim capability sooner. we do have a requirement to come back with those options to you and we're working through that in a report, will be provided by september that goes through those different option spaces both within the gbi program and broader across the missile-defense enterprise to try to get any capability we can

out of the weapon systems we have and also into the future with the gbi program. >> what can you tell us in the setting for the record that you would do specifically. you already alluded to the intention to try to accelerate some things, but what are concrete steps that you going to be able to take or plan to take? >> yes, sir. right off the bat, one is we begins with both of our primes the riff on the gbi program today to identify opportunities that they see within their industry space and the broader enterprises to come up with acceleration options that we could be taking within the program, within the gbi program. otherwise i'm also looking across that of the weapon systems that we have in place today to understand what, if any, residual capability they may have and/or what potential

developments, smaller developers could we take within those of the weapon systems that could bring some type of residual capability or interim capability to the fight. >> thank you. i work in my questions there but i will just quickly summarize my concerns. this budget as proposed cuts in funding, delays the schedule and adds risk to the acquisition approach. i understand it will save some dollars and is cheaper but i'm just not sure it will even lead to success in the long run much less address the threats in the meantime. without a turn to the ranking member for any questions he might have. >> thank you, mr. chairman. i certainly share some of the same concerns. lieutenant collins, the f-35 and north group summon stenotic symbols of programs effectively and zero competition and are grossly over budget, and grossly behind schedule. you have extensive acquisition experience. can you cite example of a broken

the benefited from down selecting and reducing competition early? we has such a reduction fielded better technology faster and reduced cost? >> ranking member moulton, thank you for that question. >> well, i think the silence speaks volumes. let's move on. mr. hill, the department indicated cancellation of the sm three block one was done in part to purchase more sm three block to a. will set aside the are no additional two ways in this budget request and focus on the policy issues i continue to raise. is it accurate to say block 1b b is solely a regional missile-defense asset? >> sm three block 1b is a regional missile-defense. it is medium-range sprays also act as a sm three block two has been proven to intercept an icbm range of threats, the type of

threat designed to be handled by the ground-based midcourse defense system? >> i believe it's been shown to be able to intercept at that beginning edge, but the operational concept for it as a regional defense missile that is bolted for medium-range speeders i'm asking that if the builders. >> i believe as a test there that was done. >> a very long way of saying yes. so my question is, was there a policy evaluation done on how or adversaries to include china-russian north korea would respond to a further increase of sm-3 block 2a which a capability can strategic missile in lieu of the 1b variant which does not? >> yeah, that was done before my time doing this but i think the implications of the sm-3 2a

which are being deployed in fleet of different places around the world is not something that should logically cause china or russia to have any concerns from a strategic stability perspective. >> if you could provide a report to the committee it would be helpful. you said there was some analysis done. >> no, the decision, the decision on the test was before i was doing the missile-defense business. i was talking about the history that was done at there. >> the point is what matters are for strategic stability is that just what we think is perfectly logical of what our enemies think. we have to consider these concerns when we're making these budgetary decisions. sm-3 block 2as have important role but the quantities we're covered by are about one-third of what was intended for the 1b. if we suddenly reversed that an triple our 2a, we could and bolder adversaries do further

proliferate advance the technology tech told you with a numbing make a regional defense posture weaker at the time were regional missile-defense is of prime importance but also impacts strategic stability at their strategic level. i get the sense this decision was not thought through on operational is is. general collins from your perspective is a future navy fleet equipment or merely sm-6 interceptors and some sm-3 2a interceptors with the direction you see the threat going? >> sir, ranking member moulton, good question. what i would take is i i woule concerned with the capacity capabilities that are in the fleet and our ability to support with enough 2as going forward moving the capacity from that production line today. >> well, we obviously share those concerns. general collins come has in the a complete analysis of the

