the shortest lapse of time but as of last month, and smell a member. ministry of defense month they make their countries more interoperable to make mark aware of what made our best and look at the old mets and work and receive the benefits i hope students me audience income for role-play have to play" an american mark bring, it's fitting closed by remembering a

little-known european expert, sir mick jagger athletic i think of him because interest organization, some think he's saying you can't always get what you want but if you try real hard, he might get what you need. please join me in thanking the panel.. please join me in welcoming the panelist to the stage. [applause] >> it's a pleasure to be here and having a chance to delve into the issues explored a

little bit in the first panel now will get a bit more into defense. elsa to stage and in short each of our panelists. the consensus on the appropriate size and strategy for equitable sharing and strategic risks has been an enduring talent and realization of nato deterrence of defense policy to be heard already. it became clear ambitions goals

set at the 1952 meeting that was never going to be achieved so nato shifted to greater reliance on nuclear defense on u.s. strategic forces and moving to retaliation in the 50s which envisioned or sustained conventional forces preserving ambiguity. we heard in the first panel strong opposition in many countries to the 1979 decision deploying nuclear weapons in

europe for new capabilities and strengthened u.s. strategic deterrence to improve capabilities nato launched long-term defense program 1979 to mitigate negative shifts but the soviet union exporting emerging technology. while few allies but the goal to realize the program nato continued deterrence. after the cold war territory became last urgent and the focus of military effort shifted to peacekeeping and counterinsurgency operation.

nato undertook steps to ensure vulnerable allies and develop his presence. his 2022, nato has taken steps to strengthen the eastern part of the alliance and other elements strategy and military posture and added this today. allies are seeking way to expand cooperation in both areas. we've asked our panelists to discuss next steps to sustain what nato calls deterrence and

defense. we are very fortunate to have three speakers to address these issues and i will turn to them sequence and in each of their expertise. would you provide the audience an overview and military posture advancing nato summits tried to hug to the deterrence. >> it's a real pleasure to be here and i think you're right

there's something quite profound happening and has been for a couple of years focused on building regional security now back to putting that at the heart. >> the overall approach on the primary goal is to make sure there isn't an attack and we have been pretty successful but there is a recognition that the scale of the challenge and brushing objectives, we can't

take it for granted. the best way to achieve it, we would when importing that back at the heart of nato and what is happening at the moment. we are conscious that we have to think of this we have to manage deter but is stopped short in this and then we have to be ready and be able to win a conventional attack and we have

to be ready to maintain nuclear weapons and a strategic effect and how they interact with it's about convincing them that you can exploit. the professing that's happening, the alliance of national defenses so we have war plans and teaching plans and approve

the end open conflict and you will hear this afternoon to follow through the logic of the plan what they are doing and how and it is quite transformative. there's a lot in terms of the headquarters and norfolk virginia and northern europe. this is the core of my job and

allies are much more transparent and her pretty good idea over the next couple of years and a couple of areas will need target first at long range and let it move things around. we still need the ability to bring land forces together we

have a pretty big area. there is no recognition and's are changing now. but i hope the numbers will keep rising and they were not spending that much and all that will take time and you need industrial capacity. i am quite optimistic moving in

that direction. sometimes people underestimate reset but the organizational structures and funny and getting people to understand and what it means. not just frontline countries but also where areas so it's really exciting time.

>> thank you very much for a good segue even where you work in both, would you share insights from your work and requirements of deterrence by then i'll. >> nato's conventional defense

that will go back in time and crimea that question defense is that it took quite a long time and poland a lot it is the only nato military and at the same time battle groups more than 1000 troops.

overall it still is poland's 1000 outcome of the compromise in 2014 when the county got in the new member states of the alliance but not only a nato response to his army nato was

created quarters all of it is limited by poland and this was reversed after 2022 on ukraine for more battle groups and

reinforcing these battle groups, a very important exchange but still not sufficient on the opinion of many but they were set up over the panel as well as training nato so very important changes adding to that. in exercising across the

northeastern plank. i have done, not yet, maybe we are heading toward this goal allies are capable but it does not mean it does not work. it does.

