victory and such a one day that we sat there oh how on victory day we signed some kind of act on the surrender of russia well, it is possible, but i don't believe in such extreme options i know that i am not waiting for victory day i realized that i will bring it closer and that's why i started to make a farm and we continue school meals, and i open more restaurants, establishments . i help people. i will open it for the production of stewed kulish. spunder in cans to give to those in need. most of all, i do not stop because i know that i am bringing this victory closer with my actions. and when it i will say ok, because after the victory it will be even more difficult, because we will have to rebuild everything, and this is also such a job, you know, it is very important, even if it is more difficult, it is very important, that's why this answer is just a balm for my soul, because i am somewhere so-so , too well, maybe she took off there. we imagine it the same way. that is, it's not some point thing. and it's actually not to be afraid and to do what you love. because well, if you just lie

there and shake with fear, that's already and i think that 's exactly what it is. thanks to such people as to bring out their own by example, you show how it should be related to this, because, well, in the grand scheme of things, well, this is already a victory, this is already a victory, i thank you very much . it was so nice for me and i still hope that we will meet again somewhere together with you in a kyiv restaurant e- yes, in yevgena klopotenko's restaurant and let's eat together i already want to talk about you boykivskyi district for you i congratulate you on the espresso channel in almost six months of hostilities in ukraine the russian army lost more than 4,000 units of armored personnel carriers and infantry fighting vehicles this is extremely much and what can our the army will continue to ensure such dynamics

of destruction of the mobile component of the enemy's forces, or has the aggressor already made conclusions and actions? it is already somehow different on the battlefield, so understanding the features of the enemy's tactics, the capabilities of his equipment and weapons is extremely important for updating our approaches, how to further destroy the enemy, understanding where his vulnerable spots are this is what the following conversation is about. my name is serhii zhoritsa, the director of the information and consulting company defense express, and my interlocutors today are mykola salamakha, a retired lieutenant colonel a specialist in the field of bronte technique, a person who has unparalleled authority in the expert and military environment. mykola, i congratulate you. good evening. and now vyacheslav, a serviceman of the special operations forces of the armed forces of ukraine, greets you well . mykola, six months of war with the enemy are already behind,

did this period show anything new in the use of bmp and apc on the battlefield, what was and is the typical tactic of using this armored vehicle by the enemy, so 6 months of war have shown several things, the first thing about the tactics of use is that at all times combat the kopi machine is usually used to support the infantry offensive or to cement the enemy's defense against the enemy, i.e. as a means of fire that helps the infantry maintain a position from the water, a strong point, a popular strong point or a battalion defense area, or those times when infantry fighting vehicles were planned to be

used as e armored kulak when overcoming e-e territory on which strikes were made with the help of nuclear weapons faded into oblivion why because even the use of tactical nuclear weapons is e-e, according to specialists, it is not always leads to the achievement of those results that the command sets before itself, but at the same time, uh, this thing called tank support combat vehicles, which russia used for the first time on the territory of ukraine during the last uh, two months, showed that it was just about armored combat vehicles of this class of future protection, that is, the enemy faced the fact that the

protection of armored personnel carriers btr-80 btr-80a btr -82a infantry fighting vehicle first second and even third infantry fighting vehicle even the combat vehicle of the landing party 4 and the bmw 4m, they are not sufficiently protected in order to use them to break through the defenses of the enemy who uses modern anti-tank means. actually, it is a certain dark thing that we have seen in the last six months vyacheslav according to the general staff of the armed forces of ukraine on 17 on august 22, the enemy lost 4,162 vehicles of all types of vehicles in the category of bmps and apcs. what are the main methods used by

the armed forces to destroy these bmps and apcs? what does your practice and experience show? divide the experience into the beginning of the war and the modern one. the fact is that at the beginning of the war, the russians used combat vehicles to transport infantry for their parking lots, no, no, significant losses somewhere in the eye of the day of anti-tank missile systems. return the fire of manual anti-tank elements . very large parties that the russians suffered in wholes and against technology, they forced them to reconsider their approaches and now these machines are used both in a certain way and for experimentation designed as let's say make fire points, but