impacts on this decision on its ability to support and sustain the current inventory of what meet the needs of allies and support the navy's requirements? have that analysis been completed? >> we've not completed that analysis. we have been waiting for the 24 appropriation to understand the amount of money were going to get within the sm 31 be lying to support the negotiation for an additional lot of 1b. that work is going on currently today to understand the impact the both the 1b fight a lot as well as the future of the 2a line. all of that to inform what type of would be required within the 1b line to support the lifecycle of 1b. >> to quickly summarize as a chairman did, we both share a concern about the lack of competition. that seems to be echoed by your silence. we both share a concern about simply the magazine capacity that we have if we are reducing

the number of regional assets we have at a time when we're using them quite regularly here and i have additional concerns about what this all means for strategic stability that it just sounds like have not been analyzed or even considered carefully. we have a lot of questions and i think that's important. just one final question. there have been a lot of discussions from the subcommittee about the potential need for a third conus interceptor site. hasn't jroc validated in a requirement for a third site? >> no, sir, there's no requirement. >> if it were to validate such a requirement is a location those look at almost injured to go still would you believe that third site should be located? as the last study explicitly indicated that in the eighth we need to we look at the analysis prior to moving forward with any sort of program once you had a requirement. >> that's correct. we would take a look at if a requirement for east coast site was identified as requirement

and validated as mentioned when the final report came up we could take a look at the current threat to current performance at the system, the current state of affairs to assess and evaluate what that optimal site would be. >> so just to summarize come as a renegade don't need a third site. if you were to need a third that you would just go with what was selected ten years ago can you do another analysis. mr. hill i would add i hope we would permit questions about strategic ability look at the implications of a third site on the views of our adversaries. >> that's correct. focus on a third site will be the things we are already investing rather than a third site. >> great. thank you, mr. . thank you, mr. chairman. i yield back. >> thank you. mr. desjarlais. >> general collins come hypersonics are a complete d our prior conception of the global missile threat landscape with our ability to evade our legacy detection systems. we are not in position were rippling catchable in our

building to detect and defeat these novel capabilities. can you update our committee on how you are addressing the issue of detection first with the capabilities like hypersonic and ballistic tracking space sensor satellites? and how are you collaborate with sba's on these and other efforts pertaining to hypersonic missile defense? >> thank you for the question. hypersonic missile defense is certainly a key focus of the missile defense agency and protecting our war fighters as we move forward. the hypersonic ballistic tracking space sensor i mentioned a opening statement and you just mentioned, that is a prototype set the satellites didn't demonstrate our ability and the technology to from space detect, track, close a loop against the hypersonic threat come to take a hypersonic threat and track it throughout its entire launch come from launch to intercept. that is a key aspect of our future ability to detect and eventual intercept hypersonic

weapons anywhere on the planet in the future. to get there we have worked very closely with the space development agency. they would be the operational transition agent for us to take it and included within the future proliferated war fighting space architecture. we have been working very closely with them. also the space war fighter, war fighting analysis center, the slack part of the space for. >> we been fighting with them to ensure that our long-term fire control requirements are included within the forest design of any future space architecture. and so with those relationships within space force we are ready when we complete the demonstration later this year to transition into the proliferated war fighting space architecture tracking layer to pick up on the hypersonic requirements. >> on the clyde face interceptor, where are we at? >> yes, sir. we have two primes awarded

another transaction authority agreements, and both are proceeding post system requirement review and working to finalize designs as well as tech maturation for each of their designs. there's a good amount of maturation of the design and integration of the system that we worked on. >> okay. is an acceleration research and hypersonic defense options necessary and is it technologically feasible? >> sir, , we believe hypersonic defense is feasible. we have today a terminal case ability capability to intercept hypersonic threats within the sm-6 sea bass terminal capability within the aegis weapons system. so we are already fielded capability to intercept hypersonics in the terminal phase. glide phase interceptor we've identified the technology areas that need to be matured within