and that conventional very much on the elements in this plank and the potential conflict in the defense on the page of national european investments in

the state of transatlantic relation. all in all having in mind politically within the alliance and in the coming years on the baltic states and armed forces with nato weapons for the alliance, or them not to respond going to nuclear escalation

conventional deterrence, more elements working and making progress and important defense is necessary. >> we would like to come back to the question about these capabilities if you let nicely and talking about deterrent posture backed up by the guaranty nuclear capability to other allies that helped so want to ask, how do you assess the direction of the dimension of the alliance including steps taken or should be taken to

ensure strategic nuclear capabilities secure steps taken over the last couple of years? >> thank you for the invitation, honor to be on the panel. want to start off by pointing out fundamentals because i think they will that direction. as long as nuclear weapons exist, it will remain unbiased. it's worth pointing out nuclear capabilities, any sharing arrangements, those are getting a lot of attention, the nuclear posture united kingdom and france and the other factor we will going is nato has consistently said they remain committed to arms control,

nonproliferation and those are priorities that will have to work together to shape the direction the alliance goes on so there's a couple of indicators on these issues, clearly an effort by allies to strengthen allies. we learned deterrence issues and better understanding and extended care deterrence. the other direction we are seeing is the unity from my

perspective, there are two big factors that will shape the direction which is obviously russia particularly the question is how much they will rely on it going forward. russian forces have not performed particularly low but it isn't just about national performance, it's about investments to rebuild original forces, that is not a turnaround profit. while they do that we anticipate the shift also anticipate russia continues it is underpinned the

invasion. it has been insisted. this is a key part of that and i'm glad that came up so much in the previous panel. what is really important the impact of the thing that we are all obsessed with it and talking about. are they allies thinking about future competition? it seems like it has started and evolving for the way allies engage will be significant impact on nuclear posture. for example the u.s. conventional forces are divided, what is it mean for alex? i think the direction traveled really is actively and seems to

be what mayor wants in this posture. there's a couple of options that i think could contribute my just putting out there on the first would be supplemental new nuclear capabilities so the most obvious cruise missile or other regional capabilities. another option would be another important nuclear actor, the uk. if the uk wanted to add a big boat pretty serious domestic financial constraints. another one which i'm sure we will get to which is the nuclear sharing. another option might be a change in nuclear posture and strategy

to consider earlier decisive escalation pension weapons or nuclear weapons. the united states the longer signaling to one adversary so that's where i've been more decisive. what should be done to remain effective, nato's nuclear posture underpinned you want a safe and security nuclear, shall continue on the current modernization from up there will be challenges on that inc. in the difficult growing.

but proceeding the pace with rest modernization in a record at minimum i think is essential or nuclear security but in addition, other allies can participate exercising in the alliance continually multis of things they've been doing anyway and i know this panel is about deterrence, a key component of the conversation is talking european allies, i hear them more and more express their concerns and domestic politics is a part of that. the other part is that allies are concerned with competing priorities for u.s. attention. it goes expert once we are now

number three on foreign policy verities coming after the war in gaza and china so i want to make another equitation he in addition to following through and have large one of our greatest assets means in the national interest so i hope we can get to that. >> i like to come back to that and the impact it might have on this habitability.

i did want to turn back to initial capabilities. we did mention in the earlier discussion, very ambitious and much larger goals and working on these plans and it can be discussed in any detail whether it might be additional elements or reinforce by the decisions of the washington summit and the development of generational abilities. >> of posture we have now and whether it is robust.

the answer is the only way we defense was through even one scaled up. it's not the only way to defend all territory and ukraine cap draw on that and power protected from see. when i arrived in the baltic, a lot of firepower would come from the north atlantic but also, we are very focused on this question of this into place two things. we need to know it's happening and get back to 2022, we saw it,

we had a debate of what it meant and even russians can't have this. you need to act early enough to move forward and now the necessary authority to make the move into place before we get to that situation and the logistics of the terry on how you move across europe so there's a lot in that. on the fourth level to clearly from a essentially what made european allies for the last 20

years is providing relatively small, sending them to the other side of the world and doing that on a rotational basis. a much larger force, you pretty much know where it is going and what it's going to be so the way in which we organize this as really changed. last year we confirmed this. the number of forces behind that is much larger. this most your interest lies said if we collectible you got it.

be made available we know there are capability gaps. but we have a much clearer idea no on how we can fight. >> that the good segue third discussion about learning lessons and when asked about lessons from russia for ukraine tornado strategy and how can be applied all and nato defense agreed to establishing on the nato ukraine.