use them as supply vehicles. that is, where it is not possible to bring in some ural or kamaz or interphase protection, then pmp are used for this, that is, it is my own experience, when you can, they came in one of the recommended education to deliver ammunition there and take out wounded russians these ranks formed a column and one bmp, just as it was shooting to deliver ammunition and withdraw the parliament, that is, the record of this armored car, they are used not only as classic pmp and armored personnel carriers, but more armored vehicles, i.e. not as combat vehicles, but i am king of vehicles as mobile firing points, and if we talk about bmw mp3 and find 3 4 4m, then these vehicles are also used

as independent artillery, that is, they fire from closed firing positions, and this is also due to their own when according to our positions there are exactly three and bmd 4 engines, the fire of closed positions, well, that is, i am so -so, write it down on the artillery, they do not cause range support, mr. mykola, if it were possible to distribute according to such a rating in in s- ways impressions of the enemy's armored vehicles this is what we considered earlier on tanks, artillery against tank vehicles, guided unguided er-e kurdno-caliber machine guns, if before the destruction of armored vehicles, how is this er-e hierarchy of means of impressions distributed according to your estimates, that means during marches, it is still artillery during directly participating in hostilities, these anti-tank weapons, as well as our armored combat vehicles , those that we have in service, i.e., a

30-millimeter cannon, are quite enough to fight with similar systems in number and with combat infantry fighting vehicles 3 well, those of us with combat vehicles of the landing party are the fourth, that’s why there is a double assessment depending on where the enemy uses its armored combat vehicles , we should not even forget about the class of armored combat vehicles. we also include there are also multi- purpose lightly armored tractors, the so-called mt-lb and mt-lbv mtlbsh. well, the enemy also uses them in large quantities, and the armor there is no matter what. the frontal sheet of this one is only 8 mm long, that’s all - only 6 mm one more yes, it’s all for the hens to laugh. although

armored personnel carriers are also only 4 mm of tool steel, vyacheslav, and regarding the use of anti-tank weapons to destroy this category, about a car in the middle category by weight, guided e-e anti-tank guided missile defense systems stugna javelin unguided rpgs, what is the optimal strategy because when we saw that the javelin was used for light infantry fighting vehicles, sometimes the question arose whether the ratio of efficiency and cost in such duels was too much, but your assessment is exactly the use of guided and unguided arcgen in fact, it is a lightly armored vehicle. it can be hit with an rpg, as well as from anti-tank elements, that is, many times, many times, and the reactivity of anti-tank grenades is disposable for the domestic soviet production of western and so on, the successors of a single polymer in the principle of automatic gratuity, and so on. and so on, but on the

modern at this stage, the problem is that the russian bmps simply do not converge with our approach, there is a certain situation when they come into contact, but at least in our sector they tried the means i really, thanks to the nato e-e supplies, we have a colossal number of disposable electro- throwers, that is, there are 10 air assault special purpose units in each of the units. how do we have a large and huge number of means of short- range movement ? the shapes of the turns and not that they simply do not converge and even that e road safety, they landed under the photo at a considerable distance and remained in that to cross the development of the battle, i.e.

even at 2.5 km, our positions will not be suitable , so these letters are easter eggs that can destroy power lines in connection with the change, as well as the russians. they simply do not fit at this distance, and that is why the defeat of this technique is really used by anti-tank missile systems and er, is it so that you can say that they have few signatures and it is worth using it, but in fact, if during the russian offensive you managed to disappear, then this already significantly demotivates the opponent and they can turn away, so it would be it is more rational to use the older soviet selections of the patriarchy, those that were transferred

to the western partners, for example, milan, then they are capable of destroying any pmp or bmp of the russian army, not to mention an armored personnel carrier or an mtb or a wheeled e-e, wash the equipment there, features tigers and so on. so on. but in connection with the fact that you may have a statement in a specific place and well, it seems to me that there is no point in not shooting at the bmw. because if you managed to put two bmws, then the tanks may not go any further because they see that there are anti-tank divans that is, the situation is realistic for three weeks. unfortunately, the late comrade of his unit was seen burning a russian tank for others. they just saw everything. it was the first pansion of a tank attack. they simply ran away without

er -er. it is necessary to do as for other means, for example, artillery, but we can say that the soviet anti-aircraft guns hold up quite well to archeological shelling, again. my experience here is that i see how the bmp-1 got three close ones hitting 5-7 m with 155 mm projectiles, that is, being very close, but then they left, that is, even if the conditions are large enough, i will try the armor on - it can offend the landing detachment, which can be a desert, and hit it there, but not cross, which is a critically important element combat vehicle and it retains the ability to shoot, the impossibility of moving, therefore, there is artillery, let’s say so, for this we are talking about self-reinforcement, there are combat elements like the smart 155 on the shell of 2,000 if we