the program to do glide phase intercept farther away from the intended target. we are in the midst according to all those technologies to be able to feel this capability. so yes, we believe that technology exists with some maturation to come but we do believe hypersonic flight phase intercept keep of those is feasible. >> mr. hill what is the department also help u.s. will address there. hypersonic threats to the homeland? >> as general collins describe investing capabilities. as congress directed. we created come we designated the secretary of the air force for leading the cruise missile defense of the homeland project and, of course, glide phase interceptors, cruise missiles, so we will defend them against that, recognizing that in many cases this is something that an adversary is using and developing not in the context of a nuclear strike but in the

context of potential defeating our ability to respond. we want to demonstrate that we have the ability to follow up on the commitment we made and that means we will defend critical infrastructure in the united states. >> thank you. yield back. >> thank you. mr. norcross. >> thank you, chairman, ranking member for today's hearing and certainly the witnesses. we've had a number of discussions on this committee that talked about the ability to produce the weapons we need, the interceptors. quite frankly the entire industrial base. mr. hill, today you talk about the investment in that industrial base. so just for the sake of an argument let's say we have the technical expertise to design and build up we might be able to build a prototype. when you look across the u.s. industrial base, and the

workforce, are you comfortable with where we are in terms of being able to produce the numbers that we're talking about? >> i think, frankly i'm concerned that we have taken a bit of a holiday and that we're playing some catch up here. i am concerned that we have an adversary in russia that is war footing in ukraine. we and our allies in europe only to look more carefully at the investments and improve our abilities to replenish when we draw down munitions and other key systems. >> so you talked about the investment in the industrial base. what specific it would you .2 that in this budget is actually going to mitigate some of those concerns? >> i think that our focus particular on munitions area and

expanding capacity and some of that is function of when you are buying in larger quantities, when you're buying, using the authority the committee has given us to multitier procurement. now you're creating an environment in which you were not just rely on the kevin sproge but companies are also willing to put their money into expanding their capacity. >> so what are we doing to address that exactly? what signals are we signaling? i'm very personally with me ammunition what were doing over there. when you start talking about investing our workforce, what does that mean? you can send the signal but and lets the contract follows it, it's a hollow signal. >> right. the contract following it would be the question of resource allocations in finite budgets. this is the question we've been discussing earlier today about

how many are we acquiring. >> well, i'm not trying to pin your data actually i am going to pin you down because were doing this to address exactly what we're talking about. again, we make the decision and all the complexities and deal with that and he would say we need it yesterday. i need that is historically what we do. if you look at some of the numbers we are requesting an particularly mr. moulton what he was saying, even if you change your mind they cannot ramp up in time. so when we start looking towards investing in that industrial base we have to send the signals that are true to industry. we have to build it ahead of time because the longest lead item is not a peace material. it is a human, and that is why i continue to bring this up meeting after meeting but with that i will yield back to the chairman. thank you. >> thank you. mr. bacon. >> thank you, mr. chairman. thank you, gentlemen for being here. could you help you understand

why the budget overall budget numbers have gone down significantly for civil defense in the upcoming budget versus what we did last year? that's what it appears to me. is it because of budget caps or maybe there's other priorities? trying to understand that. >> sure, i'll start. definitely the fiscal responsibility act did set the scene. read work within that ceiling. we had must pay bills, payroll increases come healthcare programs, a lot of of the ths are going in the defense department. then you find, you are having to make some choices. my readiness today for the things i'm working on, investment for the future, not easy choices. >> i think it's something of the armed service committee to maybe review seemed like missile defense is there we do not want to be cuddy. i know the budget is going up a little bit but i was surprised to see the amount of the cut going on for missile defense.