>> definitely nato has a lot in this ability. how russia waking this but overall we had conflict between russia and nato and was on but that will change substantially the picture somehow special and fatal will be waged. please capabilities, something ukraine does not have and

currently limited access and need to look at lessons learned what russia takes in my observation with what nato should learn that we need more, we talked about that. the conflict for needs to grow to build reserve. we had discussion on going in the decision made already on the tract extending the voluntary from drafting women or introducing service for military

for young people so this is a discussion have. you had public discussions but come decisions were made it i think if you look at :'s decision that shows land forces are marked in the war on ukraine could not be repeated and nato

needs to reinvest these capabilities so another issue is we need to exercise information, training of ukrainian forces, time is missing it will have negative effects on the battlefield and ukraine. i think we are observing air defenses, they need to know ukraine has had huge amounts of equipment and supplemented we

don't have it in nato. we have huge gaps to be dealt with. we have right now problems in poland and we have been flying, is taking a turn for the second time talking with the opinion of many polls testing our reaction we don't have capabilities nationally and limited capabilities within 80 and we don't have a strong base system on the order to deter russia for the air defense system. let us how huge the gap is not

quickly need to invest : is doing that but it takes time. it's working on your defense on lower levels. the only way to capture such moves in the future. more long-range capabilities from germany, top military and being depleted. the need for delivery.

a long-range capability and increase. but what is particularly interesting from the wharton ukraine is introducing innovation to the battleground quickly how to it is not accustomed to development in this lesson. ...

>> and how to move come for example, major public services online come something ukraine has done under the war conditions. i think ukraine can compete, we can learn a lot. also similar military cooperation, that would be another point. >> great, thank you. i do want to come back to the nuclear question. before we do sin should mitchard recited i know angus has been working on come his colleagues at nato headquarters had working on looking at ways to encourage cooperation among allies and strengthening their defense industrial capabilities. you might touch on that. weekly before we go and then i come back to heather and will go to some questions from the audience. >> sure. just say no, that are too big aspects of this.

the first is society and something governments are thinking about and do they have plans for how they would experience a war eventually. this is partly psychological shift and using some allies addressing that by collision very directly about this. countries like sweden and denmark have stood up very boldly resort is said to the population you need to be ready for the prospect of war. it's also about are you planning, how you would keep going things like provision of energy, food, telecommunications, healthcare, transport, et cetera. what we do in nato is we set benchmarks for what does this look like in each of these areas and we have process of assessing allies against that come having them to learn from each other, do compare and contrast that the other aspects to this thise relationship between the military and the civilians in a

war. so many civilian governments over the last 20 years have got quite used to the idea that if there is a civilian contingency you turn to the military for help. with the pandemic or natural disaster or a terrorist attack. in a full-scale article v situation, actually that they do have is likely to get reversed because the military would be flat out dealing with the military threat. what it will need from the civilian side is access to transport, access to much larger healthcare and dealing with mass casualties, for example. and public access to stocks the food energy and things like that that it wouldn't be able to generate organically. this is why one of the things were looking at for the washington summit is allies making a pledge that they will have nationally, each according to their own systems, a mechanism for doing that

civilian military planning so that they know they are ready for that. there is a third aspect to civilians which is as well making sure that our infrastructure is not vulnerable to interference from hostile powers. it's a lot about china and when you look at how embedded china has become it a lot of infrastructure and sensitive services in an number of our allied countries, there is quite a big debate going on in it and in the european union about how to reduce the risks of those dependencies in exploited in a time of crisis or war? >> great, thank you. before we do ship to audience questions i did want as come come back to you heather. he touched on some important issues on the board's of strength in the strategic, the is and other nuclear

capabilities that at the strategic level the backup nato's deterrent posture. you mentioned uk is an option. what about the question of perhaps europe filling both combined uk-french effort and filling some of the pressure gets is going to feel if they continue to focus on deterring china unless i forget north korea as well? and interesting,, is a part of what was behind the macron gambit of think if you put a nuclear arms power on the ground in ukraine is that going to get put in some second thoughts? i know you would think that some of these issues with regard to russia saber rattling at csis in the pony party on deterrent and divide. it's a bit of the murder of question that maybe could touch on a couple of those issue. >> i will start with with e contribution of the uk and france in this debate going on out about your deterrence. i'm not a european. spent enough time there.