are talking about high-precision ammunition, they scale stands ee, well, it is very close to falling from an armored unit, then the classic artillery is, well , it is not effective enough for the impression of the armor of market equipment, it is even lightly armored as a pms-2 p. mykola, knowing you, you have a lot of experience in the use of anti-tank weapons, do you have additional details precisely because the use of these systems in the fight against enemy armored personnel carriers means that modern anti-tank guided missiles have the ability to attack either with a directed hit or attack from above. the use of the same mlav e-e against light armored vehicles, these are the same

mt-lb prometransporters, infantry fighting vehicles, allow them to be hit, including due to the high-explosive action of the accumulative warhead, so this is necessary for those who use e- against light armored vehicles e n-levels should always be remembered and not always attacked from above . any actions that the enemy can implement there on the battlefield, or whether there is enough saturation with anti-tank guided and guided and unguided means, it probably depends on how the command was able to organize the supply of directly anti-tank guided means and how it could organize combat training for so that

the personnel of the units were able to master the high- quality use of the equipment why because quite often we had operators who used one or another anti-tank control means could not hit the targets with the first shot you just need to conduct regular training, regularly conduct training, and such components as the use of mines to ensure the crossing of our areas of the front, the use of copters, how sensitive and important are they really for the destruction of enemy equipment, or are they so additional conditionally? what are your evaluations? vyacheslav life, the russians went to my site, they

blew up on their minefields here, that is, two tanks, two bmps blew up on their mines, it demotivated them, and they went to take them there someday and i literally returned now, we operated a copter with the help of collective-use documents from the american automatic grantomet mk-191 and fuel for all those that were blown up on video, which theoretically the russians could open and set fire to one, let’s see how serious it is, if it’s not serious enough, we will familiarize ourselves with it tomorrow , that is, such auxiliary means are copters , although they look like chinese toys in china, but the meat is essential to the chinese toy destroyed two industrial ones, one completely unambiguously one , let

's go down, press 52, it's you there b3, of course, i watched the video in detail, that is, a toy for $3,000, but a tank for $3 million is the result. yes, you can't base anti-tank defense on such means, but they are quite effective auxiliary means. are quite effective in further practice, unfortunately, quite a lot of equipment both from our side and from the russian side were blown up both on our minefields and on the russian minefields, that is, in principle, this is the problem of undermining one's own mines it exists on uh, it happens very often, medical system demining, units change, the facts of mine flights are not passed on, and yesterday the russians pressed a plastic one on these rakes, otherwise the equipment blew up on our squares , extremely interesting details, eh, now i still wanted to move on to the evaluation of samples of enemy equipment

used on the battlefield, and first of all , i would like to start with the most massive machine in the ranks of the enemy, this is the bmp-2, because actually all the main units there were equipped with this model bro which, by the way, the largest amount of destroyed equipment there just falls on the bmp-2, mykola, what is your assessment of this machine, are there any new things that the russians did with this model of equipment , or is it actually a standard model and nothing special to single out it is not worth saying that the russians understand very well the shortcomings of the bmp-2, the first is weak protection for the current period of development of armored vehicles, and the second is the defects of the main sight of the bmp-2, that’s

all there is - only 6 times during the day and 5 times at night for a 30 mm gun, this is not enough, because aimed fire from a 30 mm gun into an armored vehicle can be introduced using a similar technique at a range of up to 2 km, and since high-explosive projectiles can, in principle, be introduced at a range of up to 3 km, but e- the sight does not allow you to realize all the capabilities of the gun , that is why the russians went a bit modern to modernize the bmp-1 by installing a paste from the btr-82 armored personnel carrier there and the

so-called modernized bmp-1 and bmp-2 were already seen is equal to busurmany so, they were modernized no more than a hundred units, but they managed to light up and in the mountains suffered losses even among these machines, the sight is there. there is a better one. but, again, luckily for us, there are not two guns there. in terms of accuracy and accuracy, it is inferior to the 2a42 gun, that is, it was possible to compensate for the shortcomings of the sight, at the same time , it was not quite a smart decision, which led to the fact that the gun lost more capable weapons, but it lost the ability it had with the previous