it's concerning when you see the basis ticker like iraq and being repeatedly hit from iran. what can we be doing better to protect our forward bases from this are what are we not doing? i know this could be a theater commanders question but you have great insight. >> congressman, thank you. i'll take that question. in my current role and previous roles specifically as the army's providing a preponderance of missile defense and counter uas defense for those bases forward. again, continuing to add funding for the forward war fighter to deploy capabilities can you heard general carella advocate for additional funding is requested for additional counter uas to the building across all of our basis for big regift capability there now. that is proven successful. we're putting in technology directed energy and also other type of kinetic systems and

continuing funding of those systems allow us to put in volume additional capability. >> thank you. excellent to see the amount of targeting iran is doing at our basis and a ruckus is a? be doing anything we that. in the last ndaa we put some measures in for kurdistan. how will that look do you think i would not be a hard challenge to accomplish? >> there was a provision that helped the kurds get missile defense in the last ndaa. scribes are, i heard kurdistan. >> kurdistan, sorry. >> that's just my hearing. actually support the kurds in balancing that relationship, relations in region is also part of that question. to add to something as well

we've also said in the red sea context obviously struck back at some of the sites where some of these iran aligned militia groups operate, the houthis most notably. and that is an essential complement to the force protection, that missile defense provides. >> thank you. one less question for general gainey if i may. we've been reading reports of fatigue and burnett because of high tempo for your servicemen and women. what we do to help mitigate that? >> the army has taken a holistic look and as you heard me earlier highlight the significant strain on the force but what it will tell you is i am amazed at how the soldiers continue to respond by continue to maintain a positive attitude and high reenlistment rate moving forward. as the army looks to get after how do we improve the quality of

life and improve the up-tempo costar modernization efforts and continuing funding for modernization efforts because patriot system is a most deployed to system because it is our workforce system. as we modernize with integrated battleground system is the core point inside that modernization can we will then integrate several different capability provides the range of capabilities across several threats so you no longer have to do . just say patriot battery. you can to put different components and the army's of growth of that capability in the last will also add additional capacity so that will help moving forward. >> we appreciate the men and women who serve in your command and that matter for all of your commands and missile defense is such an important mission and its in high demand everywhere,, so we're grateful to you and your people. >> perfect timing.

now go to mr. vasquez. >> thank you, chairman. thank you to direct member. thank you to our witness of being here today. this morning i have the project representing new mexico's second disc of the birthplace of america's space and missile program. white sands continues be the department defense bring a research and testing facility for our nation those important weapons programs, we also continue to face struggles maintaining modern technology and facilities. during my visit to white sands this january leadership should repeat the long-range radars which are supposed to provide critical tracking capabilities for weapons testing have been in service and had not been upgraded since the 1960s. posing significant challenges to keeping them operational and in line with modern technology. beyond this maintenance challenges i've understood these radar challenges and the failures during tests have been come increasingly frequent occurring as often as five times per month and with tracking inaccuracies that are all my

hundreds to thousands of yards. not being able to accurately track weapons during testing bottle it poses a safety risk to the folks that are working there but also to surrounding communities that threatens our readiness to national security. that's completely unacceptable. we should do everything in our power to ensure white sands has the necessary equipment to safely and accurately track weapons test so we are providing our war fighters with the best tools and information possible to accomplish their mission. lieutenant general gainey, are conditions like these acceptable to you and how do standards pose a threat to our national security? >> thank you for the question. white sands missile range remains an integral part as you know to our testing and job, the army air and missile defense program. sc new mission commander, i also have strategic testing at the sites were also maintain an infrastructure incenses be able

to get after that. i believe continuing funding and improve its of all those capabilities are critical to continuing to ensure that we have the best capability as we test our critical systems moving forward. >> thank you so much. in mexico as you know lieutenant general with a long legacy of not just missile testing but a lot of research and government that has contributed to the strength of this nation's nasa security and also have a legacy of impacts on local trends khmers and testing activities which is one of the reason i'm fighting and others in congress are fighting to reauthorize. we want to make sure this technology are updated and we don't make the same mistakes of the past at the same time protecting national security. mr. hill, given the importance of white sands testing capabilities, what is stopping the department from obtaining these critical testing systems? >> congressman, i'm not familiar with the specific decisions on