i am a bit skeptical europeans will put us at hundreds of years of history to completely trust one country, one of them. no offense to any of the french in the room. i'm really sorry. it is not to complete ruled out. just highlights how much really is hinging on the upcoming u.s. election. there is one thing about the uk and french arsenals at a do want highlight and that is the french arsenals really historically been defined by its ambiguity, by which they really religiously -- where as the british have try to strike a slightly different balance in terms of transparency into the arsenal, transparency into numbers and conspiracy into the doctrine. in recent years in the subsequent in the good reviews the uk is done we are seeing more of a shift towards ambiguity in the uk's nuclear posture. this is really fascinating question that nato itself is also taking up, which is when it comes to nuclear issues to be

drawn red lines? article v is a stronger line really as you can say but the nuclear component i think we're seeing that shift among allies with greater strategic ambiguity over all. and then to question about how to respond to nuclear saber rattling by the russians. i think the eliza done a pretty good job of, thus far. i saw the deputy secretary-general recently called it out as psychological intimidation, which i think it's a great point and something all of us have too sparse at how much of this is rhetoric and how much is reality. and kind address this that way. some of things the alliance did really well that it should continue to do come first and foremost is intelligence sharing component. that was really both within your lines but also more publicly but also calling out and trying to combat russian disinformation campaigns. russian disinformation is really it's so pervasive but in the

nuclear space in particular we are seeing it take on certain flavors. it's really aggressive. for example, in october 2022 there was a six day. mag were like every single russian officials offs that use a dirty bomb. this is clearly a disinformation campaign. maybe it was an attempt of the false like to maybe try to shape a wider narrative but nato members came out and precluding decisively said in a nuclear use a russian and met with catastrophic consequences. no, ukraine does not trying to develop a dirty bomb. and really try to stand up to russian disinformation in that way with us and we should anticipate russian disinformation, multiheaded, it's way to keep evolving, going to keep changing at the purpose of it is to divide the allies. so staying really on the front foot and forward leaning on combating that disinformation and combating it across the alliance i think some somea taken more of a leadership role of combating disinformation and others, something i think there would be great to see more of

the eyes get involved with dirk i think one of the point around disinformation but not just disinformation the russian nuclear saber rattling, this gets to the core of what deterrent is, which is where to convince russia using nuclear weapons will not serve its long-term interest. that it will not achieve whatever those desired gains are by using nuclear weapons. and there are a lot of different ways to do that and that might mean new surety at some retaliation response on the part of nato. but the other idea i will put out has to do with what would be the international reaction. if rush russia's a first oa nuclear weapon in recent memory and however many years, then what with the international community do in response to the? i thought a lot of debates about this recent because i don't know, who in his facing a decisive military lost as a care with international between rethinks? the truth is not of us know.

if anyone of this room knows what vladimir putin is thinking that please come to the mic tell us. i think that is the best way to stand up to russian nuclear saber rattling is having that decisiveness that you will not get what you want by doing this. >> great thank you. ambassador smith mentioned the board's of information showing that was going on in terms of what was russia actually doing windows rattling that saber was important, so thank you. we have about 20 minutes for questions on the audience. as you know you've been directed to go to the microphone if you would and identify yourself. we look forward to some additional questions. i don't see anyone yet rising to the occasion. good, someone -- >> approaching. >> thank you very much for being here and taking the time. my question is -- >> kandi toussie you are? >> my name is jason rodriguez. so my question is, what lessons

from deterrence in ukraine and on the eastern flank should i made were poorly should not be applied to deter us in the case of taiwan? >> that's an interesting one. >> we will take a few and then let people -- yes, go ahead please. >> thank you all so much for being here and taking the time to speak with us. my name is alan. i'm a graduate student in security studies program here at georgetown. i also working lsd. my question cutting surrounds this point has been brought up about political development and implications for european security, given what could happen in u.s. politics in the next few months. specifically for poland, given the tensions in europe, outside of europe, , how feasible do thk it is that that france or the uk

could extend the nuclear umbrella over poland, or would it be more prudent for poland to think that develop its own nuclear weapons? and kind of it so when should that start happening? so just curious for your thoughts and opinions on that. thank you. >> why do we so we don't lose the first one, should we -- you want to take that second question and then come back -- >> we can take another one. >> one more, all right. go ahead. i'm sorry. we will take one more. >> i am christian, a recent grad from the program. i had a quick question. dr. williams brought up arms control is kind of still a pillar with new strategy to some degree but with the new s.t.a.r.t. treaty set to expire in february 2026 and russia-china really having no interest in engaging in arms control, i'm curious what you all think should that still be a pillar and its of how you actually operationalize that? thank you.