version, vyacheslav or you had the experience of encountering russian bmp bmp 1, or are there any nuances in the design of additional security that the body is trying to implement in these most massive machines on the battlefield, let’s say direct and contact combat with the use of light anti-tank weapons, did not reach this, because now it’s the russians, well , let’s say so they don’t get close at close range, although there was a situation when, well, the russian landing forces stood against us, what was the situation, what exactly was the situation, do you know the anti-tank weapons, one gas, there were fewer units than they had about it, but they no nada they already went to the contact room for some reason to the deputies, the object, the settlement, they chose positions and believed that this would be an opportunity of the last days, but the situation was serious. and as for the modern application, that is, let's say, infantry transport that is unloaded at a considerable

distance, then here the russians do not use their weapons for close combat, i.e. in fact, this is an armored vehicle and if we talk about the russian defense unit bmp 1 and bmp-2, well, in principle, we have not a bad reservation in them vyacheslav communication we have a little failure there, then p- p- peremakolo. if we now move further along the line of enemy equipment, we will first of all move on to the most powerful model in the arsenal of the russian army - this is the bmp-3. captured if i'm not mistaken, what are your evaluations of this model, what is important in this machine, what are the vulnerabilities, at

the same time, there is also insufficient armor protection to use the third infantry fighting vehicle when storming our positions, because if the infantry goes, it is either in front of the infantry or in the ranks of the infantry or at a distance of 200-300 m. well, a maximum of 400 m. this is the soviet statutes, these are the templates that exist in the russian army, because the statutes have changed, but the main tactical indicators have remained. -e are practically the same or the use of e-e is a very serious advantage bmp holds a 100 mm e gun 2a 70 and if the crews are trained which are able to shoot e-e at the maximum range and the maximum range should be semi-direct and indirect fire m-m up to 7 km if there is

such an opportunity can be used. well, it all depends on the area where the battles are fought, and on how the tactical situation is formed and whether it is possible to use all the capabilities of confident combat equipment, but the machine is very serious in terms of firepower. why? because it has 30 -a millimeter automatic cannon and a 100 millimeter cannon, although it has a low impulse, that is, the speed of the projectile is not enough to use it as an anti-tank tool. but there are missiles that the so-called arkan anti-tank guided missile, which is also a salvo, is launched through the barrel and at a range of up to 4.5 km , this missile can also be used, and this is confirmation that the enemy

used the e-e bmp-1 bmp-2p3 with amphibious capabilities, crossing water obstacles precisely at the expense of the capabilities of the machine itself, because in view of the fact that there is added to such a reservation as cranes, it seems different. it seems that this component of amphibiousness is not needed at all today. am i wrong? er through there were intentions and there were attempts to cross siverskyi donetsk, including using amphibiousness and armored personnel carriers and infantry fighting vehicles, and one, two, and three other things that er, our units tried not to give such an opportunity, er, and the enemy understood that without rights heavy equipment , that is, without tank crossings, it is practically impossible to achieve success as a result of artillery or

other means, and there were also floating mines , destroyed pontoon obstacles, or rather crossings, and the equipment that tried to carry out the amphibiousness of the equipment burned whether on one shore or on the other. well, that is, the enemy did not reach the enemy, although the amphibious capabilities were used. kurgan's task in this, er, kurgan's march of the plant, the task is to switch from bmp 3 to the production of bmp-2, so what explains such a collision with the pernatik, that is, the good capabilities of bmp-3 well, we really have to agree with mr. mykola that bmp street

sufficiently weakly armored, that is, the strength, let’s say, this is the rote development path of bmw, that is, if you take it . the battery, those combat vehicles, they are used as self-propelled artillery, too, when the infantry, which was close to the battalion, were fired upon. they said that the change, that is, we after that

small and found, please, exactly 100 mm projectiles for bmp3 and then it turns out that it was bmp-4 because we then found it with the help of garbage , that is, how the train overlapped, a car with a powerful outsider can someone close the fire x goats that the bmw 3 has a very large batch and if we are talking about a self-propelled tool, it is better that money without us, it sounds like a vyryu, but as an infantry fighting vehicle to sleep in front of the bmp because the protection and that in the mp3 or in the pmp-2 it is insufficient, therefore a certain price go to more a cheap mass means of supporting infantry and transportation ie