those, but i can survey take the question. in the general sense, obviously the previous discussions about the overall topline and making trade-offs on resources i'm sure it is part of the calculation that's happening. >> thank you mr. hill. i appreciate you paying attention to this issue in future budget request it be on the missile testing and evaluation at white sands we are also home to the largest manufacturer of space great solar cells that a key component to providing power to our satellites. producers in my district power significant portion of our nation's ashen security satellites directly contributing to the strength of our missile warning fleet in space. mr. hill for components like solar cells that are critical for missile defense and warning infrastructure, what does it mean to the department of a reliable, domestic supply chain and how can congress help support robust production capabilities like those in my state? >> i think reliable domestic reduction change was important they are across a number of

fields. one of the things we have done we most recently issued our commercial space integration strategy, recognizing how much innovation is being driven by the commercial site of space. and understand that we in the defense department need to shift from trying to contort them into meeting all requirements to being flexible about our requirements so we can leverage what they are doing. that would be an example of creating an environment in which more innovation happens inside domestic production capacity. >> i appreciate that, mr. hill and we certainly are at the forefront of that commercial, commercialization both in research and develop face but also now in assembly and manufacturing when it comes to all these different components that are going into these modern systems and appreciate your continued attention and investment in new mexico's second district. thank you so much. i give expert thank you, chairman lamborn and ranking member moulton, and thank each of you for being here today.

general, it's great having each of you in my office last week or it was interesting to learn that not only is it the rock is a but also apparently the city of love since this is where you met your wife, general james, and i also found out that general gainey parents met at redstone arsenal, so is interesting to that. redstone arsenal is making a name for itself. i've said it before and i'll say it again, we got some great things coming out of huntsville. general collins just a few vco general guillot with northcom reconfirmed to this committee that the next-generation interceptors critical for defending the homeland. last spring your predecessor testified to the benefits of keeping multiple contractors on the ngi program through critical design review. but since late last year we have learned that this is no longer the plan. this really concerns me and many

others. looking back to 2019 when the redesign vehicle program was canceled, we had all our eggs in one basket. there wasn't a backup plan. and because we didn't have a backup plan we had to extend the life of our interceptors and start an entirely new program. this cost taxpayers a lot of money. it cost this capability and the cost is of time. when there's a ticking clock over in the indo-pacific and throughout the world. what change? wise ndaa now making an earlier plan down select decision before critical design review next year? >> congressman, thanks for the question on in g.i. it is absolutely our foundation for homeland defense into the future and we have continued to focus the agency very much on ngi and its incorporation in, dollars in 2028.

two things of note. one we talked about is certainly the fiscal realities in the decisions that needed to be made across the missile defense portfolio has been far-reaching. but second, we have also been keeping the ngi program on track both primes have completed a preliminary design review. both have completed full qualification of all their parts for the radiation environment. and many of the subcomponents have been taken to the critical design review stage of design. all that brought together, we, the agency believe we have a full in-depth understanding of the designs from the two primes. we fully understand and the transition to production plans and the risks that are still involved with both primes, and

believe that the level of risk is well below the department standard of making a decision such as this. so we believe we have the technical depth and knowledge and understanding of risk as we move forward to make that decision. >> i know some very smart people have done great work to keep our current interceptors in the game longer but we cannot keep life extending the fleet, is that right? >> that is correct. >> i know the compass and ngi succeeding is a big part of that to the incredible work being done at redstone arsenal with both industry teams in huntsville, alabama, but the consequences of something going wrong with ngi are much higher now than it was back in 2019. would that would that be a correct statement? >> yes, sir, they're still additional risk ahead of us on the program and we will continue to stay very focus away that risk is. sorry. we'll continue to focus on where that risk is and focus on

mitigating the risk as best as possible. >> i totally agree. there are much higher this time because just as you said we can't fall back on doing another life extension of the current system. we have already used our get out of jail free card with the rkv. i worry that biden administration is wanting to dismantle the significant industrial capacity that has been built up over decades. ndaa budget plans are taking a detrimental hit due to some shortsighted decisions here. is there a a report or study t ndaa has contacted the down selecting before critical design review over sticking with the original acquisition strategy? >> no, sir, we do not have any report or assessment on that. >> thank you. so we are budget constrained,,