>> okay. you want to take that on poland? >> there was a lot of uncertainty in poland about the future of u.s. security and defense policy on the eastern flank. the situation that you are right now in the u.s. as a month's long discussion in the congress on ukraine supplemental racing i would say this level of uncertainty because they are showing to us that the domestic situation, domestic politics has a hand over security and defense strategic goals. but i think that overall poland has a different experience of trump administration than the

rest of europe, a much more positive one where paul and have created a workable more bilateral relationship with trump administration, and has to which poland has increased u.s. military economic political ties. we have another government which will make a difference since there is no, i would say kind of ideological affinity come so that would be a different situation but still i think there is some distance from the rest of europe and discussions in poland about the immediate repercussions of a change of administration for the eastern flank and for poland. the discussion about the nuclear deterrence is there in the public but i think and beginning

to be also in the polish administration. overall, there is a conviction that the u.s. nuclear deterrence is still the place and will remain in place, that we need to do much more in the conventional realm, so convinced the future u.s. administration, whether it be republican or democrat. that alliance, the burden sharing and the alliance, alliance nato north atlantic treaty organization a partnership, the benefits to use and i think and, therefore, from poland you can hear the proposals of setting the bar for defense spending hard to 3% in the coming years. for making european greater input into regional defense plans, and proposals to

strengthen, engagements and inputs a greater show of european willingness to cooperate with the future republican administration. nuclear discussions for us are difficult because of course there are in the public ideas about going nuclear for poland. but poland doesn't have civilian nuclear power plants, and hence that would be very difficult and only without of major allies that have nuclear weapons to develop nuclear weapons on its own. that would take time. and in the meantime, poland would become very vulnerable to some kind of russian retaliation strikes while developing nuclear

capabilities. with regard to european deterrence or ideas on enhancing european deterrence, i think there was a conversation about the french ideas, but on the margins of technology that the u.s. nuclear deterrence is in place, i suppose that there would be discussions in the future of how to strengthen european confidence and overall nato nuclear deterrence and that would be the way forward we would like to go. >> if we could turn, i would to come back to the lessons of taiwan, but on the question of arms control and also, heather, that's one thing we haven't talked about of the talk but in the context of russian saber rattling, , what is lacking in terms of their not being come third been some channels established both nato and the

u.s. in terms of strategic crisis indications with the russians. do you think there some area scope for that as well or funny way forward on reviving some of those crisis munication capabilities? >> yet, so thank you for the question. literally my favorite topic and you would've thought i would apply to that question. should on controls to be part of nato position? absolutely should be. however, arms control the future going to look very different from arms control of the past. i am not saying we should be painting ourselves to something that looks like start i&s or new start. we need to take a more expansive approach to think of arms control. arms control of the know it is dead. it really is. like new start this kind of the last of its kind. i asked folks on the pony team to ask what arms-control agreement from the cold war era are still in place and have not been somehow soiled by russia? it's official list.

i could count on one hand. so arms-control as as a know, it's really not a thing anymore. one of those was like to say that tree. the disrespect but this is exactly the type of arms-control something we're particularly interested in right now. with the second control is not just legally binding, verifiable treaty. if we take this more expensive approach think of arms-control as informal agreements. things like the incidence agreement which in terms of crisis medication kind of what escalation that's a good example of the direction of travel i think we could be moving in. other examples might be things that they can more asymmetric approach. you could have joint statements that are focused on controlling behaviors rather than controlling weapons, shameless self-promotion of an article in foreign affairs on the skull -- and so it's not about rejecting arms-control altogether issues that changing what arms-control will rethink arms-control looks like and what we want it to

achieve. one of the point on this. i hadn't brought up yet but it's really important one. the entity is also arms-control. and we have these conversations about -- the npt -- develop an independent nuclear weapon, the service come out of south korea, you know, when we have these conversation with also talk about the npt. i believe the entity is very weak at the moment but also think we are lucky to have it and we should do everything we can to preserve and protect it. with that said nato and it is nuclear members in particular have to take a to arms-control because they will be held accountable in the npt. there are a growing number of doctors in the npt the record is arms-control to know is dead so what are you doing for article six? that is how this conversation still. so to maintain the npt nato has to keep its commitment to arms-control and a final point, another reason i'm very skeptical about this idea of new independent act, nuclear actors