the primary or initial reason for the change in strategy, or is it because the team, the teams have progressed better than expected? >> i would say it's a combination of both, both teams have regressed very, very well but the was a catalyst that was driven by the fiscal decision as a. >> i think each of you for being here. i yield back. >> thank you. mr. carbajal. >> thank you, mr. chairman. hearing all the nexus that show to his district and not paradise which of my district makes me start question your judgment, i must say. we know our adversary possessed hypersonic capabilities. defendant against an defeating this threat is proving to be challenging both technically and physically. general collins, , how are advanced manufacturing technologies such as additive manufacturing being utilized to reduce costs and acquisition

timelines for future hypersonic defense programs? >> thank you, congressman for the question. and fully agree with your notes on the difficulty in developing an industry base to accelerate our hypersonic offense of in defense of we move forward. and in my previous job with an air force might hypersonic weapons we had the same challenges in developing industry base to produce critical technologies we require for hypersonic weapons. at the missile defense agency we are very focus on bringing any of the new advanced manufacturing capabilities and technologies to bear to help one reduce costs of building hypersonic weapons in the future as well helping to scale and increase base of capacity of lines going forward. we are very much looking into advanced manufacturing additive manufacturers you mentioned that we have a group within our division that is closer look at and investing in small business

maturation capabilities of additive manufacturing and particular capability that are required within a hypersonic weapon, , when a particular his carbon carbon additive manufacturing which is key to the front edge dermal protection system of our hypersonic weapons. a key technology and a limiting factor within our ability to scale the industry base. we're very much investing across the traditional and nontraditional basis to ensure we have manufacturing capability for hypersonic weapons. >> thank you. general collins earlier the missile defense agency launched two hypersonic and ballistic tracking space satellites. ndaa received additional funds in fiscal year '24 defense appropriation bill to do calibration testing and training on threat represented hypersonic target. can you please describe the status of the satellites and out ndaa is going dash in the a's going to execute the 25 million

recalibration provided in fiscal year '24 under this? >> yes congressman, absolutely. it was a major activity. on valentine's day of issue we launched -- >> that's my anniversary by the what. >> that's a great day. the satellites are still progressing through launching early orbit testing. we have a very slow methodical process whereby we turn on the satellites can we turn on the payload. over the last month we have had first what we call the first time we turn on the payloads and actually looked within and look at the data to calibrate. that calibration continues. we started to do a number of cooperative activities where there may be a launch or test that somebody else is executing and we've been using those as capabilities as opportunities to calibrate that payload. later this summer we will be executing our first htb hypersonic test bed one launched in june. that is a lot specifically

designed for our satellites to look at hypersonic threat and track it through its time of flight. there will be another htb two test later in the summer. those of the two main wickets were looking at to calibrate and certify the fire control solution and technology that we have. back to the owner conversation another opportunity where getting is a space develop an agency that will launch on the same booster. there in playing with her to satellites so were going to be able to utilize some testing of the life capability in concert with our htb s technology as well. a key capability as a look forward to a future missile warning missile defense and missile defense space architecture. thank you. >> general james, a value add of hbts as is that it will provide five controlled quality data to track and intercept hypersonic threats or can you speak to the importance the board's of fire control quality data county boards of using

threat represented hypersonic targets to calibrate and train against how space command plans to do that cross future your defense programs? >> yes congressman, i sure can. thanks for the question. i have a few things to say so thanks for the question. [laughing] absolutely, as space, continues to flush out it's missile defense mission and continue to press on that and we see those natural links between what you've heard of the colic say about the convergence of the space in the missile defense mission. how we use our space assets and develop those to get at the technology changes we see 2. the hyper velocity for the cruise missile threats that we see, we're going to accuse space-based systems, we we'rg to have to provide that level of targeting quality information. and so that's exactly the things that were working on as we continue to develop the net

centric command-and-control system and the information systems as we continue to press without you'll see that in our list as important factor when you do continue to press on to increase our ability to command and control and pass that information from a close his sensor to best shooter to be able to make those connections. there's a lot of work that's happening more than just an usspacecom over time into all that with army's convergence and we will tighten exercises and then we will fire, we exercise all of those to continue to build our expertise and that. absolutely critical because sensors are not going to allow us to track and target the threats we see come in the past but it would have to space-based, and all the things general collins just talked about from sba and work with

space force and other capabilities, absolutely important here and integrating commercial and integrating the allies. that is every bit usspacecom has been tons of work with over the years and evolve naturally into how we're going to afford with missile defense. >> thank you. thank you, mr. chairman for the additional time. >> it was really more for lieutenant general james. [laughing] >> thank you. >> mr. nelson. >> thank you, mr. chairman. indeed, i hope you will see that incredibly this is bipartisan with the leadership of our chairman and ranking member and even including congressman carbajal. but truly, we want you to succeed and i have a personal interest. i served 31 years in the army guard at our reserves and really appreciate military service and i'm grateful my oldest son served in iraq, field artillery. my second son was a doctor out

of track, he was in the navy i still claim him serving in baghdad. my third son, signal in sinai and my youngest i year afghanistan as an engineer. so all credit to my wife roxanne for actually training these guys. by the bottom line is we want you to succeed an equally it's more important than ever, mr. secretary general, one conflict we did not choose an to me it's a conflict, a war between dictators with the rule of gun for invading democracies with rule of law. ..

doctor for criminal putin is so human about that is not the real attack. 20 minutes later when the first responders were there, the fire service, the ems personnel that is when the real attack occurs. it is shocking to think of the tactics that vladimir putin has to intimidate the people of ukraine just as they did the people of aleppo in syria and then do come back and try to intimidate first responders. that continued on october 7 with the regime in iran. civilians were mercilessly

murdered, intentionally without any sense of propriety or concept -- not in uniform. every violation of war they conducted. and sadly, we have had over hundred 50 attacks that have occurred in the red sea as correctly identified in iraq. over and over again we see the attacks. culminating on january 28 with three young members of the army reserves from georgia who were killed by a hezbollah -- another puppet of iran killing three of our personnel and warned -- and wounding 40 others. it is incredible to me the challenges we have and we want the best. and in wanting the best, i'm

concerned with the level of deployment of such an important branch, the air dark -- the air defense artillery. it is no surprise that don bacon was the head -- was ahead of the curve and that was the deployment level being conducted. i know with the leadership we have come a bipartisan, we would like to back you up in any way to try to address that. with all of this in mind, how were we addressing the technological development of the chinese communist party, vladimir putin, the regime in tehran -- how are we addressing this? >> congressman, thank you for the question and we appreciate your thoughts. i will speak first on the army perspective. the army is undergoing its most monitor -- modernized effort in several years.

we are moving from a patriot centric force and i highlighted earlier how we have asked that the patriot to do everything in the fight. tactical ballistic missiles, cruise missiles and even going after drones with the patriot system here the u.s. army is now looking at integrated battle command system as the cornerstone of the system. we have that system in test right now with our unit in fort bliss. that system integrates several components and not just a system. it takes a lower tier missile defense system as the cornerstone of that capability and ads in other sensors whether ground-based or airborne platforms. it also adds in shooters.

it leverages several different defenses. and the lower tier system provide significantly more capability than the current system does which would allow them to optimize that system. great if you look at this from a joint perspective, that's where we look at you bring these together in a larger construct about something as we work toward, how do you take the integrative battle command system with systems the missile defense agency was together? we are looking at an enduring solution that integrates these systems and beverages them together. too lower to medium range, conduct counter you i have, the

army has invested in that area we have added several short range air defense and provide capability looking at technology like directed energy that we have deployed out there testing that capability. also high-powered microwave to formation. the appropriate interceptor on the appropriate target that is how it will allow us to move forward. >> thank you.