like blossoming among america's allies, i mean, is politicon to be the first country since north korea to withdraw from the npt? i don't think so. i don't think that about south korea either. that's also why we need the npt and we need to keep it healthy. and so arms-control might look different but we still need it if anything for that reason. >> person in the back. patients from one alas, i went to pick up, angus, i know the sense of taiwan is not -- obviously we do know that we certainly there's a lot of evidence that prc's watching carefully the lessons the russians learning in ukraine, in terms of resilience. unexpected resurgence, the limited capability of some other cyber and other efforts to disrupt ukrainian capabilities space. i wonder if you might touch on maybe or at least what you think some of nato has lessons drawn

about the war in ukraine that may also be exportable, lets a. >> very quickly on the other question. not only would pull that withdrawal from a beekeeper the alley the help poland would have to withdraw from npt. that's a real know, i think. and on the nuclear deterrence point, of course the uk does the extent this nuclear deterrence to poland and all members of native because the uk's nuclear deterrence is specifically a psych ended. it is the only one of the t3 that does that in those terms. i do think even if you were to see a changed uk and french posture for the reasons that have the other two earlier, it would almost certainly still be within a broad nato framework. that's the only credible framework in which to do that. what lessons have you learned

from taiwan? i think the most important lesson is don't that conventional deterrence slip in the first place. because nuclear components, i.e. they do this are and will nicu commonly difficult and not very credible. nuclear deterrence, i was done this and what do you think about it, the risk a nuclear response. that's arguably more credible. so don't get yourself in a situation where your opponent as a conventional advantage over you and has achieved something and is in bringing nuclear deterrence into play to try and stop you from doing anything about it. i think that's overwhelmingly the most important lesson. but but i think we would alsok at the kind of broader dimension of deterrence. why did putin make the mistake of invading ukraine in the first place because his understanding of ukrainian intent come his

understanding of ukrainian coherence were clearly wrong. we mustn't let russia or indeed any other adversaries make the same mistake about us. we have to kind of constantly remind them our intent, a willingness to fight and defend ourselves, our coherence, they are all absolutely strong. so it's a mixture of conventional deterrence on the basis in which a lot of things rest, and a broader sense of psychological, political coherence and will. >> great, thank you. i'm sorry, the person in the back foot in fact, i can't quite see. >> thank you for being here. i'm also a graduate student from the program in my question concerns strategic culture. you are very much at the vanguard of european and transatlantic security, experts and policymakers. do you use kind of convergence towards unified european our new

strategic culture, or do affairs within data in the only term by a culture and individual sort of material and strategic integration? thank you. >> at the think there's another, why do we take taken togete we're getting close on time? >> i work at the center for european policy analysis. i wanted to ask about the defense deterrence plans and undated and his its allies n incorporate of the partners like ukraine or georgia that are facing russian forces into those longer-term defense plans in the next ten to 15 years in the interim to nato membership? >> okay. and one last one, please. >> great, thank you. my thanks to the panel for very engaging discussion. about resilience others, welcome on this topic. nathan rogers, work in a

transatlantic arena. question as we approach of course the summit. just mentioned the pledge for planning and disregard, tickler steps in the resilience discussion with nato. interested and if you'd unpacked that more for us, where we're going in the resilience agenda. of course with an original commitment to enhance resilience from the warsaw summit 2016. the allies of double down on this in 2021. what's in store this year for the resilience and would you kariba saints is increasingly central to allied deterrence and defense? of course militaries just go to war but nations to. all of governments, whole commute is responsible for being part of this. interested if you'd unpacked that for us and where the allies is going forward. thank you. >> start with angus come if you want to loop that question and one of dda perhaps you want to address that quickly. >> yet.

start with one of culture because that's an important point. sicko back i think to the fact we do have a defense deterrence come deterrence and defense strategy that is based on set the plans that will over the next few years give our allies and much more granular understanding of exactly what the arm forces are supposed to do. that will drive a level of requirement for interoperabilit interoperability, the ability to fight together at the granular level and then the broader strategic level. the we haven't seen since the end of the cold war. i think that is already starting to make or force our allies to become a bit let national focus and a bit more alliance focused. some of it is basic service, training but some of it is for example, equipment. we have a standard artillery shell in nato, 155 millimeters. turns out for the last 25 allies

have all got off and slightly tweaked their artillery and the shows they go in it. turns out you can't put a 155 mm shell from what i want into the guns of another. that's happened to all sorts of, for understandable reasons but it is now about to be reversed and we are now anything sort of going back to much tougher focus on interoperability standardization, and as it is both technical and it is culture. on resilience and kind of what next, i mean, we always make the point the resilience is a national responsibility and somehow escaped quite cross with me if i could make that point early on but it think where we are probably going is we've got a cycle of look at how our allies form against our resilience basement. i think over time that cycle will get more demanding, we get that we're looking at.

and we will do more to support allies learning from each other and supporting each other from that. secondly, i think the broader question of industrial resilience has really come into play over the last two years, that we've seen how much north america and europe has struggled to produce quickly enough what we need both to support ukraine and to support our own armed forces. i think industrial policy defense and social policy has become an issue. i think the third area i was really developing is that the of partnership between the private sector and the public sector when it comes to resilience. that the answer to besides the duchess make more space bigger and bigger and to add more and more function to it, more and more capability. the answer is to have properly planned partnerships with the private sector. transport would be a good example. the most important single actor

and european security is probably dutch boy, the german railway sets would be essential to moving things through the center of europe and the crisis. so it's those kinds of partnerships and understanding it will probably have to spend more time. >> thank you. just turning to justine and heather, briefly, on the question of culture, any thoughts on the alliance is doing in maintaining its strategic culture? >> thank you. that is a very interesting question. i think that the alliance have harmonized to certain extent with regard to russia, russian goals and russian way of thinking, , but still we see tht some divisions and understand how to react to what rush is

doing against ukraine. i would give to back examples. i think that there is a difference, there was a difference in approaches on how, on what, i now the west should shape the strategy of most deliveries to ukraine. and i think there is division between the eastern flank and western europe together with the u.s., with western europe being more cautious, with setting red lines that gradually have been crossed but still are maintained. and with eastern europe being of the opinion that we should strive to give ukraine is what we can from the very beginning in order for them to put out brushes -- advance as possible. there's a few escalation that

has, that have been existing in the west that's not as present to a lesser extent in poland. domestic consequences offer russian defeat is much more present than on the eastern flank. and the understanding that russia needs to be defeated in order for peace to be maintained in eastern europe is strongly on eastern flank and not that much in western europe. so i think still we have different understanding how to deal with russia and russian aggression and what should be the instead of the war. so i see the first division between northeastern members of the lines in western europe together with the u.s. and the second division is a very interesting one and shows to me how difficult, how difficult situation we will have in europe if the u.s. withdraw.

then we have had exchange are positioned and statements between french and germany on french, on macron proposal on putting soldiers in ukraine. french understand is if there is less u.s. in europe, europe needs to step in. chairman's understand if there is less europe, less u.s. in europe we need to be very, very careful. >> thank you. we will have to continue some of this discussion into the break and a deceptive auto wanted to give heather one sort of last chance to make one last comment. >> i'll be very quick on what to make a quick observation of the history of strategic culture because you're asking an important question. are we seeing a convergence in strategic culture with the nato? the answer is yes and no. from a historical perspective these allies are now to buy shared history, why should

interest in things like democracy and rules-based international order that is carryforward over decades. on the other hand, there is not a convergence and allies are not in model list. and just to end with two, personal observations but when i moved moved to europe from the u.s., the most shocking to me is the proximity of war. war feels so much closer in europe. this was in 2010, 2009. at every british train station has etched in marble the names of the kids from that town who died in a war. that since the war is so close and that war can happen and it could be your neighbor, that feeling doesn't really pervade or sink in the way that it does in the u.s. and so that influence a strategic culture. and of the very quick observation, it is, the allies are not a model list. that was my observation when a move to europe. when he moved back here and being in washington i thought including leases the allies, the allies, the allies that there's only 32 opinions that to mention

the indo-pacific, within the 20 allies there are probably 100 opinions. from the u.s. perspective we still have a little bit of a historical hangup untreated allies as if there all the same it always speak in my voice. that effexor strategic culture as well. that something that are really am trying to push in my own work to have a better understanding of the allies on a much more granular level because ultimately that will strengthen the light to suspect that's a nice coda to the spat upon by the future of defense and turns and white has to continue to work. and it's all the members of the chisel the community and the wider world. so please join me, we're at the break time for lunch. please join me in thanking our panelists for providing us a very rich intellectual menu. [applause]