>> if there's ever a committee faced with the problem, it's this one. i've never had a committee that has had so many acronyms to understand what each of these are. it is a challenge but i will try to take this in a different direction. we will forever be playing defense trying to catch up with offense. we can use nfl experience we are hearing here today. much of this discussion today,

we note not environment there is great risk. what happened over the last 20 years significant shift in this entire arena. archie 2,022,000 abm three antiballistic missile. it would do well to understand the details of the language, we usually think it only applies to intercontinental ballistic's but it went beyond that. united states withdrew from

that. for the treaty to justify continued buildup of ballistic missile systems. in recent days last few years the very same withdrawal from the abm treaty system is fair to argue that treaty has led to the current nuclear arms race.

how we are going to defend using the gmd and my concern is we are in a never ending cycle of offense followed by defense cap resumes to be successful against the known offense yet one more round. as much time as we are spending on this committee, defense, we ought to look at how to break the cycle of an arms race and nuclear piece to it and it becomes even more significant in

members on this committee, understand in detail what this race is all about, the risks. my question to you, for us policymakers and you and your team to spend time thinking about how to stop the cycle from of offense, defense and back-and-forth all of which greater risk. talk to hear your thoughts. >> very key. clearly there was a time, an era

when we had someone to work with on the other side of the negotiating table. that era in the cold war we did negotiate agreements successfully. that is a key piece to our situation and now you have three and can you deal with them as a credible negotiating partner right now? is to say you always need to think about that is what you have to work with to maintain. can you come up with to a confidence level with somebody on the other side of the table?

>> five more seconds. everyone of the arms-control that went into effect during the cold war occurred almost immediately after the most difficult moments but amount of time. for me, i'm going to spend as much time talking about this as i do about offense and defense. >> i'd like to correct the record early in the hearing, the ranking members that the department of defense's ipo the holman nearly ten years ago, that is incorrect. despite the fact that that is correct, you are aware the date is 2019, correct? >> yes, ma'am. >> so ten years ago is incorrect? >> yes, ma'am. >> you also are aware last year

general milley and vice federal health testified in front of the clinic is strategically worthwhile, correct? >> yes, ma'am. >> you are also aware multiple nda a's language designated has been included, you are aware of that? but the record reflect ranking member voted that not once but multiple times as well as appropriations. in the fy 14 appropriations act, we work to secure 10 million in the design funds to begin construction activity for third was of the fence. my question to you, as the director, can you confirm to me

as dictated by congress begin the planning and design of the dark missile defense? >> that is that purpose. >> what you using it for? >> initial planning and development and design for the intersect site. >> with with the language that. >> you understand in the nda i for multiple years this has been

a draw process so you are saying 10 million was not for the planning and design? >> in support interceptor site at any location determined in line with the 2019 for the department to find out fort drum and when the requirement was that, there would have to be a reassessment. >> you know you said when we met in my office you understand it would go to the design and planning as testified by the nda. >> when a decision if the decision is made to pursue fort drum site $10 million would be one 100% in line with being able to push that. >> what you do understand been

designated as well as by dod back i am aware. >> okay great. with that, i will go back. >> i concludes the public portion of his hearing. we have folks that will be called roughly 1140 possibly broken degree 71 until folks are called and then we will return the subcommittee so we will be in recess and meet upstairs. >> friday nights, watch c-span's

2024 campaign trail, a weekly roundup of c-span's campaign coverage. along with first-hand accounts from political reporters, fundraising data and campaign ads. watch c-span's 2024 campaign trail friday nights at 7:30 p.m. eastern on c-span, online at c-span.org or download the c-span podcast or c-span now. c-span, yournfiltered view of politics. >> this past week millions gathered to watch as a total solar eclipse could be seen throughout various parts of north america. it is a rare event not expected to happen again in the u.s. for another 20 years. on saturday experienced the phenomenon once more with footage from nasa